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Abstract 
In this thesis I outline a political problem of positioning organisation theory. I 
maintain that there are projects of positioning, depositioning and repositioning, 
which articulate organisation in different political ways. To dialectically critique 
the politics of these projects I discuss the way philosophers of destruction, 
deconstruction and impossibility conceptualise the political event. I argue that 
these speculative philosophies share a political belief in the need to question and 
show the limits of the ways social reality is positioned in the realms of modernity, 
capitalism and `Empire', and explore possibilities of how the world might look 
different. I maintain that the politics of the positioning project is to turn 
organisation into the hegemony of management, which I show by engaging with 
the particular discourse of knowledge management. The politics of the 
depositioning project is to resist the hegemony of management in multiple ways; I 
discuss particularly how organisation theorists emphasise the precariousness, 
plurality and locality of processes of organising. Although the political resistances 
by the depositioning project are of great importance, I argue that there is a 
tendency to not link their politics to questions of hegemony, which I show to have 
certain depoliticising effects. In response to these failures, the politics of the 
repositioning project aims to repoliticise organisation theory by speculating about 
a new hegemony of social organisation. My engagement with the so-called 'anti- 
capitalist movement' and questions of its organisation and politics shows, 
however, that such an attempt of repositioning is itself an impossible or 
undecidable event. Nevertheless, I argue that it is precisely this political event of 
impossibility that calls for a speculative decision to be made; a decision, however, 
which will always fail to fully represent social organisation. 
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At the entrance to Dani Karavan's monument `Passages', Portbou, Spain 
Preface: The Passage Ahead 
To set the scene for the task ahead, let us begin by travelling back in time, by 
embarking on a little journey into the history books of modernity and its urban 
architecture. When Walter Benjamin fled from the German Nazis in the 1930s he 
set up his camp in Paris, which, for him, was the capital of the nineteenth century, 
the capital of early modernity. In his eyes the spatial and architectural symbol of 
Paris was the arcade, or in German Passage: 
"In speaking of the inner boulevards", says the Illustrated Guide to Paris, a complete 
picture of the city on the Seine and its environs from the year 1852, "we have made 
mention again and again of the arcades which open onto them. These arcades, a recent 
invention of industrial luxury, are glass-roofed, marble-paneled corridors extending through 
whole blocks of buildings, whose owners have joined together for such enterprises. Lining 
both sides of these corridors, which get their light from above, are the most elegant shops, 
so that the arcade is a city, a world in miniature. " (AP, 31, emphasis added) 
Benjamin was fascinated by the arcade because it presented him with the `world 
in miniature', a world that was characterised by the triumphal rise of the 
bourgeois class, technological industrialism and the commodity. Flanerie' or 
passing through the arcades in the 1930s was for him like a journey into the 
historical archives of capitalism, an encounter with the childhood years of 
modernity. He therefore embarked on a project, originally conceived as a fifty- 
The term `flanerie' is derived from the French 'fldneur'; see, for example, Gleber (1999). 
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page essay, that would preoccupy him until his death in 1940, when he committed 
suicide while fleeing from the Nazis. By that time the project had grown into a 
several hundred pages long, yet unfinished, collection of quotations from a vast 
array of historical and interdisciplinary material. Benjamin called this project 
Passagen-Werk (Arcades Project), which was thought to be a materialist 
philosophy of the history of modernity. It was, as Buck-Morss notes, "constructed 
with the `utmost concreteness' out of the historical material itself, the outdated 
remains of those nineteenth-century buildings, technologies, and commodities that 
were the precursors of his own era" (1989: 3). 
Benjamin distinguished three phases in the history of the arcades: their beginning 
in the first half of the nineteenth century when the arcade was a fairyland of trade 
with luxury goods; the phase after 1852, which was the year the first Parisian 
department store opened and in whose victorious path the arcade also transformed 
into a place where the commodity and its spectral other, the advert, ruled; and 
finally the period of the arcades' decline, which saw many arcades destroyed by 
Baron Haussmann, the moderniser of Paris, as he made way for grand boulevards 
by cutting through the traditional labyrinthine space of the city. By the time of 
Benjamin's writing the arcades had become the `graveyard' of modernity, where 
everything from palm trees to photographs and feather dusters to pocketknives 
was on sale. In their decline the arcades had transformed into a `flea-market' for 
the ruins of modernity, the material excesses of industrial and technological 
revolutions. Once glorious, pompous and triumphant palaces of wealth, by the 
1930s the arcades had become an `exhibition space' for the monstrous 
`achievements' of humanity's `progress', a space which displays ruins, a space in 
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which things collapse into each other and lose their traditional meanings. 
Although one could say that Benjamin was somewhat obsessed with the 
particularities of the Parisian arcades, for him their rise and fall was not an 
extraordinary phenomenon but an event that points to the ongoing crisis of 
modernity. For him, the arcade was a `world in miniature': the fall of the arcade 
was but one example of the wider processes of decline and discontinuity that 
characterise modernity. For Benjamin, then, the point of analysing the Parisian 
arcades was not only to understand their particular architecture, their spatiality, 
but also to position the arcade as a particular historical event. 
The Arcades Project's historical analysis of modernity was Benjamin's life 
project, which was cut short by his death in September 1940 when he is said to 
have committed suicide in Portbou, a small Spanish border town, while fleeing 
from the Nazis on his passage to join the Adornos and Horkheimers in America. 
Although the exact circumstances of his death remain mysterious, "it has 
generally been accepted that he took his own life, in despair at an impossible 
situation" (Brodersen, 1996: 256). It is said that he was carrying a big manuscript 
with him on this journey, which, unfortunately, was lost without trace. This 
manuscript must have been of high importance to Benjamin, otherwise, why 
would he have carried it on his tortuous passage across the Pyrenees? It is very 
likely that this was the manuscript of the Arcades Project. Thankfully he had left a 
copy with a librarian of the Parisian National Library, someone called Georges 
Bataille. It is thanks to Bataille that we, today, are able to have access to this vast 
collection of quotations and commentaries, which, however, was only edited by 
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Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser for the German publisher 
Suhrkamp in the 1980s. It was 1999 when it finally appeared in English. 
Thus, the Arcades Project has a special position in Benjamin's work; it is not only 
a close analysis of the passage to and from Parisian modernity but also symbolises 
Benjamin's own journey: the ambiguities of his life, his personal struggles, his 
passage from life to death. Benjamin was preoccupied with the Arcades Project 
for over fifteen years, years in which he lived in and travelled to numerous places, 
such as Berlin, Naples, Marseille, Ibiza, Denmark, London, Moscow and finally 
Paris. In these years he wrote some of his most important essays, such as `Theses 
on the Philosophy of History', `Charles Baudelaire', `Franz Kafka', `The 
Storyteller', `Surrealism', `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction', to name but a few. The Arcades Project can be seen as a collection 
of material from these journeys, these nomad-years; it is the product of a 
`personal' passage for Benjamin. However, one needs to be careful not to simply 
see the Arcades Project as a personal endeavour; it is not an arbitrary, subjective 
selection of texts. Instead, it is an analysis of how, under modernity, the 
`subjective' or `personal' is produced by particular historical forces. This is to say 
that, as much as the Arcades Project, the Passagen-Werk, was perhaps a personal 
passage for Benjamin, its main contribution can be seen to lie in the careful 
analysis and critique of modern production processes of `the personal' and 
offering possible routes, passages, beyond modern subjectivity. 
What is important to recognise at the beginning of this investigation, this thesis, is 
that, for Benjamin, the arcade is not just an architectural feature of Parisian urban 
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space. It is not only a transparent technology, made out of iron and glass, which 
suddenly appeared or was put there by a `higher' or `exterior' force such as a 
genius constructor or governmental decree. No, for Benjamin the arcade must be 
located, or positioned, in the historical realms of modem technics (Technik) or, 
what Heidegger (1977a) calls, the immanent technical `goings-on' of the modern 
Gestell, which could be translated as `emplacement' (Weber, 1996: 71-72; see 
also my discussion in Chapter One). In the terminology of Foucault (1970), the 
arcade can be seen as a product of the modern dispositi, f, which is an apparatus or 
organised assemblage of forces (Deleuze, 1988). According to Foucault, the 
modem apparatus is a historical, technical regime that organises relations of 
power and knowledge in such a way that they operate both at the `subjective' and 
`objective' level of reality. This is to say that, on one hand, an apparatus is 
produced by inter-subjective relations of power and knowledge - it is a particular 
historical social construction - but, on the other hand, as much as it is a product of 
social relations it also reproduces them as an `objective' force. This is to say that 
once the arcade made it onto the scene of modern reality it has played a defining 
role in the way the modern apparatus has been reproduced, organised and 
emplaced. One could say, then, that for Benjamin the arcade is a feature of the 
emplaced apparatus of modernity. On one hand, it is a specific product of modern 
power/knowledge relations, but, on the other, it also functions as a `machinery' 
that continues to reproduce and emplace reality in specific ways. 
One of Foucault's major concerns is to show that reality is not something that is 
constructed by active, conscious and intentional subjects but something that exists 
as power/knowledge regime outside the human body. In fact, for him the human 
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body, the subject, is a product of this modern apparatus - the subject is `folded', 
or emerges, out of the regime of relations of power and knowledge, as Deleuze 
would have it (1988,1993). For Benjamin, what emerges out of the Parisian 
arcade-apparatus is the fläneur, the bourgeois mane who strolls through the 
arcades to meet the mass of urban city folk and commodities through the `tactility' 
of his eyes and kinaesthetic feelings and imaginations. For Benjamin, the fläneur 
is the modern Parisian subject par excellence, because his experience is 
characterised by the `shocks' of the modern city: commodities, advertising 
images, anonymous crowds. The fläneur has a deep empathy with these `things' - 
his subjectivity is made up of these objects. Yet, for Benjamin (or Foucault for 
that matter), an analysis of modernity has to go beyond seeing the `subjective' and 
`objective' as mutually exclusive categories and, instead, analyse their dialectical 
interrelationship and co-determinacy. This is to say that for Benjamin the arcade is 
such a fascinating technology not only because of its specific architectural 
features - the iron-glass construction - but also because this very construction, 
this object, must be seen in relation to the emergence and reproduction of the 
modem subject itself. 
Sometimes Foucault's concept of dispositif, or power/knowledge regime, is seen 
as some sort of Orwellian superstructure that operates from a hidden position to 
control all aspects of modem life without leaving holes of resistance. In such a 
z The Parisian fldneur was indeed a man; a man in a full bourgeois wardrobe including a large 
hat, stick and cigar. To visualize the f[dneur, see, for example, Parkurst Ferguson (1994). The 
sexual bias of Benjamin (and Baudelaire, who is Benjamin's fldneur par excellence) has been 
challenged recently by feminist writers who argue that women, too, engage in fldnerie; see, for 
example, Gleber (1999), Wolff (1985) and Wilson (1992). Whenever I mention the flaneur in 
this thesis I will attempt not to reproduce this sexual bias. However, when I occasionally do 
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light the Benjaminian arcade, too, could be seen as the place where the modem 
subject is dominated, controlled and hence alienated by the emplaced structure of 
modem relations of power and knowledge. Whereas domination, control and 
alienation are clearly part of Benjamin's analysis of the `miniature' world of the 
fläneur, things are not that easily defined within the arcades - with Benjamin one 
is never quite sure who and what is alienated and who and what is alienating, or 
who/what is resisted and who/what is resisting. One could say, perhaps, that for 
Benjamin the arcade is a place of the `in-between'. 
This `in-betweeness' is architecturally manifested by the arcade's glass roof. One 
is not quite sure where the inside ends and the outside begins - the arcade is a 
mixture of the exteriority of the street and the interiority of the house. For 
Benjamin this `in-betweeness' has a profound effect on the fldneur and his way of 
experiencing reality. According to Benjamin, the fldneur reads reality not as a 
symbolic whole, but as a series of allegorical holes, as fragments and parts, which 
cut into each other. In this sense, the fldneur's walk through the arcade becomes a 
speculation, an experiment, in which things lose their function, meaning and 
definiteness. "The perception of space", says Benjamin, "that corresponds to this 
perception of time is the interpenetrating and superposed transparency of the 
world of the fldneur" (AP, 546). In other words, the world of the fldneur is 
characterised by a transparency that is not only created by the special architectural 
feature of the arcade, but also by the destruction of the symbolic space of 
traditional meanings. Thus, for Benjamin, the arcade is not only a particular 
refer to the faneur as a man I mean to point to the particular subjectivity Benjamin was 
concerned with when he studied the `goings-on' of the arcade in 19`h century Paris. 
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architectural construction but indeed a place of destruction, a place where there is 
no clear boundary between things and images, between inside and outside - it is a 
place beyond conventional organisational principles of reality. The arcade is a 
place where time and space are `out of joint', where reality is not a `whole' but 
has disintegrated into a collection of `holes' or fragments. 
Although Benjamin never used the concept of `destruction' as extensively as, for 
example, Derrida has used his `deconstruction', it nevertheless can be seen to be 
central to his philosophy. This at least is the view of Andrew Benjamin and Peter 
Osborne who, in 1994, edited a collection of essays on Walter Benjamin's 
philosophy entitled Destruction & Experience. For them, the concept of 
destruction points to "the destruction of some false or deceptive form of 
experience as the productive condition of the construction of a new relation to the 
object" (Benjamin and Osborne, 2000: xi). In this sense, then, destruction is not a 
getting rid of something - it does not necessarily imply that something 
is 
destroyed in the physical sense, although this can be involved too - but describes 
the condition for a radically new experience, a new knowledge of the object. In 
Benjamin's work `destruction' appears, for example, in his study of the 
emergence of the German mourning play, or Baroque tragic drama (OG7), where 
allegory destructs Greek symbolism and thus enables a new way of seeing, a new 
figuration of language, a new meaning outside traditional symbolic relationships. 
In his `Work of Art' essay (WoA) photography and film are seen to destruct the 
artwork's traditional aura, thus enabling new political possibilities for art. In 
Benjamin's view, technology does not destroy art; instead, it reconfigures 
it; 
technology opens new possibilities for a repositioning of art in relation to politics 
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and society. Equally, in his essays on language and translation (e. g. Ti) he sees 
translation as an act that destructs language in order to reopen the question of 
language, to enable the emergence of a new language which is yet unknown and 
unnameable - in Benjamin's view, translation brings about the death of language 
in order to ensure its survival. 
The difficulty with writing about a philosophical concept such as `destruction' is 
that it cannot be easily defined; or, rather, it cannot be defined. One cannot simply 
say `Destruction is X', because such a statement can itself be subjected to 
destruction. The point of destruction is that one can put any statement, any 
signifier-signified relationship into question - one can expose the deceptive 
totality of any knowledge by destructing it. Therefore, a concept like `destruction' 
resists definition. This is exactly the point Derrida makes in his `Letter to a 
Japanese Friend' in which he tries to explain the impossibility of defining 
`deconstruction': 
To be very schematic I would say that the difficulty of defining and therefore also of 
translating the word `deconstruction' stems from the fact that all the predicates, all the 
defining concepts, all the lexical significations, and even the syntactic articulations, which 
seem at one moment to lend themselves to this definition or to that translation, are also 
deconstructed or deconstructible, directly or otherwise, etc.... All sentences of the type 
`deconstruction is X' or `deconstruction is not X' a priori miss the point. (Derrida, 1991 a: 
274-275) 
What destruction seems to share with deconstruction - and I will explore this in 
more detail in Chapter Two - is a certain movement, a movement between 
negativity and positivity. This is to say, both concepts cannot be defined precisely 
because they are not entities, programmes or methods - instead, they are 
movements. The difference between method and movement is that a method can 
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be represented in a single position - the whole point of a method is that it can be 
reproduced in a predictable manner by returning to the same. This makes a 
method subject to controllability and examination. A movement, on the other 
hand, cannot be controlled; a movement always already escapes definability, 
predictability and examination. One could say, perhaps, that movement destructs 
methodological positions and turns their monuments into ruins. However, 
destruction and deconstruction are not simply negative movements - they are not 
simply eradicating or getting rid of something. Instead, they are affirmative. This 
becomes clear in Benjamin's short provocation `The Destructive Character'. For 
him, the destructive character, who is the embodiment of the movement of 
destruction, reduces things "to rubble, not for the sake of the rubble, but for that of 
the way leading through it" (DC, 303). The point of destruction thus is not to 
reduce everything to rubble - this would be a programme of pure negativity - but 
to find a passage through it, to find a way through death to affirm life. 
This thesis will attempt to be such a movement of destruction, such a movement 
between negativity and positivity, between death and life. However, it should 
have become clear by now that it cannot be the task of this thesis, nor of any other 
text, to define destruction. Perhaps one should therefore refrain from saying 
anything more about destruction, as this `about' already attempts to put 
destruction into a simple location from where it can be viewed and examined. 
Destruction is not something that is; instead, it is a movement. The vital task, 
then, becomes not one of defining destruction but of performing it. Benjamin's 
Arcades Project must be seen as such a performance. The Arcades Project is not 
an organised text that intends to provide a clear historical narrative of the Parisian 
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arcades. Instead, it is a montage, a disorganised collection of quotations from a 
vast array of interdisciplinary sources that does not attempt to integrate the 
presented fragments into a well-defined whole of meaning. The Arcades Project 
does not prescribe meaning; it writes meaning between the lines, as it were. In this 
sense, the project could never be finished - it is a movement that never ends. 
Yet, the destruction performed by the Arcades Project should not be mistaken as a 
celebration of fragmentation - Benjamin does not simply want to destroy things in 
order to disperse reality endlessly. The quotations of the Arcades Project are not 
arbitrarily organised; instead, they are positioned in such a way that a meaning 
springs out of them, so to say. Hence, the positioning of the quotations is of vital 
importance for Benjamin. The aim of the Arcades Project is not to subjectively 
celebrate the fragmentation of reality, but to arrange the destructed fragments of 
texts in such a way that a passage becomes visible, a passage that points beyond 
fragmentation, a passage that anticipates the future. For Benjamin the concept of 
destruction has an affirmative character: "`construction' presupposes 
`destruction"' (BGS V, 587; AP, 470). The point, then, is not to endlessly 
celebrate a movement of destruction but to find a passage through destruction that 
enables new possibilities of construction. To put it differently, Benjamin 
assembles a montage, a text full of `dead' quotations (dead, because they are taken 
out of their `original' contexts), not in order to celebrate death, but to find new life 
between the lines of deadly material. For him, the guarantee of life can only come 
through death; journeys have to go through death if they are to continue. 
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When Theodor Adorno last visited Benjamin in his exile in Paris in the mid 1930s 
to persuade him to join him on the passage to America, Benjamin apparently 
responded by saying: `There are positions to be defended in Europe' (Brodersen, 
1996: 245). At that time, with European Fascism on the rise and World War Two 
just around the comer, going into exile to America must have seemed to Benjamin 
like a path not worth taking precisely because the `moment of danger', the 
politically more important and intense constellation, was to be found in Europe 
and not in America. However, when his position in Paris, after several Nazi 
interrogations, finally became too precarious, he decided to embark on the journey 
down south to Spain and further on to Portugal, which would eventually take him 
to America. However, on his passage he was denied entry into Spain, which led to 
his suicide in the border-town Portbou in the night of the 25`h of September 1940. 
About only a month afterwards Hannah Arendt passed through Portbou and tried 
to find Benjamin's grave, but without success; his name was not written 
anywhere; he was added to the millions of nameless dead buried by the war. She 
describes her visit to Gershom Scholem: 
The cemetery faces a small bay directly overlooking the Mediterranean; it is carved in stone 
in terraces; the coffins are also pushed into such stone walls. It is by far one of the most 
fantastic and most beautiful spots I have seen in my life. (cited in Brodersen, 1996: 261) 
In 1994 the monument `Passages' was inaugurated in Portbou. I was lucky to visit 
it when I travelled to Spain in 2002. Its centrepiece is a tunnel, with rusty iron 
walls and a flight of narrow steps, cut into the cliff at the seaward side of the 
cemetery. Entering the tunnel takes courage, as one cannot precisely see where 
this dark passage leads to. Once inside one becomes claustrophobic; one is 
overwhelmed by a stifling feeling of being in danger, of being crushed to death by 
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the brute force of the rusty iron walls all around. Slowly one can make out light at 
the end of the tunnel; but it is not the expected safe haven, paradise, but the wild 
sea crashing against the rocks. The same white image is presented when one turns 
around and looks up to the entrance of the tunnel: the unreachable heaven with 
fluffy clouds dancing in the air. One feels trapped and lost: between negativity 
and positivity. Is this a passage or a dead end? Then, suddenly, a glass screen 
appears where before there was only the image of the uninviting sea. The glass 
blocks the passage toward the sea, but, at the same time, it is a diversion, a 
passage toward an elsewhere. Engraved into the glass is a single quotation from 
notes Benjamin took for his `Theses on the Philosophy of History' (BGS 1.3, 
1241), written in 1940, just a few months before his death: 
It is more arduous to honour the memory 
of the nameless than that of the 
renowned. Historical construction is 
devoted to the memory of the nameless. 
This, then, gives us an image of the task ahead. It is yet nameless. It is a passage 
into the void, into the dangerous unknown. It is a passage that is full of death and 
destructed buildings, ruins. Yet, it is not for the sake of the ruins that this thesis 
`destructs', it is for that of the passage leading through the debris, the rubble. This 
is the task of the critic: first, `things' and `beings' need to be destructed, this is the 
negative movement; second, the silence that is left behind by this destruction 
needs to be filled by an affirmative, constructive, speculative knowledge that can 
act as a political `hammer' in a particular constellation of time and space. This 
composes the `originality' of destruction, which, however, is not to be understood 
as a metaphysical beginning, but as an Ursprung, as the Sprung is a jump, a leap 
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into the future; like the knight jumps on a chessboard, it makes a pass, which 
might suddenly change the constellation of the game and enable a new experience. 
This originality is the passage from the past it springs from and the future it 
springs to. In this sense origin can never make sense; instead, it brings forth 
something, it is `worlding', in the Heideggerian sense (1962). Yet this new world, 
this new whole still lacks a clear language of understanding, a language that 
makes sense. Therefore, let me warn here of the dangers of the passage ahead. Not 
everything might be immediately comprehensible. And, as this passage does not 
know a beginning, it also does not have an end. It is endless; it must remain 
unfinished, because destruction cannot be defined as a finite project. It is infinite, 
even impossible, but it is precisely this impossibility that constitutes the 
affirmative possibilities of destruction. 
xxii 
After entering the tunnel of `Passages' 
1. Images of Organisation Theory 
I have started this thesis with a historical image of the Parisian arcade to 
tentatively indicate the passage that lies ahead of us. In this first, introductory 
chapter I will employ the above Benjaminian insights to broadly position this 
thesis in relation to the wider literature of organisation theory, which is the body 
of knowledge this thesis mainly aims to put into question. I will argue that there 
are three projects within the realms of organisation theory: positioning, 
depositioning and repositioning. The politics of the positioning project - which I 
will discuss in detail in Chapter Three - is that it mainly serves the contemporary 
hegemony of capital and management. Although the concept of `hegemony' will 
be introduced in the next section and discussed in detail in Chapter Two, we can 
note here that, based on Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) understanding, hegemony 
points to a certain unity in a particular social formation and the dominance of a 
social discourse in a particular historical constellation. Yet, for Laclau and 
Mouffe, this dominance can never be complete or total; instead, "hegemony 
supposes the incomplete and open character of the social" (1985: 134). 
Hegemony, then, is a concept that highlights the relative `closure' of social 
formations, which, nevertheless, remain `open' enabling a plethora of forms of 
dissent and resistance. 
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Within the realms of organisation theory the depositioning project - which I will 
discuss in detail in Chapter Four - has resisted the hegemony of the positioning 
project by generalising the concept of organisation and exposing the relations of 
power and knowledge that characterise processes of social organisation. This 
resistance has worked on many different registers, which is to say that the 
depositioning project is itself a multiplicity that cannot be located in a single 
place; it can thus not be represented and discussed in its entirety. Nevertheless, I 
will argue that there is a tendency in the depositioning project to conceptualise 
organisation as a local process, multiplicity and plurality which leads to the 
emphasis of `micro-political' resistances. Although these resistances have been of 
great importance, I will critique such depositioning discourses for not linking 
politics to questions of hegemony, which, in my view, has certain depoliticising 
effects. In Chapter Five I will therefore speculate about the possibilities of a 
project of repositioning which enables a repoliticisation of the terrain of 
organisation. Let me, then, introduce the projects of positioning, depositioning 
and repositioning in more detail. 
Positioning Organisation 
To introduce the problematic of positioning, let us start by reflecting on the word 
`position' itself. In my view this could not only help us to position `organisation' 
itself but also position this thesis in relation to the wider organisation literature. In 
German one possible translation for position or positioning is stellen, which in 
turn can be re-translated as to put, to set, to place, to bring forth, to present, to 
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figure. Hence, stellen is clearly a positive movement of bringing something into 
position. It can be seen as a productive movement as it is adding something to a 
particular space and time, which, in the realm of positivism, makes it subject to 
prediction, forecast and control. Before I consider the relationship between 
positioning and organisation, let me briefly consider some aspects of Heidegger's 
philosophy, which is particularly concerned with the problematic of positions and 
positioning. 
In his essay `The Age of the World Picture' Martin Heidegger (1977b) makes two 
fundamental claims: first, modernity conquers the world as image; and second, 
because the world is an image, the human being becomes subiectum, a subject. 
For Heidegger, the world-image is not an individual, psychological imagination, 
but a structured image, a Gebild. This structured image secures, organises and 
articulates itself as a worldview, it emplaces (stellen) being into a centred subject- 
position. This Gebild, this world-as-image, is the structured perception of the 
Gestell, the emplacement of modernity in a definite place. In Heidegger's view, 
modernity is continuously emplaced by modern technics, or Technik, a term which 
must not be reduced to technology. For him, modern technics is a term that does 
not just allude to the form of a particular technology (e. g. a power plant or an 
arcade) but to the wider processes of economic, cultural and political formation of 
society. Rather than being restricted to a certain technology, technics is a concept 
that highlights the general organisation of `the social' as such. Hence, technics is 
the ongoing emplacement, or positioning, of the human in relation to the world. 
What we see of this world is not the world itself but the structured image of this 
world. Thus, our seeing is based on the way the world is emplaced as the 
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particular regime of modern technics; modernity is characterised by the technics 
of imagining the world as an image which `securely' places the human being in a 
subject position. 
According to Sam Weber, this positioning, or emplacing, points to "the various 
ways in which everything, human beings included, is `cornered' (gestellt) and set 
in place" (1996: 72). However, emplacing is not simply a "placing of something 
but the staking out of place as such... A place that has to be staked out is one that 
cannot stand on its own. It must be defended" (1996: 71-72). An emplacement, 
then, can never be taken for granted. "Places must continually be established, 
orders continually placed. As emplacement, the goings-on of modern technics 
thus display a markedly ambivalent character" (1996: 72). What Weber names 
here `goings-on' is the translation of the German word Wesen, which is popularly 
translated as `essence'. For Weber (1996: 62), however, Heidegger is not so much 
concerned with the absolute origin or essential content of a phenomenon but the 
way something comes into place and continuously stays in place, which includes, 
as we have seen above, a continuous defending of that place. The term `goings- 
on' thus points to the process of emplacing a place, a process which is embattled 
and contested. 
According to Heidegger, then, positioning is inherently related to the question of 
organisation: the ordering and forming of social relations, the representation of the 
world, the subjectification of human beings. The word `position' points here to the 
fact that modem life is, to a large extent, about the attempt of putting `things' and 
`beings' into a definite and secure place. Notions like home or house, Heimat and 
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family spring to mind here - they are all closely connected to this modem 
emplacement, this modem form of organising `the social'. Another etymological 
insight might be of interest in this regard. The German stellen could be related to 
the Italian stelle or stars, which becomes significant if one remembers that the 
emergence of modernity is inherently related to the event of astronomy that 
enabled navigation at sea. At sea there is, of course, no `worldly' point of fixity 
which one could take as point of reference, as guiding position. Stars were the 
only tools the explorers of the Middle Ages had to guide them to foreign lands 
and, more importantly, to guide them back home, when their ships were full of 
exotic spices, slaves and gold. The reading of stars thus became an important 
organisational tool that emplaced Europe as colonial world power - an 
emplacement that is inherently connected to the entire event of modernity. 
Today the reading of the positioning of stars has been taken over by machines, 
namely the Global Positioning System (GPS), which guides not only ships but 
also cars and weapons (of mass destruction). 3 Today's most important stars are 
satellites which have a fixed position in the sky to send GPS and mobile phone 
signals, TV and radio programmes - information and communication flows that 
in-form the modem subject: 
Modern times: half a century after Columbus' four journeys, the orbited, uncovered, 
represented, occupied and used earth presents itself as a body that is combined into a dense 
weave of traffic movements and telecommunication routines. Virtual shells have replaced 
the once-imagined ether sky. Through radio-electronic systems the forgetting of distance is 
technically implemented in literally all centres of power and consumption. In aeronautical 
terms the earth is reduced to a aeroplane route of no more than fifty hours; satellite orbiting 
The so-called `precision weapons' that have been used by US American forces in the recent 
wars against Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq, are guided by GPS to reach their targets more or 
less accurately, it is said (MoD, 2002). 
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and Mir-circulation time units of ninety minutes and less are now standard practice; radio 
and light messages have pulled the earth together almost to a standing point - it rotates as a 
time-compacted globe in an electronic web that surrounds it like a second atmosphere. 
(Sloterdijk, 1999: 977, my translation) 
The modern subject is a being that is in-formed and emplaced, some might say 
entrapped. It is emplaced in an endless number of different technical systems that 
make it subject to surveillance, disciplinary control and predictability. The mobile 
phone, for example, one of today's most widespread technologies (at least in the 
First World), might give people a sense of freedom, because one can make phone 
calls from literally anywhere. Yet, this freedom is always already compromised by 
the ability of the mobile phone system to emplace its users in a grid of 
geographical, financial and social control. 
Taking Heidegger's philosophy of positioning as guideline, one could say that a 
lot of what is done in the name of `organisation' in educational and academic 
fields such as Organisation Studies, Organisational Behaviour, Organisational 
Development, Organisational Psychology, Sociology of Organisation, and 
Management and Business Studies is restricted to notions of organisation as form 
or secure position. Chia, for example, speaks of organisation as `simple location', 
that is, in his view, what we call `organisation', is usually reified, simply located, 
or positioned, as it were, as a "discrete, bounded, economic-administrative" 
(1998b: 6) entity. In other words, "[t]he noun `organization' is usually taken to 
refer to... some very specifically constituted formal organizations" (Parker, 2002a: 
183-184, emphasis added). It is this formality that characterises the discourse of 
organisation, or rather organisations. Hence, organisation is restricted to the realm 
of formal entities and institutions where social organisation seems always already 
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formed, predetermined and given. In such a view organisation is about the 
administration and maintenance of an ordered world that is characterised by clear 
divisions of labour, professionalism, bureaucracy and rational bodies that can be 
placed, measured and represented. As Cooper notes, the `normal' view of 
organisation is thus dominated "by a form of knowing that specifies the world in 
terms of increasingly particularized structures and grids" (1998: 137). It is guided 
by a "principle of simple location to `place' knowledge in knowable (i. e. coherent, 
self-contained) spaces" (ibid. ). In such a view, then, organisation is about the clear 
positioning of `things' and `subjects' into a simple, formal, hierarchical and well- 
bounded location. Thus, organisation as simple location, as positioning, is the 
positive emplacement (see also R. Munro, 2002) of knowledge into a predefined 
grid; this is the realm of positivism, something I will come back to later in this 
section. 
In this `normal' view, then, organisation is about the administration, or 
maintenance, of `the order of things', to speak with Foucault (1970). Hence, the 
debate in much of what can be called organisation theory is centred on different 
models of how to organise formal organisations most effectively and efficiently. 
This is the realm of pragmatism and management, which, as Parker notes (2002a: 
184), has become the dominant conception of organising nowadays. For him, out 
of a wide variety of potential organisational models, "it seems that the credibility 
of many aspects of these alternatives is being questioned through the generalized 
application of managerialism as the one best way" (ibid. ). He continues: 
The dominant conception of organizing nowadays rests on the application of three forms of 
management as a generalized technology of control. The increasing celebration of the 
managerial class, the application of managerial language to more and more `informal' areas 
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of life, and the dissemination of particular forms of expertise by the B[usiness] School, are 
all combining to produce a hegemonic model of organization. (ibid. ) 
The `market' provides the legitimacy for this hegemony of managerialism. As 
Parker argues further, this is not a national, regional or Western phenomenon. On 
the contrary, in his view, managerialism has become the universal organisational 
principle. This coincides with Hardt and Negri who argue that an `Empire' has 
emerged, which, for them, is a theoretical concept that points to the global, 
boundary-less organisational regime that `rules' over the entire `civilised' world 
(2000: xiv). Thus, the `hegemonic model of organisation', as Parker calls it, is 
characterised by a view of organisation that cannot be disconnected from 
managerialism and global capital. One could say that management is the 
hegemony of organisation. 
Now, as I mentioned above, when I here talk about `hegemony' I broadly refer to 
Laclau and Mouffe's usage of the concept; for them, hegemony points to the 
"unity existing in a concrete social formation" (1985: 7). This is to say, hegemony 
can be seen as a concept that highlights the fact that social reality is firmly 
positioned or emplaced within particular historical formations that endure over 
time and space. In relation to the positioning project of organisation, for example, 
one could say that management describes the particular way organisation and 
organisation theory has been positioned or emplaced in relation to the hegemonic 
discourses of capital. Capital and management are hegemonic because they 
continuously `corner' organisation, to use Weber's (1996: 72) expression; they set 
organisation into a particular place, a place which is continuously defended. 
However, according to Parker (2002a: 182ft), this particular positioning of 
8 
1. Images of Organisation Theory 
organisation does not take account of all the potentials of organising. One could, 
perhaps, say that, for him, the particular emplacement of organisation as 
management describes a `restricted economy', to evoke Bataille's term (1991). 
This, then, points to the second aspect of `hegemony': while Laclau and Mouffe 
maintain that the concept of hegemony refers to a certain unity in particular 
discursive formations, they also highlight that this unity can only be a contingency 
(1985: 65). That is, the apparent unity of dominant discourses, such as capital and 
management, is always already subverted by a multiplicity of alternative voices of 
organisation. Capital and management, then, are embattled phenomena that need 
to be continuously defended and emplaced in order to reproduce their position 
within society. 
As I will show in Chapter Three, in organisation theory the hegemony of 
managerialism is particularly apparent in the field of knowledge management, 
which has become one of the most popular organisation and management 
discourses over the past decade. Knowledge management is predominantly 
concerned, one could argue, with positioning individual and organisational 
knowledge within the restricted realms of management, which is always already 
connected to the wider `goings-on' of capital. That is, knowledge management is 
a particular management technique to further commodify social relations. What is 
particularly interesting is that business academia and the management world are 
both equally invested in the knowledge management phenomenon. As academic 
theory is increasingly pushed to be practically relevant to the business world, 
knowledge management is regarded as the ideal vehicle to cross the boundaries 
between theory and practice (e. g. Gibbons et al., 1994). It is clear that within such 
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a view knowledge is always already restricted to the hegemonic interests of 
managerial institutions: knowledge is seen as something that can be commodified 
and exploited for the reproduction of a particular value system. 
What the example of knowledge management also highlights is the fact that the 
concept of organisation is usually reserved for the description of what is going on 
inside and around managerial institutions, companies and workplaces. That is, 
organisation seems clearly positioned and defined as a formal entity within 
established structures of modernity and capitalism. As Cooper notes, the academic 
discipline of organisation studies can be seen to be "almost naturally disposed to 
expressing itself in structural terms, where structure becomes an end in itself" 
(1976: 1001). Thus, organisation is usually taken for granted as the unit of 
analysis, as an object of study that can be identified, encircled, then grabbed and 
finally fully exposed to the mechanisms of the academy's `critique'. Within such a 
framework, the role of organisational scientists is to study the structures, forms 
and institutional processes, as well as the behaviour of people within these 
organisations, for which they have developed scientific frameworks, theories and 
concepts. As Burrell poetically notes, "[i]n this they have forced organizational 
analysis on to a procrustean bed on which it groans and squirms because it is not 
the right size to fit the cramping framework into which it is being pressed. Yet the 
forcing goes on. " With such an approach, so he goes on, the subject of 
organisation is made into an object that is pressed "into an understandable and 
simplifying framework. This, after all, is what science does.... Science begins by 
placing the perpetually dynamic into a field of stasis" (1997: 18, emphasis added). 
This is echoed by Dale (2001) who links the event of organisation to modem 
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disciplines such as medicine which have to anatomise the human body in order to 
make it subject to study and intervention. In her view, the body of the modern 
subject is one that is `under the knife': it is positioned on a deathbed in order to be 
dissected and divided. What Dale thus spells out is that the body's positioning, 
that is, its positive emplacement in the modern world, is always already connected 
to its simultaneous death: the body has to be killed in order to be `positively' 
recreated as modern subject. 4 
What I have argued in this section so far is that the event of modern organisation 
is inherently connected to the positioning of being in an anatomised, increasingly 
managerial grid, which literally kills the body in order to construct a structured 
image of the modem subject. In such a view, organisation is a positioning exercise 
- the military connotations of such a conception of organisation are obvious. Pace 
Bataille (1991), one could see such a theory of organisation to be dependent on a 
`restricted economy'. This is to say, what is usually done in the name of 
organisation, in organisation theory and elsewhere, is restricted to an economy of 
positioning that is committed to `securely' emplacing things and subjects into 
formal, managerial, linear, static, hierarchical locations which enable modem 
organisational phenomena such as positivism, pragmatism, representationalism, 
institutionalism and managerialism. Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) as well as 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) - and many authors since then - have argued that this 
formal and rational view has become the predominant ideology of organisation 
4 This is not to say, however, that a `positive' recreation always has to follow the negative 
movement of 'killing the body'. The event of the Holocaust shows that modem organisation is 
fully capable of turning into a machine of absolute negativity; see, for example, Bauman's 
(1989) argument about the role of institutional bureaucracies in the organisation of the 
Holocaust. 
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theory. This ideology accepts that organisation theory is something that positively 
posits knowledge within established grids of a scientific-managerial field, which 
is mainly concerned with "providing explanations of the status quo" (1979: 26). 
Today, the critique of positivism seems well established in certain circles of 
organisation theory. One could even maintain that this critique itself has become 
the dominant discourse, which, in turn, simply assumes the continued dominance 
of positivism. As Fournier and Grey write: "the positivism of the mainstream is 
rarely explicitly argued for and defended (see Donaldson, 1996 for a rare 
exception). In general, some (often rather weak) version of positivism is simply 
assumed" (2000: 19). In their view, then, `positivism' and `the mainstream' are 
often treated as imaginary signifiers used by `critical' researchers to legitimise 
their work. Having said that, one should not nullify or downplay the danger of 
positivistic organisation theory, which continues to be a dominant orthodoxy. The 
way `Donaldson', for example, has become the scapegoat for many `critical' 
scholars and a signifier that one can pick out and rubbish characterises this 
danger. Just because Donaldson is one of the (last) few explicit defenders of 
positivism, one should not assume that the field of organisation theory at large has 
fundamentally gone beyond positivism. One could argue that Donaldson 
continues to be given space in organisation theory because the field at large is still 
positioned along the lines of positivism. 
Positivism is usually referred to as epistemology, as a specific way to construct 
knowledge about the world. For Burrell and Morgan, for example, positivism 
seeks "to explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for 
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regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements" (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979: 5). However, taking the philosophy of Heidegger into 
consideration, which I have discussed above, one could suggest that the project of 
positioning organisation, although very closely related to the specific intellectual 
discourse of positivism, points to something much broader than positivism. 
Positioning is not only an epistemological method of constructing knowledge. 
Following Heidegger, one could, instead, argue that it works at the level of the 
ontological. This is to say that positioning is concerned with the emplacement of 
modem being and life itself, and not only with the knowledge of such an 
emplacement. For example, when Burrell and Morgan and other critics argue 
against the epistemological method of positivism, they still produce their critique 
from within the modem apparatus of positioning. That is, their book, Sociological 
Paradigms and Organizational Analysis, can be seen not only as a positioning 
exercise (they position social and organisation theory within four paradigm 
boxes), but also as a product of the modern emplacement, the technics that 
organises life and aims to put everything into a formal, hierarchical position (e. g. 
the book is the product of an academic institution). Therefore, when I prefer the 
terminology of positioning over positivism I mean to suggest that the positioning 
project of organisation does not only have implications on the level of 
epistemology; instead, positioning points to the ontological dimension of modern 
technics - it emplaces reality and thus life itself. 
As already noted above, in the language of Foucault this modern technics of 
positioning is an apparatus, which must be seen as a particular power/knowledge 
regime that organises modem social relations from within. Foucault also refers to 
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this organisational regime as discourse (e. g. 1970,1972), which, for him, is not 
simply a language but indeed a structuring principle of social reality as such. 
Discourse, as the structuring apparatus of reality, produces the subject through 
various disciplinary `micro-techniques' carried out by institutions such as prisons, 
hospitals, schools and asylums. These positioning techniques can take various 
forms, for example, examining, evaluating, observing and recording. For 
Foucault, these techniques act as bio-power in the sense that they in-form our 
subjectivities and bodies: the modem apparatus is a `machine' that produces 
specific subjects and bodies through a range of disciplinary `micro-techniques'. 
Hardt and Negri (2000) take up Foucault's concept of bio-power to assert that 
today these disciplinary `machines' are not confined to specific institutions 
anymore but, instead, organise the entirety of life. This does not mean that 
disciplinary institutions, such as the police, disappear, but that their powers extend 
far beyond individual institutions to increase their overall pervasiveness and 
ability to control larger aspects of life: today life itself has become the object of 
policing (I. Munro, 2002). Hardt and Negri thus talk about the coming of a control 
society that positions all life within the organised networks of `Empire'. This 
leads them to claim that `there is no more outside' of the contemporary 
emplacement precisely because `Empire's' bio-power positions life itself. 
This bio-power should, however, not be seen as something that organises life in 
totality. For Foucault, modem relations of power and knowledge are not 
totalitarian regimes in the sense that there are no holes of resistance against 
dominant modes of emplacement. Instead, Foucault claims that "where there is 
power, there is resistance" (1998: 95). Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe argue that 
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"there is no single underlying principle fixing" mechanism through which `the 
social' can be constituted (1985: 111). Instead, for them, society is something that 
is inherently open and characterised by a field of difference. This also implies that 
their term `hegemony' does not point to totalitarianism; instead, hegemony 
describes the dominance of a discursive regime. Applying Foucault's term of 
discourse, Laclau and Mouffe argue that every discourse is characterised by, what 
they call, a `field of discursivity' which is a `surplus of meaning' that subverts the 
very discourse it is emplaced in (ibid. ). Within such a view, then, one could say 
that the hegemonic positioning forces of modernity can never be all- 
encompassing; the modem structured image, Heidegger's Gebild, can never give 
us a full picture of reality as there will always be a shadow in that very image. 
One could thus say, perhaps, that those forces that seek to fully position or 
emplace reality will always be accompanied by forces of subversion or 
depositioning. 
Depositioning Organisation 
Over the past two decades there have been important developments regarding the 
attempt to broaden the concept of organisation and formulate a critique of 
restricted economies of organisation that have been dominating organisation 
theory and other fields of enquiry. Authors, whose work, maybe problematically, 
has often been described as `postmodern', have increasingly been arguing that 
social reality is not something that is fully organised and neatly locatable within 
structured grids (e. g. Cooper and Burrell, 1988; Chia, 1995; Hancock and Tyler, 
2001a; as well as the contributions to Reed and Hughes, 1992; Hassard and 
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Parker, 1993; and Linstead, 2003). It has been their concern to go beyond 
restricted notions of organisation as a form and argue for the conception of 
organisation as a social formation process that is characterised by heterogeneous 
forces of power and knowledge. Rather than being restricted to the effective and 
efficient management of modern forms of positioning, their work has attempted to 
develop, what Chia calls, a `social theory of organization' which does not neglect 
"the wider questions of the organizational character of modern social life" (1998b: 
6). These authors, then, have attempted to `open the field' of and for organisation 
(Cooper, 1976), which might enable us to imagine what could be called, pace 
Bataille (1991), a `general economy of organisation' that is not restricted to the 
management of organisations but indeed more interested in organisation as a 
`basic' social process. Instead of a noun, which points to the managerial and 
institutional aspects of organising, organisation has increasingly been seen as an 
ongoing process "that occurs within the wider `body' of society" (Cooper and 
Burrell, 1988: 106), a process that is characterised by heterogeneous and contested 
forces of positioning and depositioning, organising and disorganising (Cooper, 
1990). 
What has thus been argued is that there is a need to go beyond restricted notions 
of the organisation of positioning, which include the organisation of economic 
production and prediction, and move towards a `general economy of organisation' 
that would point to, what Cooper and Burrell (1988: 106) call, the `production of 
organisation'. This notion of a `production of organisation' could be seen as the 
questioning of the position of organisation - it is a dislocation, 
displacement or 
depositioning of traditional conceptions of organisation. However, what Cooper 
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and Burrell have in mind is not simply an invention of another (economic) logic 
of organisation; it is not another organised territory. Their depositioning of 
organisation does not only question organisation as an economic object but also 
the presence of words such as `organisation' and `position' themselves. 
Depositioning, then, can perhaps be understood as a movement which claims that 
"every position is of itself confounded" (Derrida, 1987: 95, emphasis in original). 
Derrida calls this movement differance, which is a concept that questions the idea 
of a full presence of phenomena such as `position', `organisation' and, instead, 
sees their meaning to be continuously deferred, postponed in space and time. 
Differance thus points to a certain undecidability over the presence of objects of 
reality, such as `position' or `organisation'. Differance questions the basic 
presence of any position and organisation; it puts into doubt and resists the reality 
of organisation that is continuously produced by the `goings-on' of the modern 
positioning project. 
What has thus been under way in organisation theory, at least since Cooper's 
seminal essay `The Open Field' (1976), if not before, is a putting into question of 
the established positions of organisation. This questioning has not only been a 
critique of the restricted economic rationality of dominant forms of organising, 
but has indeed generally exposed the precarious and undecidable nature of 
positions of reality that are taken for granted. 
The old theatrical organization has become unjustifiable, [it] is no longer answerable to 
anyone; the old phantoms called the author, the reader, the director, the stage manager, the 
machinist, the actor, the characters, the spectator, etc., have no single, unique, fixed place 
(stage, wings, house, etc. ) assigned to themselves by themselves, except in the 
representation they make of it to themselves, of which an account must be given. That is 
where the story (history) will have taken place, if it takes place, where something will have 
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been seen, recounted, summed up as the meaning or presentable substance of the book... 
Any attempt to return toward the untouched, proper intimacy of some presence or some 
self-presence is played out in illusion. (Derrida, 1981: 296-297) 
One could thus say, perhaps, that within the realms of the depositioning project 
established positions of organised reality have been exposed as being inherently 
theatrical; that is, they have been shown to not have a single, unique or fixed place 
(or stage) - their representational structures have been turned into liquid flows. 
The outright positivity of the organisation of reality has thus been put into doubt; 
the presence or position of organisation has been exposed to a negative movement 
of disorganisation. What has been questioned are common sense perceptions of 
organisation that seem to be "unable to recognise the obvious point that every 
positive - that is, positioned - object or event depends for its existence on a 
negative background that cannot be made obvious" (Cooper, 2001a: 336, 
emphasis in original). Organisation has thus been depositioned; it has been 
exposed as "a process of undecidability that pervades all social organization" 
(Cooper, 1990: 182). 
Cooper points here to Derrida's (e. g. 1987) concept of `undecidability' - to be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Two - which implies that depositioning 
is not 
a fixed signifier or something that has clear boundaries; instead, it is a multiplicity 
that works on a host of different registers. It can thus not be the task of this thesis 
to discuss all approaches that have been challenging and subverting dominant 
conceptions of organisation - if this were at all possible. If Foucault's claim about 
the interdependency and simultaneity of power and resistance is true, then forces 
of positioning and organisation are always already accompanied by a multiplicity 
of forces of resistance. This is also highlighted by Cooper (1990) when 
he 
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maintains that processes of organisation always already depend on processes of 
disorganisation. Within such a view, then, organisation is an inherently 
undecidable process. As I will discuss in Chapter Four, the concept of 
undecidability is used by some organisation theorists to emphasise the plurality 
and relativity of organised reality (e. g. Hassard, 1991). For Derrida (1987), 
however, the notion of undecidability is not a celebration of plurality and 
relativity (see also Jones, 2003c). Instead, undecidability calls into question the 
very way one makes decisions, or, rather, how one often does not really make 
decisions at all, because many so-called decisions have already been decided 
beforehand. According to Derrida, undecidability does not mean that one can 
never make a decision. As Jones (2003c) argues, in Derrida's view, one must 
make a decision, which is to say that one must not only continuously deposition 
but, indeed, find a position to critique society. As I will argue in Chapter Two, 
this decision involves a certain closure of the infinite possibilities that are opened 
up by, what Laclau (1995: 93) calls, the `structural undecidability' of society. 
Part of my critique will be that, although many discourses in organisation theory 
are very effective in depositioning established forces of positioning, by showing 
the undecidability of all organised phenomena, very little has been done to 
reassemble the remaining fragments in order to politically speculate about 
possibilities of decisions that could, perhaps, reorganise and reposition society. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), such decisions have to involve the 
question of hegemony, a concept which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 
Two. As I have already mentioned, the concept of hegemony points to the view 
that there are social discourses that dominate reality. That is, although society is 
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`structurally undecidable', Laclau and Mouffe maintain that there are hegemonic 
discourses that can be seen as social decisions about how to organise social 
reality. In the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 54), one could say that 
hegemony is possible because forces of deterritorialisation are reterritorialised on 
a level of an abstract signifier. This is to say, although reality might be described 
by a multiplicity of local forms of life and a host of depositioning discourses and 
deterritorialisations, there are forces, according to Deleuze and Guattari, which 
always already reterritorialise everything. As I will show in Chapter Three, capital 
is such a hegemonic `machine', which - although it makes possible all sorts of 
deterritorialisations - always already reterritorialises these deterritorialisations on 
the level of the specific value system of commodity production. 
In Chapter Four I will argue that there is a tendency for some depositioning 
discourses to not adequately deal with hegemonic forces such as capital. What is 
sometimes emphasised by organisation theorists, for example, is the social 
construction of reality within local communities. That is, rather than discussing 
and critiquing social discourses that endure over boundaries of time and space, 
social constructionists often highlight the multiplicity and plurality of local truths. 
Weick (1979,1995), for example, emphasises, what he calls, `sensemaking' 
processes through which people negotiate their social realities on `the ground' of 
organisational communities. For him and other social constructionists, reality is 
constructed by `muddling through' problems on the ground and renegotiating 
one's social place at every second. While such a view must generally be regarded 
as an important political resistance against those universalising discourses that 
always already position everything within predefined categories, I will critique 
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such a `depositioning strategy' by arguing that there is a danger for local forces to 
be simply swallowed up and neutralised by established discourses of capital and 
management. In fact, I will show that capital can be seen as a hegemonic 
`machine', whose production depends on local depositioning or deterritorialisation 
forces that ensure the plurality and multiplicity of social construction processes. 
Precisely because this hegemonic aspect of reality construction is not always fully 
recognised by depositioning discourses I will argue that the emphasis on local 
processes, plurality and undecidability can have certain depoliticising effects. 
Repositioning Organisation 
So far I have set up a dialectical constellation of projects of positioning and 
depositioning in organisation theory. I have argued that the positioning project 
embodies the hegemony of management, which emplaces organisation within the 
realms of capital. I then introduced the idea that many organisation theorists have 
resisted the dominance of the positioning discourse by engaging in a project of 
depositioning organisation, which often emphasises the plurality and multiplicity 
of local truths. While this depositioning of established positions and truths of 
organisation theory has been politically important, I pointed to the dangers of 
depoliticisation that are inherent to the depositioning project. 
Before I introduce the project of repositioning organisation, let me briefly discuss 
the difficulties one might encounter by setting up a dialectical triad like that of 
positioning, depositioning and repositioning. The first thing to note is that 
`dialectics' is not a fixed category or universal method; instead, it is a contested 
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concept that has been used in many different ways (for a discussion of some 
dialectical approaches in organisation theory, see, for example, Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Carr, 2000; Hancock and Tyler, 2001a, b; Reed, 1996; and 
Willmott, 1990). Dialectics is often attributed to Hegel for whom, according to 
Burrell and Morgan, "the dialectic stresses that there is a basic antagonism and 
conflict within both the natural and the social world which, when resolved, leads 
to a higher stage of development. This dialectical process is seen as a universal 
principle, which generates progress towards the state of `absolute knowledge"' 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 280-281). Within such a view the dialectical process 
is seen as the bringing together of antagonistic categories, thesis and antithesis, in 
order to produce a new, progressive synthesis. This synthesis is thought to be a 
new unifying totality that signifies a higher state of development or, what Hegel 
called, `absolute knowledge'. As Carr writes, "the familiar triadic structure of 
Hegelian thought... represents a process wherein the synthesis absorbs and 
completes the two prior terms, following which the entire triad is absorbed into 
the next higher process" (2000: 213). Hegel's understanding of the dialectic has, 
of course, been read in many different ways. Without going into a discussion of 
the history of dialectical thought and the manifold interpretations of Hegel - for 
example, those by the so-called `right Hegelians' and `young Hegelians', who 
derive their legitimacy from different ways of reading his work -I would like to 
suggest that for Benjamin the dialectical process does not necessarily have to be 
linked to notions of historical progress. Instead, for him, the dialectical process - 
similarly, perhaps, to `destruction' or `deconstruction' - is better understood as a 
kind of open-ended movement between negativity and positivity, something 
which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Two. 
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For Benjamin, a dialectical process does not bring essential historical categories 
into opposition in order to bring about a `higher stage' of development. For 
example, he is very critical of some aspects of Marx's thought, which he sees to 
be indebted to a conception of history as `progress' (e. g. BGS 1.3,1232). Instead 
of seeing dialectics as a tool to bring about `progress', Benjamin sees time coming 
to a standstill in the `dialectical image' (BGS V, 576-577). This `dialectical 
image' does not narrate history but presents fragments of a historical experience. 
It is this anti-narrative showing of historical images of modernity which makes his 
Arcades Project so unique. Benjamin thinks that this halting of the progressive 
continuity of history is needed to politically intervene in a specific situation. What 
I would like to suggest here is that the categories of positioning and depositioning 
are not essential historical categories that seek to be progressively superseded by a 
category of repositioning. Instead, what I aim to construct in this thesis is a 
`dialectical image', a constellation, which presents fragments of a historical 
experience. This experience is `subjective' in the sense that it is presented by an 
author. However, as I will explore in Chapters Two and Three, this should not be 
misunderstood as the resurrection of the agency of a fully intentional and 
voluntaristic subject. Instead, this `subjective' experience has been produced 
within the `objectivities' of wider social relations of reality. So, the `dialectical 
image' constructed here is both `subjective' and `objective'. For Benjamin, it is 
precisely this coming together of the subject and the object in a momentary 
constellation, an event, which opens up possibilities of political intervention. And 
Benjamin is quite clear about the political ends of such an event: it is aimed at the 
destruction of the `eternal image' of history, the destruction of the continuous 
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history of those in ruling power (TPH, 254). This destruction thus challenges 
those images and discourses of history which are taken for granted and 
continuously emplaced by dominant forces of positioning. However, Benjamin's 
destructive-dialectical constellation is not only negative. It aims to be affirmative 
by seeing those historical images that have been forgotten or marginalised (BGS 
1.3,1236). This is to say, the political event of destruction seeks to halt the 
continuities of history in order to make visible marginalised images of history that 
could, possibly, enable political re-cognitions and new experiences of reality. It is 
such an understanding that I have in mind when I talk about possibilities of 
repositioning. 
In Benjamin's view, then, a project of repositioning should not be about 
`progress'; for him this would simply be a reproduction of established historical 
continuities. Instead, his dialectical approach speculates about a political event 
that would disrupt and discontinue `eternal images' of history, which are always 
already reproduced by those in power. For Laclau and Mouffe (1985), such a 
disruption of the `normal' course of history is possible because society itself is 
impossible; that is, society and thus history can never be finished. In their view, 
this notion of impossibility points to the fact that hegemonic social relations can 
never be all-encompassing; hegemony can never be a totality that could provide 
us with a full picture of society and history. Disruptions, resistances, 
discontinuities or depositionings are therefore possible. As I argued above, the 
depositioning project in organisation theory is characterised by a multiplicity of 
political resistances against the positioning project of organisation. According to 
Laclau and Mouffe, these resistances are the `field of discursivity', which is a 
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constitutive, yet subversive, part of every discursive formation (1985: 111). 
Within this view, one could say that the depositioning resistances in organisation 
theory both constitute the positioning hegemony and subvert that very hegemony 
at the same time. The depositioning discourses thus describe the possibilities of a 
different reality; yet they are also embedded in and subsumed by the hegemony of 
positioning. 
In the language of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), one could maintain that the 
depositioning discourses, or deterritorialisations, are immediately reterritorialised 
by dominant forces of reality. For them, capital is a `successful' social 
`machinery' precisely because it makes possible a multiplicity of resistances and 
deterritorialisations, which, however, are immediately subsumed, or 
reterritorialised, by dominant signification systems. Hardt and Negri (2000) use 
this insight to conceptualise, what they call, `Empire', or today's globally 
integrated capitalism, as `non-place', a term borrowed from Auge (1995). For 
them, `Empire' does not exist in one place, that is, in one totality that can fully 
represent `the social'; instead, it is a dynamic system of "radical contingency and 
precariousness" (2000: 60). `Empire', then, is an open system that allows room 
for multiple identity politics and resistances. In Hardt and Negri's view, however, 
this openness is a particular one; that is, this openness works towards specific 
ends. They argue that this deterritorialised openness of `Empire' is always already 
reterritorialised along the lines of the stratifications of capital. In such a view, 
then, capital is a deterritorialisation force that reterritorialises all deterritorialised 
fragments along the particular lines of its value system. 
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Applying the above insights to the problematic of this thesis, one could thus 
suggest that the depositioning discourses of organisation theory do not stand in 
opposition to the positioning project; instead, they are an immanent part of it. 
When, for example, some depositioning authors celebrate the processual and 
plural character of organising, one could claim that they describe the way capital 
works today. In this sense, the resistances of the depositioning project can be seen 
as being a constitutive part of the positioning project. This, then, becomes a 
problem if one is concerned with the way capital and the entire positioning project 
works today. That is, if resistance is always already a constitutive part of today's 
regime of power and knowledge, how is it possible to imagine a different, 
repositioned regime of social organisation? In this thesis I will argue that a project 
of repositioning organisation should be understood as an impossibility. For Laclau 
and Mouffe, the concept of impossibility does not point to a nihilistic or 
relativistic understanding of social organisation. Instead, they maintain that the 
impossibility of society opens up possibilities for reconstituting social reality. 
This is to say, if it is impossible to fully constitute society - that is, if society as 
totality is impossible - it must be possible to organise a different hegemony of 
society. Now, such a project of reconstitution or repositioning is also immanent to 
society. The difference to the depositioning discourses is, however, that the 
repositioning project is not only about resisting realities of social organisation that 
are taken for granted; instead, it aims at exploring some new `principled positions' 
(Squires, 1993) along which `the social' can be constituted. 
Within the realms of organisation theory, attempts have been made recently to 
critique the depoliticising effects, which are sometimes produced by depositioning 
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discourses and explore possibilities of repoliticising the terrain of organisation 
theory. For example, it has been Parker's (e. g. 1995,2002a, 2000b) consistent 
attempt to point to, what he calls, the "dangers of postmodernism" (1995: 553) 
and offer ways to engage with organisation more ethically and politically. For 
him, "we have a responsibility to be clear about why we wish to tell a particular 
story in a particular way and that is essentially the arena of politics". He goes on 
to say that "ethics and politics are essentially ways of saying `I think the world 
would be a better place if such and such were the case'. This necessarily means a 
disagreement or agreement with the ethical-political claims of others, a process 
for which postmodemists are tactically ill-equipped" (1995: 558). Although, in 
my view, one has to be careful with referring to the signifier `postmodernism', as 
it has been used and misused in many different ways, one could generally say that 
Parker is deeply suspicious of the depoliticised nature of, what I have named here, 
the depositioning project (see particularly 1995,1999,2002a, 2003). 
Other writers, too, have, as Fournier and Grey (2000: 21) put it, attempted "to 
sever the logical link between epistemological and moral or political relativism" 
and "re-infuse critique with some degree of political engagement" (e. g. 
Armbruster and Gebert, 2002; du Gay, 2000a; Grey, 1996; Jones, 2003c; Reed, 
1997; Thompson and Smith, 2001; Willmott, 1994,1998; Wray-Bliss, 2002, 
2003). There are many differences in the way these authors conceptualise the 
`degree of political engagement' possible today, and their political commitments 
do indeed vary considerably. Yet, what these authors share is a general suspicion 
of the relativistic nature of some depositioning discourses. While I value these 
contributions and build on them, I am concerned that little has been done by way 
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of connecting questions of `the political' to the level of hegemony and exploring 
alternative hegemonies of social organisation. One valuable contribution in this 
direction, however, has been made by Contu: 
[T]o assert the contingency of any objectivity (the social) should not be taken as 
`everything becomes contingent' where we find ourselves living in a fluid and dispersed 
and fragmented reality. This would seize contingency as mere `absence of necessity', and 
negativity as the opposite of full positivity, which would be re-posing the same 
metaphysical argument it is contesting but with an opposite sign, so to speak. (2002: 168- 
169) 
Her critique of the depositioning project in organisation theory is that "the point is 
not the `replacement' of a totally united, positive universe with a totally 
fragmented, negative one" (2002: 169). For her, this replacement of a full 
positivity with a full negativity amounts to the reposing of the hegemonic position 
of organisation theory - just this time under an opposite sign. While, as I have 
discussed above, I would not subscribe to the idea that the depositioning project 
stands in opposition to the positioning project, Contu's valuable critique is that 
because depositioning discourses are often negative - in the sense that they are 
mostly concerned with the depositioning of those positions of reality which are 
taken for granted - and oriented towards `micro-political' resistances, the political 
imaginary of these discourses often exclude the question of hegemony. 
Yet, when Contu asserts that the "situation is not OK! It is actually bad and 
deteriorating" (2002: 173), she does not seem to only have a particular, `micro- 
political situation' in mind but indeed the hegemony of `neo-liberal' capitalism 
itself. In what is a powerful plea for `us' to wake up and repoliticise the terrain of 
social organisation, she states: "unless we start working towards this logic, 
working with(in) the (im)possibility of `the social', there is always someone else 
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with more certainties and appealing promises that will be instituting the `social' 
for us all" (ibid. ). Contu's words, then, remind us of the fact that society needs to 
be organised and instituted. For Laclau and Mouffe (1985) it is precisely this 
organisation or positioning of `the social' that describes the terrain of `the 
political'. In their view, politics is about engendering the question of hegemony, 
the question of how to organise society as such. As I will argue in Chapter Five, 
the terrain of politics rarely seems to be connected to the radical questioning of 
the contemporary hegemony of capital. However, there are discourses that have 
done just that. For the past four years, and perhaps for longer, the so-called 'anti- 
capitalist movement' has been protesting against the way today's global 
capitalism is organised. In Chapter Five I will engage with and analyse the 
history, politics and organisation of this social movement and explore its 
possibilities for repositioning society. This analysis, then, will serve as an 
empirical exploration of the possibilities of hegemonic, democratic politics and 
the implications for a project of repositioning organisation. 
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In the previous chapter I set up a `dialectical image', a constellation, which 
presented three organisation theory projects. First, there is, what I have labelled, 
the positioning project, which puts organisation into predefined locations of 
representationalism, institutionalism and managerialism. Then there is, what I 
have called, the depositioning project, which has reacted against the dominance of 
the restricted discourse of positioning. This reaction has been multifaceted, but 
has particularly emphasised the precarious, processual, local and plural nature of 
processes of organising. Although I argued that the depositioning project has been 
of great importance for generalising the concept of organisation and resisting the 
dominant hegemony of managerialist organisation, I expressed deep concerns 
over its political relevance in relation to today's struggles of social organisation. 
This led me, therefore, to call for an event that would reposition organisation 
theory. I have introduced this event as an impossibility, which, nevertheless, 
opens up possibilities for the staging of a new hegemonic content of social 
organisation. Before I engage more closely with the positioning, depositioning 
and repositioning projects in Chapters Three, Four and Five respectively, it is 
necessary to outline the theoretical approach of this thesis in more detail. 
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For me, the problem of positioning is a political one. As I argued in the previous 
chapter, positioning is about the emplacing of social reality along specific lines. 
Positioning is about establishing particular relations of power and knowledge and 
producing subjectivities in a specific social formation of time and space. Equally, 
depositioning involves `the political' because it resists the `goings-on' of the 
positioning project by politically disagreeing with its specific ways of organising 
social reality. Positioning is political because, pace Laclau (1995), it can be seen 
as a social decision about how society is to be organised. Questioning established 
positions is, I will argue in this chapter, a speculative-political event. It is this 
event in which established positions are negated and different positions are 
affirmed; for me, this speculative movement between negativity and positivity 
generally describes the event of politics. 
In this chapter I will discuss a range of philosophies that can all be seen to be 
speculative in nature in the sense that they are negating, or discontinuing, 
established positions and exploring possibilities of affirmatively creating new 
positions. In my view, these philosophies are all concerned with conceptualising 
the political event. Part of what I am trying to do in this thesis is to read between 
the lines of what are sometimes regarded as different philosophical traditions in 
order to make productive use of them. This `making use' can be related to 
Benjamin's conception of reading, which, in his view, should not be aimed at 
trying to reveal the origin or `true' intension of a work; instead, reading is always 
a translating of text, which must be understood as an affirmative destruction of an 
author (Ti). One could also say that reading is a movement of positivity that has 
to go through a moment of negativity. The aim of this chapter is not to present the 
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`wholeness' of philosophical texts. Instead, I will see these texts as fragments that 
need to be translated. For Benjamin, this is the only way to do justice to a text: to 
destruct and translate it into a new text. The destruction of philosophical texts 
attempted here aims at conceptualising the event of politics, which is of 
importance for formulating a political project of repositioning organisation. 
One particular type of translation I will attempt in this chapter is between, what 
we could call, a German inter-war and a French post-World-War-Two tradition of 
theory - or what has, perhaps problematically, been referred to as critical theory 
and post-structuralism/postmodemism. In organisation theory and other fields of 
enquiry there are sometimes artificial demarcating barriers seen between these 
traditions (see, for example, Alvesson and Deetz, 2000: 81-111). On one hand, 
critical theory is sometimes regarded as rationalistic, elitist and something that is 
aiming at `grand' emancipatory and political narratives. On the other hand, post- 
structuralism, or what is usually referred to as postmodernism, is sometimes seen 
as a celebration of fragmentation, textual plays, hyper-reality and loss of 
foundations (ibid. ). Rather than relying on a binary understanding of `critical 
theory' and `postmodernism'. I will, instead, show that there are many connecting 
lines between, what I refer to as, the philosophical traditions of `destruction' and 
`deconstruction'. In my view, what these traditions generally share is an 
understanding of speculative thought, which aims at negating, or discontinuing, 
established positions and exploring possibilities of affirming different positions. 
What I will be concerned with is to show that such a speculative movement 
between negativity and positivity, on one hand, never ends, but, on the other, still 
makes possible a particular event of politics, in which new positions of social 
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organisation may be claimed. Before I engage with these philosophical traditions 
in detail, let me generally outline my view of speculative thought and the 
reasoning behind a privileging of discontinuity over continuity. 
The Politics of Discontinuity 
In 1969 Peter Drucker, the famous management guru, wrote a book called The 
Age of Discontinuity. He predicted that society would change dramatically in the 
run up to the millennium. This change, he argues (1969: vii-ix), would be 
characterised by four major discontinuities: (1) new technologies will create new 
major industries and brand-new major businesses; (2) the world will become one 
market, one `global shopping centre', which will replace traditional national 
markets; (3) society will be pluralistic and traditional institutions, which over- 
organise our lives, will be revolted against; and (4) knowledge will become the 
central capital which will have immense effects on the way the economy and the 
whole society functions. Thus, in his view, at the end of the 1960s the world faced 
an Age of Discontinuity in world economy and technology. We might succeed in making it 
an age of great economic growth... But the one thing that is certain so far is that it will be a 
period of change - in technology and in economic policy, in industry structures and in 
economic theory, in the knowledge needed to govern and to manage, and in economic 
issues. While we have been busy finishing the great nineteenth-century economic edifice, 
the foundations have shifted under our feet. (Drucker, 1969: 9) 
What Drucker predicts here is a fundamental change in the way the capitalist 
economy works. In his view, there is a worldwide knowledge economy on the 
horizon which will be characterised not so much by bureaucratic and hierarchical 
corporations and public institutions, as by agile entrepreneurs that can flexibly and 
rapidly apply new technologies and exploit business opportunities. The age of 
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discontinuity Drucker predicts, then, describes capitalism as a global, 
decentralised economic system, which he hopes will bring new prosperity to the 
world. 
Twenty-three years after Drucker's prediction Fukuyama (1992) published a book 
called The End of History and the Last Man (sic). In some ways this book can be 
seen as the consummation of Drucker's The Age of Discontinuity, as it sees 
capitalism and democracy to have triumphed on a global scale. Fukuyama writes: 
What is emerging victorious.. is.. . the liberal idea. That is to say, for a very large part of the 
world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to 
challenge liberal democracy, and no universal principle of legitimacy other than the 
sovereignty of the people. (1992: 45) 
According to Fukuyama, the triumph of capitalism and the liberal-democratic 
idea, which became irreversible with the fall of the Berlin Wall and `the 
communist project', has led to the end of ideological struggles and therefore the 
end of history itself. Today, he asserts, "we have trouble imagining a world that is 
radically better than our own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and 
capitalist" (1992: 46). 
Here, then, we have two related images of discontinuity. Drucker, on one hand, 
celebrates the innovative character of capitalism that is able to continuously 
reinvent itself and discontinue its own positionings. In the language of Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987) one can say that Drucker describes the deterritorialising, or 
depositioning, powers of capital; it questions and discontinues established 
territories of its rule in order to search for new territories to be colonised. As 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 54) make quite clear, these deterritorialisations are 
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immediately reterritorialised, or repositioned, within the specific value system of 
capital. In this sense, Drucker's age of discontinuity is also one of continuity; the 
continuity of capitalism and its specific way of organising social relations. 
Similarly, Fukuyama's discontinuity of history - because all struggles are 
supposed to have ended and capitalism and democracy have triumphed or will 
soon triumph on a worldwide basis - is also the continuity of a particular liberal 
idea about how the political economy of society should be organised. Drucker's 
and Fukuyama's rhetoric of discontinuity can thus be seen as the continuation of a 
particular history. Yet, not everyone seems to be happy to join in with the 
celebrations of that history. 
`The time is out of joint'. Derrida uses this phrase from Hamlet to introduce his 
interest in Marx. For him, `the time is out of joint' because "a new `world order' 
seeks to stabilize a new, necessarily new disturbance by installing an 
unprecedented form of hegemony" (1994: 50). "The time is out of joint. The 
world is going badly" (1994: 77). Are these really Derrida's words, one is tempted 
to ask? And he repeats: "The world is going badly, the picture is bleak, one could 
say almost black" (1994: 78). Derrida goes on to repeat these phrases several 
times, as if he wants to make a point. It seems he wants to make sure that 
everybody realises that deconstruction is not some relativistic, idealist method of 
reading and writing. Instead, and this is what Derrida practices with Spectres of 
Marx, it is an intervention, which does not shy away from analysing the politico- 
economic world and making political judgements about its `goings-on'. 
35 
2. The Political Event 
Why, then, is the `world going badly' for Derrida? In, what he calls, a `ten-word 
telegram' he lists ten areas of urgent concern that, in his view, indicate the 
problems, contradictions and insufficiencies of the `new world order'. This 
`telegram' (1994: 81-84) could be summarised as follows: (1) massive 
unemployment, underemployment, social inactivity and poverty which national 
statistics, such as the unemployment rate, often do not calculate anymore; (2) 
massive exclusion of the homeless, migrants and state-less people from any 
participation in democratic life; (3) the ruthless economic wars between nation 
states which control the interpretation and application of international law; (4) the 
contradictions of the `free market' discourse, which are often combined with 
discourses of protectionism; (5) foreign debt and connected mechanisms drive a 
large proportion of humanity into despair; (6) the arms industry and the arms trade 
are fully embedded in the normal `goings-on' of scientific research, economy and 
labour; it cannot even be cut back without running risks of social and economic 
deprivation; (7) the spread of nuclear weapons is maintained by the very countries 
which say that they want to protect us from them; (8) inter-ethnic wars driven by a 
primitive conceptual phantasm of community, nation-state sovereignty, borders, 
native soil and blood; (9) the growing powers of that properly capitalist phantom- 
state which is the mafia on every continent; (10) the limits of international law 
and institutions that are largely controlled by particular nation-states and images 
of national sovereignty. So far, then, Derrida's `telegram'. 
This list can, of course, be continued and it should also be clear that many of 
Derrida's assertions and judgements can be contested. However, in the first 
instance it does not matter so much whether this list represents the problems and 
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antagonisms of this world 'correctly' - Derrida would be the first to say that a list 
or programme can never fully represent a problem or phenomenon. What interests 
me here, first of all, is that for Derrida `things are not OK'; for him, the liberal- 
democratic consensus that characterises the language of the `end of history' 
cannot be the final word. Derrida's `telegram' claims that `the time is out of joint' 
precisely because, in his view, this time, `our' time, this epoch, `is going badly'. 
Derrida's `telegram' can be seen to be addressed at, what he calls, the "gospel of 
politico-economic liberalism", sung by Fukuyama and others, which relies, in his 
view, on "the event of the good news that consists in what has putatively actually 
happened (what has happened in the last quarter of the century, in particular, the 
supposed death of Marxism and the supposed realization of the State of liberal 
democracy)" (1994: 62). For Derrida, this `event of the good news' is a `gospel' 
because it preaches a "trans-historical ideal" (ibid. ), which is often contradicted by 
the actual events of capitalist reality. He therefore asserts that "a thinking of the 
event is no doubt what is most lacking from such a discourse" (1994: 63). In 
Derrida's view, then, the `gospel' of politico-economic liberalism, of the type 
provided by Fukuyama and Drucker, can only think of an event that delivers `the 
good news': for example, `the victory of the liberal idea', `the end of all 
ideologies', `the end of all struggles', `unlimited economic wealth', etc. For 
Derrida, a real political event would look different. Instead of celebrating `the 
good news' of the liberal-democratic ideal, his conception of an event would put 
that very ideal into question: 
It would be a question of putting into question again, in certain of its essential predicates, 
the very concept of the said ideal. This would extend, for example, to the economic analysis 
of the market, the laws of capital, of types of capital (financial or symbolic, therefore 
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spectral), liberal parliamentary democracy, modes of representation and suffrage, the 
determining content of human rights, women's and children's rights, the current concepts 
of equality, liberty, especially fraternity (the most problematic of all), dignity, the relations 
between man and citizen. It would also extend, in the quasi-totality of these concepts, to the 
concept of the human (therefore of the divine and the animal) and to a determined concept 
of the democratic that supposes it (let us not say of all democracy or, precisely, of 
democracy to come). (Derrida, 1994: 87) 
Derrida's political event is one that puts into question the celebrated ideals of a 
given historical order that are taken for granted. It is a questioning of the 
continuity of `the good news', which portrays itself as `discontinuity' (e. g. the end 
of history, or the age of discontinuity). 
There are thus two types of discontinuities. The first type is a `major' discourse of 
discontinuity, to use Deleuze and Guattari's (1986) terminology. It is a discourse 
articulated by a dominant regime as it calls for `the end of history' and `the age of 
discontinuity', which means nothing but the continuity of the `eternal image' of 
capitalism and the liberal-democratic order. This `major' discourse immediately 
positions all language (of discontinuity) in relation to the hegemonic content, that 
is, capital and democratic liberalism. One could also say that every discontinuity 
or deterritorialisation is immediately reterritorialised on the strata of an 
established continuum of history. Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 160), 
however, this `major' discourse, or what they refer to as `hegemony', is itself very 
fragile. That is, a `majority' can never be all-encompassing; there will always be 
gaps that can be populated by, what they call, a `field of discursivity' 
(1985: 111). 
The openness of the `major' discourse thus enables the second type of 
discontinuity, which could be described as a `minor' discourse (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986). This `minority' does not stand outside the `majority'; it does not 
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constitute a voluntaristic place of opposition. Instead, the `minor' is an immanent, 
yet subversive, part of the `major'. One could say, the `minor' discourse of 
discontinuity continuously engenders the gaps left by the `major' in order to 
produce new figurations of struggle. A statement like `the world is going badly' is 
such a `minor' discourse. It comes from within the very world that `is going 
badly'; yet it resists the way the `majority' organises the world and thus aims to 
"brush history against the grain" (THP, 248). 
Benjamin's phrase `to brush history against the grain' - taken from his `Theses on 
the Philosophy of History' - first of all means to recognise `history' as something 
that is continuously constructed by `those in power', the `majority'. To `brush 
history against the grain' calls for a `minority' act to interrupt the `official' 
history. This act, he hopes, would unveil the `goings-on' of that history: the 
continuity of time, the `eternal return' of the commodity and `commodity 
fetishism', for example. This act also hopes to see the lives of those that have been 
defeated by history - those that have been rendered nameless. It hopes to see the 
tradition of the oppressed minorities that are continuously being ignored by 
dominant discourses. For Benjamin, history, as it is continuously constructed by 
the `majority', is a catastrophe. That is, for him the catastrophe is the insistence on 
history being natural, directional and progressive. He asserts: "That things just go 
on is the catastrophe"; "catastrophe is not what threatens to occur at any given 
moment but what is given at any moment" (BGS V, 550). For Benjamin, 
the task 
of `minority' discourses is to halt the catastrophe of continuous history; that 
is, to 
discontinue that which is always already going on. So, when Derrida calls for the 
questioning of the liberal politico-economic ideals and asserts that `the world 
is 
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going badly' he sees, perhaps, the catastrophes of our time and attempts to 
discontinue precisely these catastrophes. In Benjamin's language he aims to bring 
the catastrophic narrative of history to a standstill (BGS V, 576-577). For 
Benjamin, it is this halting of continuous history which is needed to politically 
intervene in a specific moment of opportunity. 
In reality, there is not one moment that does not carry its own revolutionary opportunity in 
itself .. The particular revolutionary opportunity of each historical moment is confirmed for 
the revolutionary thinker by the political situation. But it is no less confirmed... by the 
power this moment has to open a very particular, heretofore closed chamber of the past. 
Entry into this chamber coincides exactly with political action. (BGS 1.3,1231) 
The halting of history, the discontinuation of the catastrophes of a given time, is, 
for Benjamin, a political event that enables possibilities of seeing history 
differently. It is a dialectical speculation about a different time that emerges out of 
seeing historical images differently. 
Derrida's deconstructive questioning of the ideals of our time can be seen as such 
a speculation; it is an attempt to see the world and its history differently. For 
Derrida, speculative thought is of particular relevance; in fact, it has been argued 
that his work is not thinkable outside the tradition of speculation (Barnett, 1998: 
35). In his essay, `The Age of Hegel', for example, Derrida acknowledges Hegel's 
importance as a philosopher of, what he calls, the `already-not-yet' (1986: 3). For 
Derrida, this `already-not-yet' is one way to express the dialectical, speculative 
structure of Hegel's work. In Derrida's view, Hegel's dialectic is not some sort of 
`method', which one can reduce to a programmatic application of the `thesis- 
antithesis-synthesis' triad to any `problem'. Instead, for Demda, the dialectic is 
first and foremost a way of speculating, speculating about difference, the `not yet' 
(ibid. ). This speculation about the `not yet' is not simply a projection into the 
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future and a radical break with history, with the `already'. Instead, Derrida's 
`already-not-yet' could be seen as a questioning of history, as a rereading of past 
images in order to see their `revolutionary opportunity', to speak with Benjamin. 
This, then, is a speculation about the `not yet' in what is `already' there. 
Derrida illustrates Hegel's dialectical, speculative `already-not-yet' by engaging 
with a letter Hegel sent to the Prussian Royal Ministry of Education. In what 
seems to be partly an implicit commentary on Deleuze and Guattari's (1986) 
distinction between `minor' and `major' literatures and their frequent portrayal of 
Hegel as `major' or state philosopher (e. g. 1987: 377,385), Derrida sees Hegel's 
letter as a `minor' intervention by someone who, in his view, is both close and 
distant to the state. In Derrida's view, a `minor' literature is not separate from the 
discourse of the `majority'; he asks: "Does not every subversive discourse always 
constitute itself through rhetorical effects that are necessarily identified as gaps in 
the prevailing discourse, with the inevitable phenomena of discursive degradation, 
mechanisms, mimetisms, etc.? " (1986: 25). For Derrida, Hegel's engagement and 
closeness to the state, although it needs to be problematised and questioned, is not 
a problem per se precisely because every `minor' discourse is close to the 
`majority', that is, it is constituted by and constitutive of the `majority'. In 
Derrida's view, Hegel's dialectical speculation, as practiced with his letter to the 
Ministry, is to explore the subversive possibilities of this constitutive relationship 
between the `minor' and the `major'. This is to say, he hopes that his letter will 
intervene in the state's education policy and enable a school teaching that does not 
simply teach formulas and `babble' but helps children to "substantiate mind with 
content" and speculate about the `already-not-yet' (Derrida, 1986: 25). 
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Although Derrida does not mention or directly relate to Deleuze and Guattari's 
work, he seems to suggest that there is a danger of simply opposing Hegel's 
discourse because it is seen to be too close to the `majority' or the state. In his 
view, speculative thought needs to be able to relate to and intervene in the 
discourse of the `majority' and not pretend that a `minority' can be constituted 
from the outside. It is, of course, Deleuze and Guattari's (1983,1986,1987) 
consistent argument that precisely this `outside' is not possible; that is, in their 
view, `minority' and `majority' always produce each other. This is also one of 
Hardt and Negri's main points in Empire, where they argue that an effective 
opposition to today's world-integrated capitalist system cannot be formed from an 
`outside', precisely because that system constitutes life itself; they see `Empire' to 
be everywhere. Given their problematisation of forming any kind of opposition 
from the `outside', it is surprising that Hardt and Negri seem to think that it is 
necessary to work in opposition to the tradition of dialectical thought. In Empire 
and elsewhere (e. g. Negri in Negri and Zolo, 2003) they frequently suggest a need 
to break with dialectics and go beyond it. For them, even the `best' German 
thinkers of the first half of the twentieth century were not able to break with the 
dialectic; only those French philosophers who began to reread Nietzsche in the 
1960s were able to do just that, as Hardt and Negri (2000: 378) claim. There are 
several points to be made in relation to such a reading of the dialectic and history 
in general. 
Hardt (1993: 52) engages with this problem of being in `opposition' to something 
in his monograph on Deleuze. There he quotes Judith Butler whose response to 
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the claimed possibility of a `break with Hegel' is: "References to a `break' with 
Hegel are almost always impossible, if only because Hegel has made the very 
notion of `breaking with' into the central tenet of the dialectic" (1987: 183-184). 
Hardt's response to Butler is two-fold. Firstly, he maintains that there are different 
kinds of oppositions. On one hand, there is an opposition that becomes assimilated 
by the object it tries to oppose, as it lacks a crude, energetic force. On the other 
hand, however, and this, he says, is Deleuze's project in relation to Hegel's 
dialectic, one can develop a strategy of `total opposition', which seeks to totally 
disrupt and discontinue something. Secondly, Hardt points to a Deleuzian 
forgetting; that is, he maintains that Deleuze opposes Hegel by simply forgetting 
him (mainly in his later work): not mentioning or engaging with him. Whether 
Deleuze's strategy, and Hardt and Negri's for that matter, is one of `total 
opposition' against Hegel or one of `forgetting' Hegel, both are somewhat 
problematic for several reasons. First, the notion of `total opposition' seems to 
suggest the possibility of the formation of critique from an `outside', which stands 
in contradiction to what Deleuze and Guattari's, as well as Hardt and Negri's, 
theoretical projects seem to be about. Second, to oppose Hegel and the dialectic 
assumes that there is a `Hegel', or a `dialectic', in the sense that these terms can 
be seen to signify a unified content. I would suggest that this also stands in 
contrast to Deleuze's consistent attempt to reread the `old' philosophers, such as 
Leibniz, Bacon, Hume, Bergson and others, in order to explore new possibilities 
of their work. As I argued above, such a strategy of rereading could precisely be 
related to speculative-dialectical thought. Third, opposing or even forgetting 
Hegel seems to imply the possibility of an `end of Hegel', which, of course, points 
to nothing less than `the end of history'. As I discussed above in relation to 
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Fukuyama, the notion of ending something like history is based on an idealist 
understanding that society could indeed be made fully transparent; that is, one 
could get rid of all antagonisms, such as `Hegel' for example. According to 
Derrida's (1986) argument in `The Age of Hegel', such a total discontinuity is 
impossible; what he seems to imply is that `today we are all Hegelians in a way'; 
that is, it is impossible to totally oppose Hegel, or any other author, precisely 
because his work has always already shaped history - our age or epoch - in a 
particular way. 
The point I am making here, then, is that one cannot simply oppose or even forget 
Hegel or `the dialectic' precisely because one cannot `end' history. One can also 
not assume that there is `a' dialectic that can be applied like a unified `method'. 
Instead, what I see in dialectical thought is a general engagement with the 
problematic of the relationship between discontinuity and continuity, negativity 
and positivity. For me, the dialectical process is about the continuous translation 
of this problematic, which also includes the continuous translation of the 
problematic of dialectics. 
Guaranteed translatability, given homogeneity, systematic coherence in their absolute 
forms, this is surely (certainly, a priori and not probably) what renders the injunction, the 
inheritance, and the future - in a word the other - impossible. There must be disjunction, 
interruption, the heterogeneous if at least there must be, if there must be a chance given to 
any `there must be' whatsoever, be it beyond duty. Once again, here as elsewhere, wherever 
deconstruction is at stake, it would be a matter of linking an aj Irmation (in particular a 
political one), if there is any, to the experience of the impossible, which can only be a 
radical experience of the perhaps. (Den-ida, 1994: 35, emphasis in original) 
Perhaps one could suggest that the above passage is Derrida's `translation' of the 
problematic of the dialectical process as a two-fold movement: first, it exposes a 
given homogeneous history as an impossibility by interrupting its continuous 
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flow, by showing that history, including that of `the dialectic', is not a unity 
(thesis) but a heterogeneity (antithesis); the second movement is an affirmation 
(synthesis), a speculative filling of the gap that is left behind by rendering the 
continuity of history impossible. For me, these two movements describe the 
political event. This event is political because established positions are questioned 
and resisted and new positions are sought to be put into place. This political event 
is about contesting the `principled positions' of history and society. As I have 
argued above, however, this event cannot simply be about the total opposition to, 
or discontinuation of, history; this would simply replace the continuity of history 
with the continuity of discontinuity, which would imply the end of all history. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), such an end or total discontinuity of 
history and society is impossible. 
Now, according to 2i2ek (1989: 176), the common understanding of the 
dialectical process is that the synthesis is some kind of return to the thesis, or 
some sort of higher, progressive unity that can `heal the wounds' produced by the 
antithesis. In 2i2ek's view, the contrary is the case. For him, the synthesis does 
not heal anything, it does not return to a positive identity (ibid. ). Instead, the 
synthesis is an affirmation as `negation of the negation'. 2i2ek maintains that with 
this `negation of the negation' one comes to experience how the negative, 
disruptive power of the antithesis, which is menacing the unity of the given order, 
the thesis, "is simultaneously a positive condition of it" (ibid. ). However, he 
makes clear that this positive, affirmative experience is an event which does not 
abolish any antagonisms - it does not unify reality in a new, higher 
identity. For 
him, the synthesis is as ridden by antagonisms and possibilities of discontinuity as 
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the anti-thesis (ibid. ). This is why, for Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the dialectical 
process is impossible; if it were simply possible, that is, if it could ever be 
finalised into a unified synthesis, there would be no space for dialectics or indeed 
society as such. 
Hegel thus appears as located in a watershed between two epochs. In a first sense, he 
represents the highest point of rationalism: the moment when it attempts to embrace within 
the field of reason, without dualisms, the totality of the universe of differences. History and 
society, therefore, have a rational and intelligible structure. But, in a second sense, this 
synthesis contains all the seeds of its dissolution, as the rationality of history can be 
affirmed only at the price of introducing contradiction in the field of reason. It would, 
therefore, be sufficient to show that this is an impossible operation requiring constant 
violation of the method that it itself postulates. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 95) 
What Laclau and Mouffe thus describe here is the impossibility of dialectics 
which, for them, can never lead to a full identity that is closed in itself. That is, 
dialectics cannot lead to a totality, or the full continuity of history, because it 
continuously leaves open a gap for discontinuity -a gap for an antithesis to negate 
the homogeneous unity of a given order. For Liiek, a dialectical synthesis can 
never give us a final answer. Instead, he maintains that the continuous failure of 
the synthesis to deliver a final answer becomes an affirmation in itself; in its very 
failure, the `negation of the negation' "begins to function as its own answer" 
(1989: 177); that is, in its failure the dialectic produces a hopeful content. One 
could say, then, although it cannot give us a final answer, the dialectical process 
might begin - and, according to Demda (1986), the conceptualisation of this 
`beginning' is one of Hegel's main contributions - to give us some answers. At 
least it might be able to speculate about what type of questions should be asked. 
What I have tried to problematise in this section, then, is the relationship between 
continuity and discontinuity, which, for me, is at the heart of speculative thought. 
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I have discussed the tradition of speculation in relation to dialectics, which, in my 
view, is not a specific `method' but a general movement between negativity and 
positivity. This movement will always fail to produce any final answers or final 
places in which `dialectics' can be located. In this sense `dialectics' is an event of 
impossibility, an event, which, as I will try to show in this chapter, can be traced 
in a range of different philosophical traditions. For me, this event is political 
because established positions and histories are rendered impossible, that is, they 
are discontinued, and possibilities of new positions and experiences are explored. 
This, then, brings us back to Derrida's `telegram', which aims to indicate ten 
reasons as to why `the world is going badly'. Part of what I am trying to suggest 
in this chapter is that Derrida's `telegram' and his notion of `deconstruction', in 
general, can be seen in relation to a wider tradition of politico-speculative 
philosophies. When I say `political' here, I am not only referring to specific places 
of `politics', that is, places where `politics' are normally seen to be done, such as, 
for example, the Houses of Parliament. Instead, for me, `the political' is inherently 
connected to speculative thought itself, because speculation is about putting into 
question established positions of society and imagining different positions along 
which society could be organised. 
As this section has gone over a great variety of philosophies far too quickly, I will 
now turn to a more detailed discussion of how different philosophical traditions 
have conceptualised the political event. As I mentioned before, the aim is not to 
integrate the philosophies of destruction, deconstruction and impossibility 
discussed in this chapter. Instead, what I will try is to read productively between 
these philosophies in order to gain an understanding of how the political event 
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could be conceptualised. As I argued above, such a conceptualisation is of 
importance if one is concerned with exploring possibilities of repositioning social 
organisation. 
The Politics of Destruction 
The concept of `destruction' features in the writings of all three German writers 
that I am concerned with in this section: Benjamin, Adorno and Heidegger. This is 
probably not a coincidence as all three had their main writing periods in a time of 
war and destruction in the first half of the 20`h century. As hopefully becomes 
apparent, there are similarities, but also important differences, in the way these 
writers understand the movement between negativity and positivity that 
characterises destruction. What I aim to show in this section is that for all three 
philosophers destruction is not simply a negativity that eradicates history and 
tradition; instead, it is a negative movement that seeks an affirmation -a new 
experience and a new life. 
Throughout his career Adorno was engaged in the development of, what he and 
others have called, `critical theory', which he practiced with a host of colleagues 
at the Institut für Sozialforschung, commonly known as the Frankfurt School. 
5 
Although Benjamin was not formally involved with the Institute, he shared a lot 
of its philosophical and political concerns, which are expressed, for example, in a 
See Rose (1978) for a short discussion of the Frankfurt School and particularly Adorno's role 
in it. For an extended history of the Institute, see Jay (1973). 
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lively exchange of letters between Adorno and Benjamin (C). 6 For both writers, 
the purpose of research, of critical thought, is not to ask how a particular social 
phenomenon functions, but how it stands in relation to the underlying 
antagonisms of society. The idea of Benjamin's Arcades Project, for example, is 
not to simply describe the functionalities of the Parisian arcades' social space, but 
to analyse in detail the particular subjectivities, ideologies and architectural 
emplacements formed by the wider `goings-on' of capitalist modernity; Benjamin 
and Adorno called such an analysis `immanent critique' (e. g. Adorno, 1967: 32). 
Benjamin's `immanent critique' of the arcades exposed the inherent antagonisms 
of Parisian modernity; it analysed how `early' capitalism produced specific 
subjectivities, for example, that of the fläneur who reproduces capital by 
consuming images of fashionable commodities on display. For Benjamin, the 
shiny, glitzy commodity world of the arcades produces, what he calls, a 
phantasmagoria which `intoxicates' the fläneur. 
Now, the purpose of `immanent critique' is to awaken the fldneur and the whole 
modern `sleeping collectivity', as Benjamin calls it (AP, 388); it aims to destruct 
the phantasmagoric `dream-world' of capitalism and heighten the reader's 
knowledge by exposing the antagonisms of social reality. In the `dialectical 
image', or constellation, of the Arcades Project this destructive exposure is 
achieved by way of bringing antagonistic textual images of reality in such a 
6 Benjamin and Adorno met each other in 1923 and quickly developed a close friendship. They 
began a lively exchange of letters in 1928, which lasted until Benjamin's death in 1940. This 
correspondence reveals interesting insights into their analysis of capitalist society as well as 
their understanding of immanent critique as speculative, affirmative technique of destruction. 
While Adorno was firmly embedded in the German university system, Benjamin operated at its 
fringes. Benjamin never held an academic position - his text The Origin of German Tragic 
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position to each other that a new knowledge of the object is made possible. 
However, this new knowledge does not become possible by way of merging the 
different fragments of reality into a coherent or even final synthesis that would 
give us the illusion of a harmonious, non-antagonistic reality; what emerges is not 
a unity or totality. Instead, these fragments are presented as precisely that: 
antagonistic, non-integrated particulars which cannot be synthesised. In his essay 
`On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy' Benjamin refers to the `outcome' 
of such a dialectical process as `non-synthesis' (BGS 11.1,166). What this concept 
of `non-synthesis' highlights is that, for Benjamin, the dialectical process does not 
lead to any progressive or higher state of knowledge. Part of what he tries to 
achieve with his Arcades Project is to halt the continuity of history. The montage 
of fragments of historical experiences presented in the Arcades Project is the 
attempt to freeze history into a `dialectical image' and produce an event in which 
history could be seen differently. For Benjamin, this difference is a `non- 
synthesis' because it is precisely that: difference; that is, it is not a united and 
harmonious experience but one that is ridden by antagonisms. Such an 
understanding of the dialectical process coincides with Adorno's notion of 
`negative dialectics' (1973a), which, too, describes a dialectical movement that 
continuously fails to complete itself, that is, produce a unified and harmonious 
whole. For Adorno, the dialectical process is `negative' because it will always 
result in a failure, the failure to produce a final synthesis. Yet, for him, this failure 
does not amount to an idealist or nihilist conception of what critique and 
philosophy can do. Instead, it is a failure that bears an affirmation in itself. 
Drama (OG7) was not accepted by the University of Frankfurt as habilitation thesis, which in 
the German context means that one cannot become a university professor. 
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Let me make this point clearer by discussing Adorno's conception of philosophy, 
which, in his view, always has to envisage its own liquidation, or destruction: 
"each philosophy, which today is not concerned with securing the existing mental 
and social conditions but with truth, is faced with the problem of a liquidation of 
philosophy itself' (AGS 1,331). What Adorno poses to us is the notion that 
philosophy can only exist by liquidating itself: the being of philosophy comes 
through its non-being. For Adorno, the positivity of philosophy describes itself in 
contemporary modes of disciplinary knowledge production, which have turned 
philosophy into an apparatus based on a logic of positioning thought within 
formal categories. Let us think, for example, of analytical philosophy, which, 
according to Adorno, is "learnable and reproducible by robots" (AGS 6,40), and 
which, in his view, has attained a monopoly position in Anglo-American countries 
(AGS 10/2,462). Such a philosophy assumes reality to be a chronological 
historical order that can be positively measured and analysed. In his view, 
positivism, as the name suggests, confirms the positive; it positions social 
relations and contemporary modes of being inside a grid of predefined knowledge, 
which itself is never questioned. According to Adorno, positivism's brother is 
pragmatism, which tries to eternalise the here and now by basing all its analytical 
power on existing relations to make them consumable and practicable. For 
Adorno, pragmatism, which aims at the production of a "reasonable and 
responsible mankind, remains in the spell of the disaster without a theory being 
Adorno asks the question of philosophy primarily in his essay `Why still philosophy' (AGS 
10/2), but also in, for example, `The actuality of philosophy' (AGS 1; 1977) and `On the Meta- 
critique of the theory of knowledge' (AGS 5) as well as the introduction to his book Negative 
Dialectics (AGS 6; 1970a). All quotes from these texts are my own translations. 
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capable of thinking the whole in its untruth" (AGS 10/2,470). Adorno, then, is 
deeply troubled by the fact that contemporary philosophy seems merely another 
scientific discipline, whose knowledge production is institutionalised and made 
practicable for the mundane purposes of existing social reality. For Adorno, 
philosophy, as a formal logic of positioning, a philosophy that is only practiced to 
reproduce an institutional8 positivity, is bankrupt and corrupt, because it exists 
only for itself. If, in Adorno's view, philosophy wants to be relevant in relation to 
social reality, its task has to be one of a destruction of its own positivity; for him, 
philosophy needs to be understood and practiced as `negative dialectics'. 
Philosophy as `negative dialectics' would continuously negate or destruct itself in 
order to expose its own antagonisms. For him, only this movement of destructive 
discontinuity can prevent philosophy from celebrating the positive, continuous 
order of history. 
At first sight Adorno's and Benjamin's philosophies look similar to what 
Heidegger poses to us in Being and Time, which he describes as the destruction9 
8 It would, of course, be a gross simplification to say that Adorno, by going against the 
institutional positivity of philosophy, denies a role for institutions per se. On the contrary, 
education, also philosophical education, is crucial for him; see, for example his essay 
`Philosophy and Teachers' (AGS 10/2). 
The original translation of Being and Time by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (1962) 
is poor in many passages. For example, they translate Heidegger's 'Destruktion' as `destroy'. 
This is absolutely unsatisfactory as `destroy' has usually a very negative meaning. However, 
the German 'Destruktion' and Heidegger's usage of this term is to be understood as 'De- 
struktion', the negation (de) of a structure or structuring process (struktion). Hence 
'Destruktion' implies both a negative and positive movement, that of destroying or destructing 
and, at the same time, constructing something. In a new translation of the Introduction of Being 
and Time Joan Stambaugh, J. Glenn Gray and David Farrell Krell translate 'Destruktion' as 
'destructuring', which highlights this process of negativity and positivity. I prefer, however, to 
simply translate it as 'destruction', which, in fact, could also be written as 'de-struction' or 
'de/struction': the slash, or cut, highlights here the simultaneity of negativity and positivity. 
9 
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of Western metaphysics1°. Here, too, destruction must not be understood simply 
as the negativity of doing away with a philosophical tradition. "On the contrary, it 
should stake out the positive possibilities of the tradition, and that always means 
to fix its boundaries. 
-The 
destructuring is not related negatively to the past: its 
criticism concerns `today' and the dominant way we treat the history of 
ontology.... However, the destructuring does not wish to bury the past in nullity; 
it has a positive intent" (Heidegger, 1993b: 66-67, emphasis in original). Hence, 
this destructuring, or simply destruction, is not simply a getting rid of something, 
as is sometimes assumed; instead, it is affirmative: destruction is a movement of 
negativity that points to the positive possibilities that such a movement can 
produce. From this point of view, Heidegger's `destructive philosophy' is similar 
to Adorno's call for the liquidation of philosophy and Benjamin's destructive 
presentation of Parisian modernity. For all three writers, philosophy implies not 
simply a positivity or even a scientific knowledge production `machine', but a 
`labour of the negative' (Hegel, 1972: 10), which aims at the destruction of merely 
positive conceptions of history and time. For them, only such a destructive 
movement can point to possibilities beyond the popularly consumed positivities of 
the Zeitgeist, the positive `spirit' of the here and now. 
Although Adorno was clearly impressed by Heidegger's philosophy - he even 
shared, as I have shown, some of its concerns - he also subjected it to some fierce 
criticism. '' What Heidegger attempts to show in Being and Time is that time 
10 See also Heidegger's essays `What is metaphysics' (1993a), `Overcoming of Metaphysics' 
(1954), and `The Essence of a Fundamental Metaphysical Position; The Possibility of Such 
Position in the History of Western Philosophy' (1984). 
Adorno's fierce and unapologetic criticism of Heidegger can be found, for example, in his 
already mentioned essays on philosophy (see earlier footnote). Additionally, see his essays 
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shapes and produces being, being is temporal (1993b: 62). As I briefly discussed 
in Chapter One, the radicality of this thought lies in the fact that Heidegger sees 
being, or the subject, not as a transcendental, eternal thing, but as something that 
is emplaced, or positioned, by the technics of history. Put differently, for him 
modem being is a specific arrangement of, what I have labelled, the positioning 
project. However, what Adorno laments about Heidegger's work is that it does not 
analyse in any detail these specific historical contingencies that position being. In 
other words, he does not concern himself with closely studying the specific 
production processes of being, the subject. Instead, Heidegger tries to develop an 
understanding of Being, which is a more `general' or `basic' conception of 
being. '2 What this means is that, for him, being, which, at first sight, seems so 
obvious and simple to understand as `all there is', is in fact not what it is. Instead, 
being is that which has `fallen' from Being. What Heidegger thus sets out to do in 
Being and Time is to question today's popularly consumed notion of being and 
come to an understanding of Being itself, that which lies behind being. In other 
`Cultural Criticism and Society' (1967), `On the Meta-critique of the theory of knowledge' 
(AGS 5), and The Jargon of Authenticity (AGS 6; 1973b). For a discussion of Adorno's 
criticism of Heidegger see also Rose (1978). 
Heidegger distinguishes between `being', which is `all there is', and `Being', which is the 
`basic' conception of being, the questioning of being: "Our provisional aim is the Interpretation 
of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being" (Heidegger, 1962: 
19). The concept of `Being' is thus Heidegger's attempt to put Being itself into question, to 
question it under the horizon of Time, which is not spatialised time but more `basic' than that. 
He writes: "`Being' cannot be understood as being.... `Being' cannot be defined by attributing 
beings to it. Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by way of definition and cannot be 
represented by lower ones. But does it follow from this that `Being' can no longer constitute a 
problem? By no means. We can conclude only that `Being' is not something like a being" 
(Heidegger, 1993b: 44). What Heidegger, thus, points out is that we cannot conceptualise 
'Being' with the traditional conceptual tools of metaphysics. In this sense, Being stands outside 
language. `Being' can thus be seen as something that is not from this world; it might be seen as 
the `essence' of being. One could also say that Heidegger ontologises being into an absolute 
Being, which is not to be understood as a questioning of being, which would involve a 
questioning of the concrete social relations of today's life. Instead, according to Adorno, 
Heidegger tries to put forward a theory of the realm of the ontology of Being, which is the 
realm of the ontic (A GS 5,191-192). Being thus becomes a notion of essence; Being is beyond 
being, it stands outside and above being. 
12 
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words, he is in search for Being as an original being, the `pure 1' (AGS 5,191- 
192). For Adorno, the problem with Heidegger's Being is that, on one hand, it is 
immediate, primeval and thus meaningless, but, on the other, it acquires the 
meaning of an authentic essence (ibid. ). Thus, Heidegger's depositioning of the 
subject, that is being, is at the same time the positioning of a transcendental 
subject-less Being (AGS 10/2,466). According to Adorno, then, Heidegger 
depositions being and repositions it in the lofty heights of Being. 
For Adorno, Heidegger's philosophy amounts to a `jargon of authenticity' (AGS 
5; 1973b) because it destructs being in order to get to some sort of `authentic' or 
`original' Being. One could also say that Heidegger's philosophy is one that 
discontinues in order to reveal an original continuity of life. In Adorno's view, 
Heidegger's thinking is not speculative in nature (AGS 10/2,463), but fixed in an 
absolute. This made him easily incorporable into Nazi ideology, which was 
equally based on a project of destruction in order to reveal an authentic Aryan 
Being. 13 According to Adorno, then, the danger of non-speculative destruction - 
that is, a destruction that aims at revealing some underlying continuity - is that it 
can be incorporated into projects of `absolute negativity', which, undoubtedly, the 
Nazi state was. Put differently, the danger of Heidegger's complete depositioning 
of being is that it is repositioned as the positive emptiness of `pure Being' and 
13 In his writings, Adorno is often specifically concerned to point out that today `things' should 
not simply go on as they were before the Holocaust, Auschwitz and the whole event of Nazism. 
For example, he once said: "To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric" (1967: 34). So, when 
he asks with one of this essays `Why still philosophy? ', he also asks `Why do we still need a 
philosophy that was not able to help, as `hammer', to smash the ideological structure of the 
Nazis, a philosophy that even indirectly supported this ideology'. This is Adorno's serious 
charge against Heidegger, whose thought was all too easily incorporated by the Nazi state. 
This, of course, does not mean that one should not read Heidegger or `use' his thought 
affirmatively for today's political struggles. 
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`pure Time' (AGS 1,330). According to Adorno (AGS 6,19-20), the philosophy 
of Heidegger, although at first sight related to a project of destruction as 
conceptualised by Adorno and Benjamin, amounts to idealism. What is celebrated 
and fetishised by idealism is the principle of a positive infinity or continuity of 
history which stands outside any concrete social relations. For Adorno, it is 
precisely the task of philosophy to halt any apparent continuum of history in order 
to question its `goings-on' and, perhaps, redirect it towards new ends. So, what 
Adorno has in mind when he calls for a liquidation of philosophy is not a 
destruction of being that is repositioned in the lofty realms of Being but a 
philosophy that would put into question the conditions of the production of this 
very being. This questioning cannot come through a positive reaffirmation of 
everything there is, but only through speculative, negative thinking that is relevant 
to today's actuality. 
For Adorno, then, negative thinking involves a critique of society, which is 
affirmative in itself as it aims to present knowledge of society. This affirmation, 
however, must not be mistaken for a positivity that only confirms, sanctions or 
reproduces existing social relations. Instead, it is a positivity that comes through 
the negativity of a destruction of popularly consumed images of history. Yet, 
destruction cannot simply work in opposition to history. As I highlighted in the 
previous section, a complete discontinuity is not possible as this would suggest 
`the end of history'. One thus needs to emphasise again that, for Adorno, the 
dialectical process of destruction can never complete itself - there cannot be a 
final synthesis. Although Adorno thinks that Heidegger's concept of Being 
attempts to work towards such a final synthesis, one could, perhaps, suggest an 
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affirmative reading of Heidegger by saying that his Being is equally something 
that can never be fully attained. In this sense, Being is the ultimate horizon of 
being, which, however, is impossible to reach. In the language of Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) one could, perhaps, suggest that the concept of Being describes the 
impossibility of society, that which can never be accomplished but, nevertheless, 
is always there. The concept of Being indicates that being is not the final word of 
history; there is always a `beyond' and difference. This is then, perhaps, 
something one can generally learn from Heidegger's philosophy: discontinuity 
and destruction can never be complete; there will always be an unreachable 
horizon which keeps the question of history and being open. What I would like to 
suggest now, by returning to some images of Benjamin's thought, is that, although 
destruction is impossible - because it cannot be complete - it is also possible and 
even necessary. It is this dialectic between the impossible and the possible that 
engenders, in my view, Benjamin's conception of the `event'. 
For Benjamin, destruction is an Augenblick, which can be translated literally as 
`the blink of an eye'. The Augenblick is a special, short-lived, ephemeral moment; 
it is an event. Benjamin sees this event as a response to an understanding of 
history as chronos; as chronological, linear order that is constructed by `those in 
power'. For him, the figuration of the Augenblick is Kairos, who is the youngest 
son of Zeus in Greek mythology and seen as the embodiment of opportunity. 
Hence, kairos, 14 as a concept, signifies a time when conditions are right for the 
14 kairos [Gk, fitness, opportunity, time; perh. akin to Gk keirein to cut] :a time when conditions 
are right for the accomplishment of a crucial action : the opportune and decisive moment. 
(Webster's Third International Dictionary). In antique times kairos had not only a temporal 
meaning. Homer used the concept to signify the right place' (Brockhaus Encyclopaedia). 
Thus, we can see kairos not only as a moment in time, but also a moment in space. 
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accomplishment of a crucial action - it is a decisive event. However, Benjamin's 
interest in kairos should not be misunderstood; it does not come from a 
preoccupation with psychology (the individual subject) or mythology (the 
idealised and eternalised object). On the contrary, Benjamin's event is a space 
where the continuity of both subject and object is interrupted - the Augenblick is 
an event that brings subject and object together in a politically intensive and 
sensitive `now-time' (Jetztzeit) (BGS 1.2,701,704; TPH, 253,255). 
As a response to the `official' history, which is portrayed as chronos, Benjamin 
sees history as "the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty 
time, but time filled by the presence of the now [Jetztzeit]" (BGS 1.2,704; TPH, 
255). Benjamin's `now-time' is not concerned to see the present as either a 
moment in the unfolding of progress, like any other, or a part of a backward or 
forward succession of always already positioned facts, nor is it subsumed in some 
other way under a conception of history as a project that aims at the completion of 
a predefined totality. Instead, it is an event of the actuality of the past, which is 
contingent upon the action of the present and therefore contested. The event of 
`now-time' is thus characterised by two simultaneous movements: The first 
movement is that of the destruction or halting of time as a continuous historical 
succession of positioned facts by turning its endless dynamic into a momentary 
stasis - this is like a snapshot of a camera. Here kairos (which is etymologically 
related to the Greek keirein, to cut) cuts through the idealised, fetishised, notion of 
endless time and brings it to an abrupt halt: "Marx says, that revolutions are the 
locomotives of world history. But perhaps it is completely different. Perhaps 
revolutions are when mankind, which is travelling in this train, reaches for the 
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emergency brake" (BGS 1.3,1232, my translation). Hence, the world is brought to 
a standstill - the hustle of the `normal goings-on' of modernity is stopped by way 
of a speculative thought-image: "Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, 
but their arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant 
with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock" (BGS 1.2,700; TPH, 254). The 
second movement is that of remembering, which for Benjamin does not mean to 
recognise `the way it really was'. Instead, it means to see images of the past as 
belonging to the present. Put differently, a "historian... stops telling the sequence 
of events like the beads of a rosary" (BGS 1.2,704; TPH, 255). Instead, for 
Benjamin, the historian sets up a constellation of different images of time that do 
not belong to the same sequence. He calls this constellation `now-time' because it 
is an event that aims to see (from the position of the now) history differently. In 
this event the continuity of history as chronos is destructed and different 
continuities between disparate fragments of time are established. 
For Benjamin, then, historical insight is when one puts the present into a 
constellation with the past. This forming of a constellation is the spatial aspect of 
Benjamin's event as kairos; it is a place in which past and present are read 
together: 
It's not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on 
what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the 
now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the 
relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what- 
has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly emergent. (BGS 
V, 576; AP, 462) 
Benjamin's `dialectical image' is the place where past, present and future come 
together; it is the specific place of `now-time', where "each `now' is the now of a 
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particular recognisability" (BGS V, 577; AP, 463). Thus, for Benjamin history 
needs to be recognised, it needs to be worked on, it needs to be read, as it were. 
History is a contingent and contested phenomenon that is constructed through the 
speculative power of thought. For Benjamin, dialectics is when one puts 
fragments of historical experience and dominant contemporary images of time 
together in such a way that a powerful constellation is formed, from which a `flash 
of knowledge' springs that is able to illuminate the here and now. This `dialectical 
imaging' is not progressive per se. There is no guarantee that the `flash of 
knowledge' produced by the event enables a `higher state of development'. 
Instead, it is simply an opportunity to see history differently and a response to the 
danger that the past becomes a part of "the homogeneous course of history" (BGS 
1.2,703; TPH, 254). 
Benjamin's `dialectical image' is not a subjective appearance, but an image of a 
real place, in the sense that real social antagonisms and struggles appear in this 
image. This `dialectical image', or constellation, aims to be an interruption of 
homogenous time, which would, at least this is the hope, reawaken the `sleeping 
collectivity'. It is this awakening which renders Benjamin's event political: 
The Copernican revolution in historical perception is as follows. Formerly it was thought 
that a fixed point had been found in `what has been', and one saw the present engaged in 
tentatively concentrating the forces of knowledge on this ground. Now this relation is to be 
overturned, and what has been is to become the dialectical reversal - the flash of awakened 
consciousness. Politics attains primacy over history. (BGS V, 490-491; AP, 388-389, 
emphasis added) 
This, then, spells out Benjamin's conception of the event of politics. What 
Benjamin calls for in the above passage is an overturning of the established logic 
of positioning knowledge as a predefined category of historical thought. His 
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`Copernican revolution' is that the `now' has to be genuinely understood as a time 
of the present, as opposed to time as the `eternal return' of a homogenous 
historicist organisation of `what has been'. The `dialectical image' attempts to 
`rescue' time from the winners of history, from the ones in power, and interrupt 
the `dream-image' of that time. Yet, this political event is not only a destructive 
moment; instead, it is inherently constructive as it attempts to liberate a space of 
action and hope. As Benjamin once made clear, "`construction' presupposes 
`destruction"' (BGS V, 587; AP, 470). The `dialectical image', then, is an event of 
destruction which engenders the opportunity to construct something new. 
One should note that Benjamin's destructive dialectics cannot be synthesised into 
a final frontier, as if history could ever end, as if `the social' could ever escape 
struggle. As for Adorno, Benjamin's destruction does not lead to a final frontier of 
an endless, positive time; instead, it is a never-ending movement of `immanent 
critique', which is always looking for new opportunities, new journeys, new 
passages - it always demands from us "to read what was never written" before 
(BGS 1.3,1238, my translation). However, to let there be no misunderstanding, 
"what is essential is not in the passage to infinity itself. .. 
but rather what this 
passage blossoms into" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 285). Or, to put it 
differently, what is important is not the endless negative movement of destruction, 
but the political positivity of a collection of forces to reposition reality, to 
construct a new actuality: 
It is very easy to establish oppositions, according to determinate points of view, within the 
various `fields' of any epoch, such that on one side lies the `productive', `forward-looking', 
`lively', `positive' part of the epoch, and on the other side the abortive, retrograde, and 
obsolescent. The very contours of the positive element will appear distinctly only insofar as 
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this element is set off against the negative. On the other hand, every negation has its value 
solely as background for the delineation of the lively, the positive. It is therefore of decisive 
importance that a new partition be applied to this initially excluded, negative component so 
that, by a displacement of the angle of vision (but not of the criteria! ), a positive element 
emerges anew in it too - something different from that previously signified. And so on, ad 
infinitum, until the entire past is brought into the present in a historical apocatastasis. (BGS 
V, 573; AP, 459) 
The key term here is `apocatastasis', which is formed by assembling the following 
three Greek words: `apo' (away from, detached), `cata' (against, reversal), and 
`stasis' (static). One could suggest that `apocatastasis' implies an enlarging 
movement that goes against an established order or continuum of history. This 
movement is not simply destructive; instead, it is constructive as it sets something 
into place (katastasis, establishment, to set, to place). The kairotic opportunity of 
this movement, as it were, is that it blossoms into something bigger than itself. 
This is what `apo' implies: the destructive movement detaches itself and grows 
into a different historical continuum, a new universality. At the same time, 
however, this affirmative `apocatastasis' seems to be impossible because it can 
only be the product of an infinite movement of displacement, as Benjamin 
suggests in the above passage. This brings us back, then, to his notion of `non- 
synthesis', which suggests that the dialectical process can never come to an end. 
This bears the question of who brings about such an `apocatastasis'. This, then, is 
the question after the subject that is supposed to enact the dialectical movement of 
destruction. It is true that Benjamin's discourse sometimes gives the impression of 
being reliant on a conception of a voluntaristic subject who simply decides to see 
the world differently. Phrases such as `the flash of awakened consciousness' or 
`politics attains primacy over history' fuel such an interpretation. While one 
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could, perhaps, accuse Benjamin for not always being dialectical enough (Adorno, 
for example, did so privately in a letter sent to Benjamin on the 18`h of March 
1936; see C and Adorno, 1995: 168), one should not underestimate his lifelong 
concern to conceptualise subjectivity as something that is produced by specific 
historical constellations of time and space. The Arcades Project, for example, 
presents a whole plethora of subjects, such as the fläneur and the prostitute, whose 
bodies are shaped by the forces of early modernity and capitalism - these subjects 
are not free but alienated. His essay `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction' (WoA), too, shows how technological forces change the subject's 
cognitive schema and perceptual apparatus. In both the Arcades Project and the 
`Work of Art' essay Benjamin is careful not to simply call for a return to some 
sort of original human or a Being. His concern is to explore the political 
possibilities technological innovations, such as film montage, open up for the 
production of different subjectivities. This, then, is to suggest that Benjamin's 
`dialectical image', which constructs a constellation of historical images, is 
dialectical because it is not a voluntaristic illumination; instead, it is an image that 
is constructed before the subject, not by the subject. This is to say, the `dialectical 
image' is an `immanent critique' because it springs out of the antagonisms of 
history themselves. It is an image that does not stand outside history; it is made 
possible by history precisely because history is not able to present itself as a full 
continuum. Benjamin's political event engenders this dialectic between the 
possibility and impossibility of history; the `primacy of politics over history' tries 
to open up a space for seeing possibilities in what is the impossibility of history. 
For him, history clearly produces the subject as well as itself. His work seems to 
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claim, however, that this includes possibilities of producing history and 
subjectivity differently. 
The Politics of Deconstruction 
One philosopher who has made productive use of the philosophical tradition of 
destruction is Derrida. The connection between his concept of `deconstruction' 
and `destruction' is made explicit when he says: 
I wished to translate and adapt to my own ends the Heideggerian word Destruktion or 
Abbau. Each signified in this context an operation bearing on the structure or traditional 
architecture of the fundamental concepts of ontology or of Western metaphysics. But in 
French `destruction' too obviously implied an annihilation or a negative reduction much 
closer perhaps to Nietzschean `demolition' than to the Heideggerian interpretation or to the 
type of reading that I proposed (Den-ida, 1991a: 270-271). 
Besides Heidegger's philosophy, Derrida has also been a prolific reader of 
Benjamin. One could, for example, mention Derrida's work on justice and 
violence (e. g. 1991b), which offers a reading of Benjamin's essay `Critique of 
Violence' (Coy). Derrida (e. g. 1985,2001) has also drawn on Benjamin's essay 
`The Task of the Translator' (TT) in which, as I briefly mentioned above, he sees 
translation as the destruction of text, a destruction that does not get rid of text but 
offers ways of reading differently. It could be argued that what Derrida's 
`deconstruction' shares with Benjamin's `destruction' is the insistence on the need 
to not simply read text and history as they have always been read but to read them 
differently. 
Now, there can be no question that Derrida's concept of deconstruction is 
definable in any strict sense. As I mentioned already in the Preface, 
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deconstruction, like destruction, is not a `method'; it is not something that can be 
easily positioned, reproduced and examined. Instead, it is a movement that always 
already escapes definition. This also forbids a simple comparison of 
deconstruction with the conceptualisations of destruction discussed above. What I 
would, nevertheless, like to show is that deconstruction and destruction can both 
be seen as movements between negativity and positivity: movements that are not 
simply endless and arbitrary but affirmative in the sense that they aim to transform 
and politically reposition something. Although it cannot be the task of this thesis 
to fully engage with Derrida's philosophy and its possibilities for such a project of 
transformation - this has been done elsewhere" - what I would like to move 
towards is a productive reading of Derrida that shows the close affinities between 
what is sometimes regarded as different philosophical traditions, namely those of 
German so-called critical theory and French so-called post-structuralism. 
Naturally, I am here particularly interested in exploring Derrida's conception of 
`the political', or, rather, examining in which way deconstruction can be seen as 
an explicitly political practice of theory. 
As a starting point, one could suggest that, for Derrida, deconstruction is a kind of 
spacing, which is interesting in connection to my discussion of positioning: 
"Spacing designates nothing, nothing that is, no presence at a distance; it is the 
index of an irreducible exterior, and at the same time of a movement, a 
displacement that indicates an irreducible alterity" (Derrida, 1987: 81, emphasis in 
original). Hence, deconstruction can be seen as a movement of depositioning, a 
15 Although thorough and detailed engagements with Derrida's work have been rare within 
organisation theory, Jones (2003a, c) delivers an example of how Derrida can be productively 
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movement that displaces16 presence in order to show the difference and 
undecidability that is always already inherent to every emplacement. It is this 
undecidability that depositions every structure; deconstruction displaces 
seemingly fixed constructions - like Benjamin destructs the Parisian arcades - in 
order to expose their ephemerality and transience. Such an interpretation of 
deconstruction is well-known; one could say, perhaps, that this is how 
deconstruction is normally portrayed. It is seen as a movement that puts any truth 
into question by showing its limits as fixed position. Some commentators (e. g. 
Lehman, 1991; Smith, 1988; and Lilek in Butler et al., 2000) have used such an 
interpretation to point to what they see as the tendency of deconstructionist 
thought to be somewhat relativistic and apolitical. However, Derrida is quite 
careful to position deconstruction as a movement that is not relativistic. For him, 
[d]econstruction ... is not neutral. It intervenes.... [T]here is no effective and efficient 
position, no veritable force of rupture, without a minute, rigorous, extended analysis, an 
analysis that is as differentiated and as scientific as possible. Analysis of the greatest 
number of possible givens, and of the most diverse givens (general economy)... It is 
necessary to uproot this notion of taking a position from every determination that... remains 
psychologistic, subjectivistic, moral and voluntaristic (Derrida, 1987: 94). 
Derrida, then, insists that deconstruction is an intervention. As for Benjamin, this 
intervention, or interruption, of the normal `goings-on' of reality, is not 
voluntaristic; instead, it is made possible through the rigorous analysis of those 
positions that always already structure reality. 
How, then, does deconstruction intervene if it always already aims at displacing 
positions, structures and truths? Derrida answers this question by showing how 
read in relation to a project of resisting and transforming organisation theory. 
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deconstruction is never just a negative organisational principle, in the sense that it 
only discontinues or dismembers. For him, deconstruction is both a dismembering 
and membering (Derrida, 1978: 234); that is, deconstruction not only disperses, 
displaces or depositions; it also re-members, re-places and re-positions. The 
negative of dismembering is thus always already complemented by an organised 
movement of membering - depositioning is accompanied by repositioning. To 
explicate this double-movement in more detail, it is worth quoting Derrida at 
some length: 
Therefore we must proceed using a double gesture, according to a unity that is both 
systematic and in and of itself divided, a double writing, that is, a writing that is in and of 
itself multiple... On the one hand, we must traverse a phase of overturning. To do justice to 
this necessity is to recognize that in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing 
with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-d-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the 
two terms governs the other..., or has the upper hand. To deconstruct the opposition, first 
of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. To overlook this phase of overturning 
is to forget the conflictual and subordinating structure of opposition. Therefore one might 
proceed too quickly to a neutralization that in practice would leave the previous field 
untouched, leaving one no hold on the previous opposition, thereby preventing any means 
of intervening in the field effectively. We know what always have been the practical 
(particularly political) effects of immediately jumping beyond oppositions, and of protests 
in the simple form of neither this nor that. When I say that this phase is necessary, the word 
phase is perhaps not the most rigorous one. It is not a question of a chronological phase, a 
given moment, or a page that one day simply will be turned, in order to go on to other 
things. The necessity of this phase is structural; it is the necessity of an interminable 
analysis: the hierarchy of dual oppositions always reestablishes itself.... That being said - 
and on the other hand - to remain in this phase is still to operate on the terrain of and from 
within the deconstructed system. By means of this double, and precisely stratified, 
dislodged and dislodging, writing, we must also mark the interval between inversion, which 
brings low what was high, and the irruptive emergence of a new 'concept', a concept that 
can no longer be, and never could be, included in the previous regime. If this interval, this 
biface or biphase, can be inscribed only in a bifurcated writing (and this hold first of all for 
a new concept of writing, that simultaneously provokes the overturning of the hierarchy 
16 In fact, Derrida explicitly describes his books as a displacement, and as the displacement of a 
question (1987: 3). 
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speech/writing, and the entire system attached to it, and releases the dissonance of a writing 
within speech, thereby disorganizing the entire inherited order and invading the entire 
field), then it can only be marked in what I would call a grouped textual field: in the last 
analysis it is impossible to point it out, for a unilinear text, or punctual position, an 
operation signed by a single author, are all by definition incapable of practicing this 
interval. (Derrida, 1987: 41-42, emphases in original) 
What Dezrida could be seen to describe in this passage is the deconstructive 
moment, the event of deconstruction, which, as I would argue, is closely 
connected to Benjamin's conception of the `event'. Derrida characterises this 
moment as a `bifurcated event' of writing that simultaneously overturns a given 
textual field, a reality, and rewrites it along new lines. In other words, Derrida's 
deconstructive event not only depositions or discontinues a given reality, as is 
sometimes assumed; it also attempts to reposition reality. As Derrida is keen to 
emphasise, this event cannot simply be a subjective experience. Instead, it is an 
event that happens within, what he calls, a `grouped textual field', in the sense that 
a rewriting of history happens from within the textual field of history itself. 
Derrida's deconstructive event of bifurcated writing is political precisely because 
established orders, or violent hierarchies of opposition, as he calls it, are 
overturned and rewritten along different lines. In this sense, deconstruction does 
not simply subsume every subject and object into a relativistic and nihilistic 
stream of nothingness, but directly addresses the violence of the established 
oppositions between subjects and objects. This is to say, for Derrida, 
deconstruction does not aim to neutralise a given field of subjects and objects. On 
the contrary, it aims to directly intervene in this field politically, that is, it 
recognises and addresses the specific relations of subjectivity and objectivity at 
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play. The political nature of deconstruction is made explicit by Derrida in the 
following passage: 
[T]his is the moment of politics - to have rules, conventions and stabilizations of power. 
All that a deconstructive point of view tries to show, is that since convention, institutions 
and consensus are stabilizations (sometimes stabilizations of great duration, sometimes 
micro-stabilizations), this means that they are stabilizations of something essentially 
unstable and chaotic. Thus, it becomes necessary to stabilize precisely because stability in 
not natural; it is because there is instability that stabilization becomes necessary; it is 
because there is chaos that there is a need for stability. Now, this chaos and instability, 
which is fundamental, founding and irreducible, is at one naturally the worst against which 
we struggle with laws, rules, conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the 
same time it is a chance, a chance to change, to destabilize. If there were continual stability, 
there would be no need for politics, and it is to the extent that stability is not natural, 
essential or substantial, that politics exists and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and 
a chance, and it is here that the possible and the impossible cross each other. (Derrida, 
1996: 83-84) 
What Derrida describes here is, what he calls, the `moment of politics', or what I 
have referred to as the `event of politics'. For him, politics is possible because 
there is no a priori continuum or stability; that is, organised society is 
fundamentally nonexistent as there is only chaos, which is impossible to eternally 
fix in one place. However, according to Derrida, it is precisely because of this 
essentially unstable and chaotic nothingness that makes it necessary to organise 
society, that is, to introduce rules, laws and, what he calls, `provisional 
hegemonies'. This is essentially the political event: to make something possible 
within the open space of impossibility. For Derrida, this event is inherently 
undecidable because chaos cannot be fixed and organised only in one way. Yet, he 
is equally quite clear: the event of undecidability requires a decision; that is, the 
chaos of pure impossibility is not an option. Political decisions about how to 
organise society are needed. It is because there are different ways of making these 
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decisions, or, rather, because there are different decisions one can take, there is a 
question of politics. 
Yet, what we can also learn from Derrida is that `the political' cannot simply be a 
singularity, a place that describes a particular geography, a profession, a 
programme or a manifesto. Instead, `the political' is an undecidable space that 
requires social enacting. For Derrida, the political event is when a social decision 
emerges out of an undecidable situation: it is the event in which an affirmation is 
organised out of the undecidable fragments of a negative movement of displacing. 
But precisely because `the political' has to move through a movement of 
negativity it cannot be restricted to a singular place whose shape and form can be 
foreseen or pre-positioned, nor can it be reduced to an historical programme or a 
manifesto. This is to say, then, that, for Derrida, `the political' does not have an 
essence; it can come in all sorts of shapes and forms, which we might not even 
recognise as `the political'. However, as the movement of deconstruction, `the 
political', too, does not simply go away. Instead, it is there for us to deal with, to 
give it a shape, a form, an organisation. 
The Politics of Impossibility 
So far in this chapter I have discussed two philosophical traditions and the way 
they can be seen to conceptualise the political event. In my view, the philosophies 
of destruction and deconstruction share an understanding of the political event as 
a dialectical movement between negativity and positivity. The movement of 
negativity is described by putting established historical orders into question. In the 
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first section of this chapter I discussed the political reasoning behind such a 
privileging of discontinuity. I argued that an act of discontinuity is a political 
questioning of the continuity of history, which is always already reproduced by 
`those in power'. Discontinuity is political because it questions, challenges and 
resists the `principled positions' along which society is organised. What, however, 
I have been keen to show throughout this chapter is that the political event, as 
conceptualised by the philosophies discussed here, is not only a movement of 
negativity, which simply leads to displacement and undecidability. I argued that 
the political event also seeks to put into place an affirmation. This putting into 
place is a social decision about how to fill the gap produced by undecidability; or, 
put differently, it is an affirmation of discontinuity by establishing new 
continuities. 
What my discussion of the philosophies of destruction and deconstruction has also 
shown is that the political event does not simply produce new positivities, 
decisions or unities in the sense that these new continuities are thought to be 
totalities. Instead, these new continuities are themselves characterised by an 
undecidability. This is to say, continuity is always an imperfect synthesis of 
multiple forces. This is why Benjamin talks about `non-synthesis' and Adorno 
refers to the dialectical process as `negative dialectics'. What this implies is that 
the dialectical movement between negativity and positivity can never produce 
final answers; it will always fail to put into place, what Benjamin calls, an 
`apocatastasis', a new total continuum. However, what needs to be remembered is 
that it is because of this very failure that dialectics is enabled in the first place. 
This is to say, precisely because a continuum can never be perfect or all- 
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encompassing there are possibilities of discontinuities. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987), these discontinuities, or, what they call, deterritorialisations, are 
always already inherent to the way capital works. That is, in their view capitalism 
is not simply a fully territorialised or totalitarian system. Instead, it is 
characterised by a plethora of deterritorialisation forces that continuously leave 
the regime of capital open for intervention and change. As Hardt and Negri (2000) 
make clear throughout Empire, capital is a dynamic regime. Resistance to the 
`normal goings-on' of capital are therefore enabled from within these very 
`goings-on'. That is, discontinuities cannot be launched from an artificial 
`outside', for example, a voluntaristic subject; instead, they are immanent to the 
continuities. Resistance, then, can only come from within regimes of power and 
knowledge that always already produce subjectivities. In this view, resistance is 
made possible because the regime of capital itself is impossible; that is, it is not 
fully constituted as continuity. This, then, I would suggest, is the dialectics of 
possibility and impossibility that describes the political event. As I have shown in 
the above sections, speculative thought engenders this dialectical movement by 
searching for political possibilities within the realm of the impossible. 
So far I have been concerned with the conceptualisation of the political event, but 
it is not quite clear yet how this event relates to the constitution of social 
organisation or, indeed, society. To make this link between the political event and 
`the social' clearer I will now turn to the political theory of Laclau and Mouffe, 
who have made productive use of the philosophies discussed in this chapter. In 
my view, it is their concern to show how the dialectical movement between 
possibility and impossibility is at the heart of the question of society. For Laclau 
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and Mouffe, who explicitly claim to write in a deconstructionist tradition of 
thought (1985: 2-3), one of the important concepts to describe this movement 
between possibility and impossibility is `hegemony', which I will introduce in this 
section and connect to the philosophies discussed above. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985, see also Mouffe, 1993, and Laclau, 1990, 
1996a, b), society is fundamentally impossible. That is, for them, the dialectical 
movement between possibility and impossibility can never be resolved because 
society itself is impossible or undecidable. This can be related to the notions of 
`negative dialectics' and `non-synthesis' which, as I discussed above, also point to 
the impossibility of ever finalising the dialectical process. For Laclau and Mouffe, 
this impossibility or undecidability of society is structural (Laclau, 1995: 93), 
which means that `the social' will never be fully represented, it can never be 
`finished'. This `structural undecidability' of `the social' points to an 
understanding of structure as discourse, which, for Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 109- 
111), highlights that society can never be fixed in an all-encompassing, centralised 
place. Instead, society should be seen as a social interaction that occurs within a 
discursive context. For them, this discourse can never be total; instead, it is 
characterised by resistance and difference. This coincides with Foucault's 
understanding of the interrelationship between power and resistance, mentioned in 
Chapter One. In their view, then, discourse can only be a partial fixation. This 
implies that it can only establish a precarious order of `the social'. If discourse is 
only partial, Laclau and Mouffe maintain, there will always be an excess of 
meaning, something which escapes the logic of discourse. They call this `the field 
of discursivity' (1985: 111), which is not extra-discursive or non-discursive, but 
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indeed produced by the very discourse of which it is a surplus. Because there will 
always be a certain excess of meaning, society can be seen as being `structurally 
undecidable'. 
Yet, precisely because of this undecidability there is, for Laclau and Mouffe, the 
question of the decision. This is to say that the impossibility of society has to be 
represented (or misrepresented, this will always be an undecidable question) by 
one particular content -a political force, a class, a `grouped textual field'. 
Following Derrida, Laclau calls this a `real' decision, because it is inherently 
undecidable how to represent society: 
To deconstruct the structure is the same as to show its undecidability, the distance between 
the plurality of arrangements that are possible out of it and the actual arrangement that has 
finally prevailed. This we can call a decision in so far as: (a) it is not predetermined by the 
`original' terms of the structure; and (b) it requires its passage through the experience of 
undecidability. The moment of decision, the moment of madness, is this jump from the 
experience of undecidability to a creative act, a fiat which requires its passage through that 
experience.... This act cannot be explained in terms of any rational underlying mediation. 
This moment of decision as something left to itself and unable to provide its grounds 
through any system of rules transcending itself, is the moment of the subject. (Laclau, 
1996b: 54-55) 
For Laclau, then, the event of decision is not a decision one takes as subject. 
Instead, it is a decision out of which the subject emerges. This is an important 
insight which can be connected to Benjamin's concept of `dialectical image' 
discussed above. For him, this image is not a subjective illumination but one 
which springs out of history itself. Similarly, Laclau seems to locate the agency of 
the decision in the structures of society rather than the individual subject. Laclau 
bases such an understanding on the psychoanalytic theories of Lacan. These I will 
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now briefly summarise because they seem to be important for understanding 
Laclau and Mouffe's conception of the politics of impossibility. 
For Lacan, "the subject as such is uncertain" (1998: 188) - one could, perhaps, 
say undecidable or impossible. For him, `the social' is not constructed by the 
interplay of subjective experiences of others (with a small `o') - in his view, 
people do not decide their future for themselves. Instead, the subject is 
`overdetermined' by the symbolic order (words, meanings, narratives) that 
prepositions `the social'. Lacan calls this symbolic order `the Other' (with a 
capital `O'), which is external to the subject, as it is a set of objective positions, 
perhaps Foucault's discursive regime or apparatus. This Lacanian Other forms the 
subject's identity: "The Other is the locus in which is situated the chain of the 
signifier that governs whatever may be made present of the subject - it is the field 
of that living being in which the subject has to appear" (1998: 203). For Lacan, 
"the subject depends on the signifier", which has to be located "in the field of the 
Other" (ibid.: 205). The Lacanian subject, then, is not a priori `full' - there is 
nothing to discover `inside' the subject, through self-knowledge or any other 
psychological strategy. Instead the subject is defined by an a priori lack, or gap. 
One could also say that subject is always already depositioned. This lack is 
constantly filled and refilled by the symbolic regimes of the Other. In this sense, 
the subject is a `fold' of the Other, to use a Deleuzian expression (1988: 94ff). 
The implications of such a Lacanian theorisation of the subject are immense. It 
moves us away from the humanist essentialism that seems to underlie many 
discourses. It links "the Ito socially elaborated situations" (Lacan, 1977: 5); that 
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is, the `I' is not viewed as the grand constructor of sociality, as the decision- 
maker, but as a product of this very sociality. This implies that, for Lacan, the 
question of the subject is always already one of alienation (1998: 203ff). That is, 
because the subject is not `free' of any ties, because it is produced by the Other, is 
comes into existence by way of an invasion of the Other's symbolic meanings, the 
prepositioned regime of reality. However, this invasion can never be a `full 
invasion', an invasion that completely fills the subject's lack. Put differently, 
although the subject can only exist through the symbols of the Other, this 
symbolisation can never capture the totality of the subject's Real. For Lacan the 
Real (with a capital `R') is not simply reality. In fact, it is that which escapes the 
`normal' symbolisation regime of reality. One could also say that the Real is the 
lack of the Other; it is the surplus of reality that cannot be symbolised. Thus, a full 
identity of the subject is impossible; there will always be a gap between the Other 
and the Real; the subject will always be depositioned. Because of this lack, Lacan 
does not speak of the subject's identity but of identification (e. g. 1977: 61ff). This 
means that the subject's attempt to construct a full identity will always fail - there 
will always be a lack in the subject's desire to fully present itself. What we are 
therefore dealing with is not identity but "a series of identifications, failed 
identifications - or rather a play between identification and 
its failure" 
(Stavrakakis, 1999: 29). The Lacanian subject, then, is constituted by a certain 
failure, the failure to fully identify with the Other, the order of symbolic positions. 
One could also say that at the heart of the Lacanian subject is not harmony, the 
fully unified and biologically whole individual, but an antagonistic lack, which is 
traversed by a certain fantasy with which the individual identifies. 
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However, for Lacan, it is not only the subject that is characterised by an inherent 
lack. The Other, too, can never be a full, all-encompassing Other, which can 
provide a full identity to the subject. He writes: 
Let me simply say that this is what leads me to object to any reference to totality in the 
individual, since it is the subject who introduces division into the individual, as well as into 
the collectivity that is his equivalent. Psychoanalysis is properly that which reveals both the 
one and the other to be no more than mirages. (1977: 80) 
This is to say, precisely because the subject always lacks something, objective 
reality, or the Other, must also be defined by an a priori lack. But what is this 
`something' that the subject and the Other lack? For Lacan, this `something' is 
jouissance, which could be translated as `enjoyment', but it is not simply pleasure. 
For Lacan, pleasure is produced by the symbolic order, the Other. Jouissance is 
beyond socially sanctioned pleasure (1998: 184); it is located in the Real, that 
which is not symbolisable. Jouissance is therefore never fully attainable, it can 
never be subsumed or incorporated into the Other. 
As the Real and its jouissance are impossible to symbolise, there will always be a 
gap in the Other. 
We have obviously gone over Lacan's work far too quickly here. Yet, the above 
summary can, perhaps, help us to understand the psychoanalytical background to 
the notion of the impossibility of society. For Laclau and Mouffe, `the social' is 
impossible precisely because there will always be a Lacanian lack in both the 
Other and the subject. That is, `the social' can never be represented as a full 
objectivity of reality; therefore, a subject can never fully identify with reality. As 
Laclau writes: 
All subject positions are the effect of a structural determination... As a structure, however, 
constitutively undecidable, decisions are required that the structure does not predetermine - 
77 
2. The Political Event 
this is the moment of the emergence of the subject as different from subject positions. As 
the decision constituting the subject is one taken in conditions of insurmountable 
undecidability, it is one that does not express the identity of the subject (something that the 
subject already is) but requires acts of identification. These acts split the new identity of the 
subject: this identity is, on one hand, a particular content, on the other it embodies the 
absent fullness of the subject. (1996b: 57, emphases in original) 
What Laclau calls here the `absent fullness of the subject' points precisely to the 
notion that `the social' is inherently impossible. This is to say, a full 
representation of `the social' is never achievable, as both the Other and the subject 
are characterised by an inherent lack. For Laclau, this amounts to a `structural 
undecidability' of society. One could also say that it is structurally impossible to 
ever close the question of `the social'. Yet, what Laclau seems to suggest in the 
above passage is that, precisely because of this undecidability, there is the 
question of the decision. Out of this decision, he maintains, the subject emerges as 
the act of identification with a particular content. 
Because, for Laclau and Mouffe, `the social' is `structurally undecidable', 
different identifications are possible. This is to say, because the structure of the 
Other is a discourse that is characterised by a `field of discursivity', or a field of 
difference, different kind of subjects can be produced. This is why Laclau and 
Mouffe insist that society is not a totality but, instead, characterised by 
antagonisms. '? What these antagonisms point to is an inherent fragility of social 
organisation; it can only be something partial and precarious (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 125). This is to say, because society is inherently characterised by 
17 Laclau and Mouffe write about their conception of antagonism: "Insofar as there is antagonism, 
I cannot be a full presence for myself. But nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence: 
its objective being is a symbol of my non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality 
of meanings which prevent its being fixed as full positivity" (1985: 125). 
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antagonisms, it is impossible for `the social' to ever fully organise itself; there will 
always be something that subverts its full presence. This is why Laclau and 
Mouffe maintain: "Society never manages fully to be society, because everything 
in it is penetrated by its limits, which prevent it from constituting itself as an 
objective reality" (1985: 127). 
However, precisely because of this fragile nature of `the social', Laclau and 
Mouffe insist that there is a need to organise society. This is the terrain of `the 
political'. This coincides with Derrida's view, which maintains that because of the 
fundamental chaos and undecidability of society there is a need for political 
decisions about laws and institutions. This decision can also be understood as a 
strategy of simplifying the space of social organisation in such a way that it can be 
politically enacted. For Laclau and Mouffe, this political decision is engendered 
by a `logic of equivalence' (1985: 130) . 
fig Whereas the `logic of antagonisms' 
points to the fundamental impossibility of society - to its openness and 
undecidability - the `logic of equivalence' gives presence to some of these 
antagonisms in order to politically act upon them. This equivalence fills the 
inherent lack of `the social' and enables identification with a particular 
organisation of reality. This dialectic between antagonisms and equivalence, then, 
points again to the dialectic between the impossible and the possible, which is 
characterised by a double movement. The first movement is one that embraces 
I8 Equivalence refers to the logical relationship or correspondence between two statements if they 
are either both true or both false. The term `equivalence' is used by Laclau and Mouffe to 
explain how a political `playing field' is established within society that always already lacks a 
clear centre, i. e. that is defined by difference. They base their conceptualisation of difference 
and equivalence on Lacan's concepts of metonymy and metaphor respectively. For a further 
discussion of these concepts see, for example, Stavrakakis (1999: 74ff); see also Lacan's 
discussion of metaphor and metonymy (e. g. 1977: 156,164). 
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difference; it shows the limits of any fixed reality and exposes the antagonisms of 
social organisation. However, as Laclau notes, this first movement 
cannot be the end of the matter. A discourse in which meaning cannot possibly be fixed is 
nothing else but the discourse of the psychotic. The second movement therefore consists in 
the attempt to effect this ultimately impossible fixation. The social is not only the infinite 
play of differences. It is also the attempt to limit that play, to domesticate infinitude, to 
embrace it within the finitude of an order. But this order - or structure - no longer takes the 
form of an underlying essence of the social; rather, it is an attempt - by definition unstable 
and precarious - to act over the `social', to hegemonize it. (Laclau, 1990: 90-91, emphasis 
in original) 
What Laclau emphasises here again is that there is a need to move from the level 
of undecidability to that of a decision. It is this move from the undecidable level 
of a limitlessly open society to a decidable level of social discourse which, for 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985), is articulated by the concept of `hegemony'. 
In their book, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 7-91) genealogically trace the concept of 
hegemony to a set of radical political discourses. These range from Rosa 
Luxemburg to Kautsky, from Marx to Lenin, from Bernstein to Sorel, from 
Trotsky to Gramsci, as well as many other thinkers. There is no space here to 
engage with Laclau and Mouffe's detailed discussion of the historical emergence 
of the discourse of hegemony at any great length. Without wanting to simplify 
their discussion one could, perhaps, suggest that their main concern is to show 
that the concept of hegemony can be seen as a response to those essentialist 
discourses that see reality to be structured by underlying economic laws giving 
rise to specific economic classes. In their view, the concept of hegemony was 
introduced to suggest that the structuring of reality does not only depend on 
economic necessities but also on political contingencies. This is to say, for 
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example, "if the working class, as a hegemonic agent, manages to articulate 
around itself a number of democratic demands and struggles, this is due not to any 
a priori structural privilege, but to a political initiative on the part of the class" 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 65). In other words, the working class is not "the 
expression of a common underlying essence but the result of political construction 
and struggle" (ibid. ). 
For Laclau and Mouffe, Gramsci (1971) was one of the most important `anti- 
essentialist' thinkers who saw the historical, contingent character of the working 
class. For Gramsci, despite its specific economic necessities, the working class is 
required to articulate its demands within a plural field of democratic politics 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 70). Yet, according to Laclau and Mouffe, Gramsci 
still restricted his understanding of political struggle to the realm of the working 
class. As I mentioned above, they applied Foucault's (1970,1972) notion of 
`discursive formation' to argue (1985: 105-114) that political struggle is 
articulated through a whole range of different discursive practices, which cannot 
be located in an essentialist category like the working class. Laclau and Mouffe's 
argument was, of course, embedded in a specific historical juncture which, in the 
mid-1980s, was characterised by the crisis of `the left' (the crisis of social 
democracy and the communist project), the rise of `neo-liberalism' (e. g. Thatcher, 
Reagan) as well as the emergence of so-called new social movements, such as 
feminist, gay, green, pacifist and Black civil rights movements, to name but a few 
(see Chapter Five). Laclau and Mouffe's concern was to open up the questions of 
`the political' and hegemony to these specific social developments that are 
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characterised, not only by concerns of the working class or labour movements, but 
by a multiplicity of discursive struggles. 
The concept of `hegemony', then, points to the notion that struggle occurs in 
multiple places and involves a great variety of discourses. As I have already 
noted, for Laclau and Mouffe, "hegemony supposes the incomplete and open 
character of the social" (1985: 134). This is why Laclau refers to the `structural 
undecidability' of society. In his view, society is structurally undecidable because 
it cannot be represented by a fixed signifier. This is to say, then, that, for Laclau 
and Mouffe, society is contingent; it is characterised by a multiplicity of political 
struggles that occur in many different social places. However, this is only one 
aspect of hegemony. The other aspect is that precisely because of the `structural 
undecidability' and multiplicity of society there is a need for a social decision 
about how to organise society. Following Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe assert that 
society is not simply an inter-play of multiple forces but, instead, described by a 
discursive unity (1985: 7). That is, there are concrete social formations that are 
characterised by the specific ordering and positioning of forces of power and 
knowledge. Linking back to my discussion of Heidegger in Chapter One we 
could, perhaps, say that hegemony points to the idea that social reality is 
positioned or emplaced within particular historical formations, which endure over 
time and space. This emplacing is not simply the placing of something, as Sam 
Weber notes (1996: 71). Instead, it is, what he calls, the `staking out' of a place 
and the constant defence of that place. As I discussed in Chapter One, this 
constant maintenance and defence of a social formation, an emplacement, is what 
Heidegger refers to as `goings-on'. 
82 
2. The Political Event 
The `goings-on' of a hegemonic emplacement also produces specific 
subjectivities; the subject is `staked out', so to say, by concrete social formations. 
Now, as I argued above, any social emplacement, or hegemonic formation, must 
be seen as being contested. That is, social struggles are constitutive of any social 
formation. For Laclau and Mouffe, these struggles are an effect of the practice of 
articulation, which is the establishing of relations among actors in such a way that 
"their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice" (1985: 105). For 
them, the concept of articulation points to the fact that social struggles do not 
merely express episodic rivalries or acts of dissent, which are constructed around 
temporary political demands. Instead, in their view, political struggles are 
articulated from within social antagonisms that are constructed by hegemonic 
discourses. This means that social conflicts are related to wider aspects of how 
subjectivities are produced by hegemonic discursive formations, or emplacements. 
One example of such a hegemonic discourse is `neo-liberalism', which, 
particularly over the course of the past twenty years, has articulated the worldwide 
politico-economic terrain by attacking bureaucratic and centralist forms of private 
and public organisation and privileging market entrepreneurship and shareholder 
value (Torfing, 1999: 102; see also my discussion in Chapter Five). Now, 
applying Laclau and Mouffe's concept of hegemonic articulation, one could say 
that the `neo-liberalist' discourse is the hegemony of the general politico- 
economic terrain. Going back to Laclau's above point, this hegemony can be seen 
as a decision about how to fill the gap that is left open by the undecidability or 
impossibility of society. This is to say, `neo-liberalism' has become possible, 
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because the wider politico-economic terrain is impossible. The hegemony of `neo- 
liberalism' is possible, precisely because it involves the construction, maintenance 
and defence of particular discursive formations that produce reality, including 
subjectivities, in concrete ways. `Neo-liberalism', then, is a social discourse that 
has emplaced this world in a particular fashion. This hegemonic emplacement is, 
however, not a totality. It is hegemonic because it is characterised by constant 
contestations and embattlements. In the language of Foucault one could say that 
because `neo-liberalism' is a regime of power and knowledge resistance is always 
already a feature of that very regime. Laclau and Mouffe's point is that this 
resistance is shaped by the way the hegemonic discourse is articulated. For 
example, the contemporary `anti-capitalist movement', with which I will engage 
in Chapter Five, has emerged precisely because of the way `neo-liberalist' 
discourses have been articulated. 
Now, Torfing (1999: 118-122) critiques Laclau and Mouffe's conception of 
politics for not being able to account for the day-to-day politics, which are not 
always characterised by social antagonisms. For him, politics does not always 
have to involve hegemonic struggles, such as those that involve `neo-liberalism' 
and capitalism. Although Torfing primarily seems to point to everyday political 
practices by governments and other political institutions, one could expand his 
critique and suggest that Laclau and Mouffe's conception of hegemonic politics 
does not, perhaps, leave enough room for those multiple `micro-political' 
practices, which do not necessarily involve struggles based on social antagonisms. 
While it might be the case that Laclau and Mouffe do not pay enough attention to 
the politics of the everyday, they would insist on the multiplicity of articulatory 
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practices of resistance (e. g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 131). Their point is that the 
articulation of political struggles is always connected to the production of 
identities, or rather identifications, which is based on the establishment of `chains 
of equivalence'. That is, resistance is relational; in their view, `chains of 
equivalences' establish a certain sameness among resisting actors who construct a 
political `field of negativity', which involves a discourse of social antagonism, or 
an `us' against `them' (Mouffe, 1993: 7). For Laclau and Mouffe, these `chains of 
equivalence' of an articulatory practice institute themselves over the course of a 
historical period which partially fixes `the social' along specific lines of 
organisation. 
`Anti-capitalism', for example, is made possible because of an articulatory 
practice of opposition against the particular ways `neo-liberalist' capitalism is 
currently organised. The `anti-capitalist movement' has established a `field of 
negativity', a field of `us' against `them', precisely because it resists the particular 
`goings-on' of capitalism. Going back to my above discussion of Hardt and 
Negri's opposition against Hegel and dialectics, one could, perhaps, say that their 
practice of opposition is a similar establishment of a `field of negativity'. That is, 
Hardt and Negri oppose Hegel because they aim to resist the particular ways 
dialectical thinking has shaped philosophical thought. My above point was not, 
however, that opposition is not possible. I tried to highlight that a discourse of 
total opposition (or what Hardt refers to as `forgetting') is impossible because the 
opposition against Hegel only becomes possible through the phenomenon we call 
`Hegel'. Equally, `anti-capitalism' is only made possible because there is 
`capitalism'. This means, then, that resistance against something can only be 
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articulated from within the discursive formation of which it is a product. There is 
not an `outside' from which one can develop a position of critique. Resistance is 
always already produced and enabled by the discourse it aims to oppose. 
The point to make, then, is that, although the hegemony of `neo-liberalism' and 
capitalism emplaces and organises social reality in particular ways, it can never be 
a totality. As Derrida, says: 
When one speaks of hegemony - that is, the relation of forces - the laws of structure are 
tendential; they are determined not (to not determine) in terms of yes or no, hence in terms 
of simple exclusion, but in those of differential forces, more or less. (Derrida, 1997: 293, 
emphasis in original) 
Hegemony is thus a discursive structure that is inherently open and precarious. It 
enables resistances and oppositions: discourses of `anti'. This, however, should 
not cloud the fact that a hegemonic structure is a particular emplacement of social 
reality; it involves a certain ideological closure. This closure can be seen as a 
social decision as to how to make society possible; it is a closing of the gap of 
society's `structural undecidability' in order to produce social meaning. This 
closure, or decision, can, however, never be final, precisely because hegemony 
points to the contingency and impossibility of society. 
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of Management Knowledge 
In the previous chapter I discussed a range of different philosophies in order to 
conceptualise the political event. In my view, what the philosophies of 
destruction, deconstruction and impossibility share is an understanding of politics 
as a dialectical movement between negativity and positivity. That is, the political 
event is seen as a positivity that has to go through negativity. More colloquially 
one could say that, in order to change `something', that is, to act politically, one 
has to negate and discontinue that `something', one has to put that `something' 
into question and expose its limits and boundaries. I argued that such a negation 
becomes possible because history and society are impossible or undecidable, 
which means that they can never be full positivities. To say that society is 
impossible does, however, also mean that it is possible; that is, what the 
philosophies discussed above seem to generally share is the understanding that 
political decisions are possible, and indeed necessary, to organise society. The 
concept of hegemony points to the notion that society is characterised by 
decisions, which position and emplace `the social' in particular discursive 
formations that endure over time and space. Hegemonic formations are, however, 
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never all-encompassing; instead, they are open and precarious, that is, contested, 
which enables the dialectical process in the first place. 
In Chapter One I followed Parker's claim that management can be seen as the 
`hegemonic model of organisation' (2002a: 184). That is, in his view, the theory 
and practice of organisation is described by the hegemony of the management 
discourse. I argued that the hegemony of management is part of a project that 
positions social organisation in particular grids of rationality, representation and 
institutionality, which cannot be disconnected from the wider `goings-on' of 
capitalism. In this chapter I will discuss the hegemony of this positioning project 
in relation to the field of organisation theory. While it cannot be the task of this 
chapter to comprehensively outline, discuss and critique the hegemony of 
management discourses within contemporary organisation theory, I will use a 
particular example to illustrate the `goings-on' of the positioning project. The 
discourse which, in my view, illustrates the workings of the hegemony of 
management and the positioning project itself is knowledge management. 
In this chapter, then, I will engage with the field of knowledge management, 
which can be seen to have become one of the most popular organisation and 
management discourses over the past decade. As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 
Two, Peter Drucker, the famous management guru, predicted the rise of a 
knowledge society as early as in 1969. Then, in 1992 he wrote: 
In this society, knowledge is the primary resource for individuals and for the economy 
overall. Land, labour, and capital - the economist's traditional factors of production - do 
not disappear, but they become secondary. (1992: 95) 
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In 1991 Ikujiro Nonaka, another management guru, wrote in the Harvard 
Business Review: "In an economy where the only certainty is uncertainty, the one 
sure source of lasting competitive advantage is knowledge" (1991: 96). After 
these early guru rhetorics, the knowledge discourse became increasingly popular 
in the course of the 1990s. Today, it seems that knowledge management has 
populated large areas of organisation theory: information management, individual 
and organisational learning, innovation management, creativity management, 
strategic management, human resource management, culture management, 
capability management - all of these management theories and techniques can be 
related to the knowledge management rhetoric (for an overview see Prichard et 
al., 2000). 
In this chapter I will outline and discuss the discourse of knowledge management 
in order to critique its politics. After the first two sections generally introduce the 
field of knowledge management and its concerns, the main part of this chapter 
will be reserved for a Benjaminian critique of the `goings-on' of knowledge 
management. This critique will be structured into three sections: first, I will argue 
that knowledge, the way it is conceptualised and practiced by knowledge 
management, can be seen as, what Benjamin calls, a paralysing `shock' rather 
than an event which makes a new experience of reality possible; second, I will 
speculatively relate the knowledge manager to Benjamin's `heroes' of Parisian 
modernity, namely the fläneur and the prostitute, who are both seen to have a 
special empathy with the commodity; and, third, I will expose knowledge 
management to be inherently embedded in the `goings-on' of `commodity 
fetishism', which I will relate to the question of hegemony. What I try to achieve 
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in this chapter, then, is to engage with knowledge management to outline, discuss 
and critique its particular discourse. Yet, this is only the first movement. The 
second movement is the speculative attempt to construct an image of the wider 
hegemonic `goings-on' of the positioning project of organisation. When Benjamin 
studied the Parisian arcades he was only partly interested in the particularities and 
peculiarities of that architectural phenomenon; what really made his Arcades 
Project into an important contribution was his ability to relate the life of and 
around the arcades to the wider `goings-on' of Parisian 19`h century modernity 
itself. Taking the Arcades Project as inspiration, this engagement with the 
knowledge management discourse is an attempt to expose the `goings-on' of 
today's constellation of social organisation. 
Organisation, Management and the Knowledge Society 
What is the Zeitgeist of organisation? If one would go into a contemporary 
organisation and ask the seemingly obvious question `What is organisation? ', one 
would probably be met by either ignorance or lack of understanding. It seems so 
obvious. What else do organisations do than to organise? - organise processes of 
production, organise human resources, organise marketing activities, organise 
accounting and finances, organise strategy, organise research, organise culture, 
organise change, organise time, organise space... everything in a modern 
organisation needs to be organised. Yet, what seems so normal and natural to us 
today is, in fact, a very recent phenomenon. Although the concept of organisation 
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might have been around since ancient Greek times, 19 it is first and foremost linked 
to the emergence of capitalism and modem forms of divisions of labour, 
specialisation and mass production in the 18th and 19th century, which gave rise to 
`organisation man' (sic) (Whyte, 1956). For Parker, the rise of modern 
organisation is inherently linked to `management', which, in his view, has become 
the `hegemonic model of organisation' (2002a: 184). For him (2002a: 6-9), the 
word `management' has three interrelated meanings: first, it names a professional 
group of managers who can be found in most of today's organisations, whether in 
the public or private realm; second, management is a `doing' that describes a 
process of `sorting something out', but also of controlling something; third, 
management is an academic discipline whose task it is to produce knowledge 
about management and business. For Parker, management is the Zeitgeist of 
organisation. In his view, management is a specific form of organisation that has 
claimed universality under the conditions of capitalist modernity. 
The task of management is not simply to organise but to manage organisational 
operations more efficiently and effectively in the name of the owner or 
shareholder of a firm. As early as in 1835 Ure, who could, perhaps, be seen as one 
of the first management gurus, describes management as the juggling of the 
mechanical, moral and commercial aspects of the capitalist firm. According to 
Starbuck, Ure 
asserted that every factory incorporates `three principles of action, or three organic 
systems': (a) a `mechanical' system that integrates production processes, (b) a `moral' 
system that motivates and satisfies the needs of workers, and (c) a `commercial' system that 
19 Starbuck (2003) argues that pre-modern forms of organising included, for example, large 
armies, such as those of Genghis Khan; building projects, such as the Chinese Wall; or colonial 
trading companies, such as the Hudson Bay Company. 
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seeks to sustain the firm through financial management and marketing. Harmonizing these 
three systems, said Ure, was the responsibility of managers. (2003: 150) 
Management, then, is about the efficient and effective organisation of a range of 
systems that make up the corporate firm. The manager uses a range of rational 
tools and techniques for this job: planning, motivation, accounting, forecasting, 
marketing, appraisals, time management, to name just a few basic ones. Going 
back to the theme of `positioning', one could thus say that management is about 
the positioning of resources, i. e. objects and subjects, within the wider organised 
realm of a firm in order to produce surplus value. 
To stay with the example of time management for a second; the task of the 
manager is to qualify and quantify time in such a way that the systems of 
organisation can work efficiently and effectively hand in hand. In such a view, 
time is always already spatialised. That is, time is seen as a Newtonian objective, 
measurable, quantitative dimension of space; it characterises the linear, 
chronological, evolutionary and progressive development of existing spatial 
relations. The management of time has a long tradition in work organisations. 
Marx (1976: 350), for example, analyses in detail how time, besides labour power, 
is the most important commodity that characterises the organisation of the 
capitalist production process. The management of the time-commodity is of high 
importance because surplus value can be accrued by extracting more time from 
labourers than is required to reproduce their wages. The clock must therefore be 
seen as one of the most important managerial tools in the history of capitalist 
work organisation. It was also one of the main ordering devices 
for Taylor's 
scientific management as well as Ford's assembly line, which today, although 
its 
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death has been often announced (e. g. Piore and Sabel, 1984), can still be seen as 
one of the main principles of managerial organising. Let us think, for example, of 
the way McDonald's and the whole fast-food industry makes its money (see 
Ritzer's McDonaldization of Society20); one could also use the example of the 
just-in-time manufacturing system (see, for example, Sewell and Wilkinson, 
1992). An important aspect of management, then, is to manage the time aspects of 
work and production processes. 21 
However, beyond the concrete processes of managing time in work organisations, 
management can also be seen to continuously position and emplace `our' time, 
that is, the time of today's particular historical formation. Relating back to my 
discussion of Benjamin in Chapter Two, one could say that management is firmly 
embedded in an understanding of time as chronos. The task of management is to 
position time within a progressive line of historical order. For Benjamin, this 
history is always already the history of `those in power', those who have a 
concrete interest in the `eternal return' of the `ever same'. Management, one 
could, perhaps, suggest, is about ensuring that this `eternal return' is connected to 
an image of progress, that is, to `higher' and `faster' returns and `more' of `the 
same'. Management thus positions time within a particular historical order. What 
is crucial is the exact qualification of this positioning: management is always 
already positively positioned in relation to capital. That is, management serves 
20 For Ritzer, "McDonaldization is the process by which the principle of the fast-food restaurant 
are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as of the rest of 
world" (1996: 1). 
21 For a further discussion of how, in modern times, time is managed, sec Adam (1990,1995), 
Giddens (1990), Gurvitch (1964) and Nowotny (1994). For an overview of the literature on 
organisation in relation to questions of time (and space) see, for example, Butler (1995), 
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capital; its task is to produce and expand surplus value and ensure `higher' 
returns. Management is thus inherently political. Its politics is the continuous 
emplacement and reproduction of the hegemony of capital; its politics is the 
application and replication of capital's particular value system, a system which, 
according to Marx (1976), is geared towards the production of surplus value in the 
labour process. 
The politics of management is particularly apparent when one considers the 
rhetoric of shareholder value, which, according to Willmott, has only recently 
become an explicit objective for management. Before the stock market boom in 
the 1990s, he maintains, the purpose of management was more generally 
expressed in "universalistic terminology, such as improving efficiency and 
effectiveness, seemingly as ends in themselves" (2000: 216). But, as he adds, 
because of the underlying agenda of profit generation shareholder value could be 
seen to have always been an important aspect of management. The notion of 
shareholder value points to the idea that the most important aspect of the 
management of a company is the production of higher returns, that is, higher 
profit levels. As Marx (1976) clearly points out, the whole idea of the capitalist 
production process is to produce ever higher economic returns for owners, that is, 
shareholders, which can only be achieved by managing the labour process more 
effectively and efficiently. In this regard Jackson and Carter write: 
Management knowledge... constitutes a relatively homogeneous canon that claims to be 
able to improve organizational efficiency (and, thereby, profit, though the link is rarely 
demonstrable), in particular through the adoption of specific techniques for the use of 
Burrell (1992), Clark (1985,1990), Gherardi and Strati (1988), Lee and Liebenau (1999), 
Hassard (1996) and Holmer-Nadesan (1997). 
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labour. The general objective of these techniques is to enable units of labour to be more 
productive - that is, to work harder. (1998: 151) 
For Jackson and Carter, management knowledge is thus "an ideologically based 
canon, biased in favour of an essentially capitalist interest. It functions as part of 
the techno-mediatic hegemony that sustains this dominant discourse" (1998: 152). 
What Jackson and Carter name here, pace Derrida (1994), `techno-mediatic' 
relates to the Heideggerian understanding, discussed in Chapter One, that 
technical regimes of society need to be continuously emplaced and defended. 
Heidegger refers to this process as the technical `goings-on' of modernity. In 
Chapter Two I highlighted the inherently political aspect of this continuous 
emplacement, by suggesting that society is made possible by forging social 
discourses into a hegemonic order. Management is at the heart of the hegemony of 
capital precisely because it continuously organises its `goings-on'. The political 
purpose of management, then, is to continuously produce knowledge that enables 
the reproduction of capital. One could, perhaps, say that management has always 
been about the production of knowledge; that is, the management of knowledge 
has always been the very purpose of management. In this sense, managers have, 
perhaps, always been knowledge managers. This seems to be an important point 
to make in relation to today's popular rhetoric of knowledge management, which 
sometimes sees knowledge as a phenomenon that has only emerged recently; 
perhaps over the past decade or two. 
It is, perhaps, no coincidence that the rhetoric of knowledge management 
originates, in part, in the strategic management literature. I have already cited 
Drucker and Nonaka who started to `talk up' the importance of knowledge as a 
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strategic resource in the Harvard Business Review in the early 1990s (albeit 
Drucker, as we have seen, predicted the rise of a knowledge society as early as the 
1960s). Since then one has become accustomed to the talk of companies being 
`knowledge-intensive' (e. g. Alvesson, 1995; Starbuck, 1992) or `knowledge- 
based' (e. g. Grant, 1996). Special issues of organisation and management journals 
dedicated to knowledge management (e. g. Strategic Management Journal, 1996; 
Organization Science, 2002), new journals (e. g. Journal of Knowledge 
Management) and a whole plethora of books on knowledge have appeared. One 
can claim that today knowledge management is an integrated part of mainstream 
academic work in the area of organisation and management studies. This is not to 
say, however, that knowledge management has only been an academic discourse. 
On the contrary, management writers, who frequently praise themselves for being 
practice orientated, often claim that they are just describing what is already going 
on in organisations. 
Consultancies are often used as example for the practice of knowledge 
management (e. g. Alvesson, 1995; Moore and Birkinshaw, 1998; Robertson and 
Swan, 1998; Weiss 1998; Starbuck, 1992): they are described as being at the 
forefront of organisational learning (e. g. Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991), 
knowledge creation and innovation (e. g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) and the 
management of `knowledge workers', 22 to name just some aspects of knowledge 
management. The function of a management consultancy is fairly simple: it sells 
knowledge to managers. Its task is to advise management in how to organise 
22 Some of the authors who have elaborated on the concept of the knowledge worker are: Zuboff 
(1988), Kumar (1995), Drucker (1992), Handy (1989), and Hage and Powers (1992). 
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resources and operations more efficiently and effectively; that is, to develop 
knowledge that management can use to increase levels of surplus value. 
Management consultants can be seen to inhabit a special boundary space between 
theory and practice, between academic and business knowledge. Of course, some 
management academics and consultants quite actively traverse these boundaries 
by serving both markets. It is therefore of no surprise that management 
consultancies and management academics can be seen to be at the heart of the 
development and diffusion of what has been called the knowledge management 
fashion. 23 Knowledge is the object of interest for both consultants and academics; 
both professional groups make a living by creating and diffusing knowledge. 
Management consultants and management academics can thus be generally seen 
as service providers for management to help to create better knowledge to run 
businesses. However, it should be clear that not all management consultants and 
management academics are restricted in this sense. All the same, there is a clear 
economic relationship between these three groups (see also Shenhav, 2002, for an 
historical account of this relationship in an American context). 
Today's popular talk of the `knowledge society' or `information society' can 
therefore not be disconnected from the economics outlined above. One needs to 
bear in mind that when one talks of knowledge management one immediately 
talks of management knowledge and a privileged `class' of often white, middle- 
class `knowledge workers' from the `First World' whose main objective is to 
23 Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1990; 1993) argue that companies often adopt new management 
techniques for fear of lost competitive advantage. By drawing on neo-institutional theory, 
Abrahamson (1991; 1996) provides a model to understand processes of the diffusion of 
management fashions. He highlights socio-psychological factors (frustration, boredom, striving 
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organise existing capitalist relations more effectively and efficiently. Recently, 
however, some writers have called for the abandonment of Marx's labour theory 
of value and its replacement with a `knowledge theory of value' (e. g. Jacques, 
2000). The argument is that today value is not predominantly created by 
exploiting labour as commodity but by managing immaterial processes of learning 
and knowing. I do not want to altogether dismiss the new importance of 
knowledge for today's management of corporations. However, it seems that 
immaterial forms of labour are often overemphasised today - especially in the 
face of Third World sweatshops, immigrant labour in the First World, and masses 
of `knowledge workers' labouring in call centres, supermarkets and on shopfloors. 
Even if knowledge plays a bigger role in the creation of value today, this value is 
always already associated with the First World and its worldwide interests. This, 
however, does not mean that the Third World and its 19`11 century style labour 
relations have gone away. The Chinese peasant who moves to the big coastal 
cities in order to work 16 hour shifts, 6-7 days a week, to produce toys, cheap 
electronic gadgets and other products for the West's supermarkets, knows what 
s/he is selling: his/her labour power. In this light, the rhetoric of the new 
importance of knowledge, which can even be traced in works, such as Hardt and 
Negri's (2000) Empire, which claim to be critical of today's `goings-on' of global 
capitalism, sometimes remain blind towards the continuous importance of 
traditional exploitative labour relations in the First World and especially in many 
parts of the Third World - an argument which has also been put forward by labour 
process theorists (e. g. Thompson and Smith, 2001; see also Chapter Five). 
for novelty) and techno-economic factors (economic, political and organisational) that shape 
management fashion demand. 
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What I have argued in this section, then, is that the theory and practice of 
knowledge management has to be seen in relation to the `goings-on' of 
management knowledge and its positioning within the wider politico-economic 
relations of capitalism. When Parker describes management as `hegemonic model 
of organisation', he implies that management knowledge is today's defining type 
of organisational knowledge. Today we not only manage business and global 
companies, but also nature, states, families, health, education; modern 
management principles are even applied to the organisation of genocide (see, for 
example, Bauman, 1989). To Parker it therefore seems 
that management... is almost everywhere nowadays. It has become one of the defining 
words of our time and both a cause and a symptom of our brave new world. It directly 
employs millions, and indirectly employs almost everyone else. It is altering the language 
we use in our conceptions of home, work and self, and both relies on and reinforces deeply 
held assumptions about the necessary relationship between control and progress. (Parker, 
2002a: 9) 
For Parker, then, management is the `hegemonic model of organisation' because it 
`alters our language'. One could say, management emplaces and positions 
language in specific ways. The politics of this managerial project is that it is 
always already positively positioned in relation to capital. What I am trying to 
show in this chapter is that knowledge management is a part of the `goings-on' of 
this positioning project. The specific modes of production, which knowledge 
management is embedded in, will now have to be analysed in more detail. 
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`Techknowledgy I 
What I pointed to in the above section is that knowledge management can be seen 
as a particular technique or technology that is inherently connected to the wider 
technics of capital. What is interesting about the discourse of knowledge 
management is that it is quite explicit about the purpose of its technical apparatus 
in relation to creating economic value. In this section, then, let me outline some 
examples of the knowledge management discourse. 
Although knowledge management consists of a number of different discursive 
domains, one commonality is striking: many seem to feature technology as the 
dominant theme. Swan et al. (1999) have found in a review of the knowledge 
management literature that in 1998 nearly 70 per cent of knowledge management 
related articles appeared in information systems and information technology 
literatures. In their international bestseller Working Knowledge Davenport and 
Prusak, who both have a track record of information technology related research 
and management consultancy work, assert that "knowledge management is much 
more than technology, but `techknowledgy' is clearly a part of knowledge 
management" (1998: 123). They go on to tell us just how important technology is: 
Indeed, the availability of certain new technologies such as Lotus Notes and the World 
Wide Web has been instrumental in catalyzing the knowledge management movement. 
Since knowledge and the value of harnessing it have always been with us, it must be the 
availability of these new technologies that has stoked the knowledge fire. (1998: 123) 
Technology is therefore seen as a determining force behind the knowledge 
management fashion. Davenport and Prusak even seem to suggest that technology 
made knowledge management possible; it has `stoked the knowledge fire'. In their 
discourse knowledge and technology has become one thing; in their language it is 
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called `techknowledgy'. Some of their favourite `techknowledgies', which, they 
argue, help us to `harness' valuable knowledge from individuals and 
organisations, include: expert systems, artificial intelligence, desktop 
videoconferencing, hypertext systems such as intranets and knowledge maps. 
They are quite explicit about the purpose of this `harnessing' of knowledge: to 
turn knowledge into a valuable corporate asset, which will help to increase the 
competitive advantage of companies: 
The mere existence of knowledge somewhere in the organization is of little benefit; it 
becomes a valuable corporate asset only if it is accessible, and its value increases with the 
level of accessibility. (1998: 18) 
Hence, one can agree with Davenport and Prusak when they write that knowledge 
management `is much more than technology': it is much more in the sense that 
knowledge is not only technology but a vital commodity that needs to be 
exploited to continuously increase the value of companies' economic assets and 
profit levels. 
In his book Knowledge Assets Boisot is also very explicit about the determining 
force of new technology: 
[T]he microelectronics revolution promises to accelerate the rate of substitution of 
information for physical resources in human activity. it increases by several orders of 
magnitude humankind's capacity to capture, process, transmit, and store data. (1998: 210) 
However, Boisot argues that technology does not only increase our `capacity to 
capture, process, transmit, and store data'; it also has a `soft' side to it. 
Technology's information and knowledge sharing capabilities, Boisot asserts, also 
enable `communities of practice' to share uncodified and informal knowledge 
across boundaries of time and space more effectively. This threatens the 
functioning of traditional economic markets and organisational bureaucracies. 
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Boisot warns that companies need to change their way of operating, if they do not 
want to be overrun by the `microelectronic revolution', as he calls it. He maintains 
that information technology "will, if anything, exacerbate the problem of 
intellectual property rights" (1998: 224), because knowledge will be increasingly 
tied to knowledge workers and shared within informal networks of `clans'. What 
Boisot alludes to here is the problem managers face with types of knowledge that 
cannot be pressed into established accounting and control systems. 
`Tacit' knowledge is regarded as such a `foggy' type of knowledge24 that cannot 
be easily captured. But what exactly is tacit knowledge? In knowledge 
management the term has been popularised by Nonaka (1991; 1994) who 
distinguishes between explicit and tacit knowledge, a classification that goes back 
to Polanyi's work (1966,1975). Whereas explicit or encoded knowledge is seen 
as objective and abstract, tacit or embodied knowledge has been referred to as `we 
know more than we can tell' (Polanyi, 1966). Their variance has been further 
analysed by their different degrees of transferability, i. e. the transfer of knowledge 
across individuals, groups, space and time (Grant, 1996). Whereas explicit 
knowledge can be transferred through media, tacit knowledge is directly linked to 
24 There are types of knowledge that have been referred to in the literature. In common language 
one distinguishes between two types of knowledge: know something `in theory' and `practical 
common sense' (Spender, 1996). In many world languages this distinction can be made more 
explicit, e. g. wissen and kennen, savoir and connaftre. In English this could be expressed by 
`know-what' and `know-how'. Other writers distinguish `knowing about something' and 
`knowing through direct experience' (King, 1964) or `knowledge about' and `knowledge of 
acquaintance' (James, 1950). While experience is directly related to `know-how', `know-what' 
is the result of "systematic thought that eliminates the subjective and contextual contingencies 
of experience" (Spender, 1996: 49). Referring to studies of organisational knowledge, Blackler 
(1995) has found the following main types of knowledge in the literature: embrained, 
embodied, encultured, embedded and encoded. Spender (1996), in his analysis, distinguishes 
among four types: conscious (explicit individual knowledge), objectified (explicit 
organisational knowledge), automatic (preconscious individual knowledge) and collective 
(practical, context-dependent organisational knowledge). 
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individuals and can only be developed by practice and experience (Goldenson, 
1984). It is argued that researchers have often concentrated on the explicit, visible 
part of knowledge, but overlooked the fundamental value of tacit knowledge in 
organisational life. For example, Leonard and Sensiper (1998) point us to the 
importance of tacit knowledge for innovating, a point similarly made by Senker 
(1995). Lam (1997) shows that cross-border collaborative work might be impeded 
by different degrees of tacitness of knowledge. The split between tacit and explicit 
has been criticised for a number of reasons. Firstly, it analyses knowledge from a 
positivistic perspective, i. e. we are able to access knowledge and measure it. 
Secondly, it assumes knowledge to be a specific entity that resides in people's 
cognising minds (Blackler, 1995), i. e. taking a somewhat cognitivist approach. 
Thirdly, it assumes that knowledge can be easily converted from something tacit 
to something explicit and vice versa. Therefore, some writers argue that it is not 
easy to separate the two, as "tacit and explicit knowledge are mutually 
constituted" (Tsoukas, 1996: 14) and "explicit knowledge is always grounded on a 
tacit component" (Polanyi, 1975: 41). 
Regardless of such criticisms, what has been argued for is a new accounting 
system that would enable managers to capture knowledge, however tacit it might 
be, as intellectual capital: 
The formation of the discourse on intellectual capital is predicated upon the assumption that 
the traditional double-entry bookkeeping system is not able to reflect emerging realities. It 
is an inadequate tool for measuring the value of corporations whose value, it is claimed, lies 
mainly in their intangible components. (Yakhlef and Salzer-MÖrling, 2000: 20) 
Today, it is argued that company assets not only include material artefacts, 
properties and financial assets, but also employees' and organisational 
103 
3. Positioning Organisation: The Hegemony of Management Knowledge 
knowledges, which explicitly reside in people's heads and are tacitly embodied. 
Some knowledge management writers have therefore called for the development 
of new systems, that would enable a more adequate valuation of companies' 
assets, and provide tools for exploiting existing tacit and explicit knowledge bases 
more effectively (see, for example, Brooking, 1996; Edvinsson and Malone, 1998; 
Lynn, 1998; Nahaphiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Roos et al., 1998; Stewart, 1998; 
Zeleny, 1989). Such discourses, then, again establish the view that knowledge 
must be seen as economic asset that needs to be valued, `mined' and `harvested'. 
The term `intellectual capital' cannot make the link of knowledge management to 
the specific interests of capital more explicit. 
In their book The Knowledge-Creating Company Nonaka and Takeuchi are 
careful not to present knowledge management as something that should be 
dominated by technological systems. Instead, they assert that knowledge sharing 
within teams, vision and tacit knowledge are of key importance. However, their 
`soft-speak' only tells half of the story: 
[T]he quintessential knowledge-creation process takes place when tacit knowledge is 
converted into explicit knowledge. In other words, our hunches, perceptions, mental 
models, beliefs, and experiences are converted to something that can be communicated and 
transmitted informal and systematic language. (1995: 230-231, italics added) 
What Nonaka and Takeuchi spell out clearly here is that tacit knowledge is not as 
valuable as explicit knowledge. Thus, the urge is to make tacit knowledge explicit, 
that is, formalise the unknown into understandable language positions. In other 
words, according to Nonaka and Takeuchi, economic value can only be produced 
by codifying individuals' and organisations' tacit knowledge and transmitting it 
via technological networks of language. Especially in complex organisations, 
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which are widely spread across time and space, technology, it is said, is 
imperative for both codifying and transmitting knowledge. This is illustrated by 
Nonaka and Takeuchi in one of their case studies: 
[Tjo assure `free access to information, ' computer systems have been introduced 
throughout the Kao organization, with all information being filed in a database. Through 
this system, anyone at Kao can tap into databases included in the sales system, the 
marketing information system (MIS), the production information system, the distribution 
information system, and the total information network covering all of its offices in Japan. 
(1995: 172) 
The process of knowledge-creation is even more explicitly shown in another case 
that has been studied by Nonaka and his colleagues: 
National Bicycle has exploited the tacit knowledge of highly skilled craftsmen at the POS 
factory. The company has externalized their tacit knowledge into a computer language, 
which operates manufacturing robots and semi-automated equipment, by studying and 
observing their manufacturing skills. (Nonaka, Umemoto and Sasaki, 1998: 167) 
These examples clearly show that the properties of the knowledge-creation 
process are remarkably similar to those of a computer system. This view is 
affirmed by Nonaka and Takeuchi when they explain the functioning of the 
`hypertext organisation', their ideal structural scenario for enabling effective 
knowledge-creation: 
To use... [a] computer metaphor, these companies [that adopt a hypertext structure) will be 
on the `Windows' operating system, pulling multiple files onto the screen dynamically, 
while the rest [the `old style' companies] will be operating like a static MS-DOS system. 
(1995: 234) 
For Nonaka and Takeuchi, knowledge-creation is therefore not separable from 
technology; organisations become a computer; organisation and technology 
become one; they both work together in a symbiosis to turn tacit knowledge into 
economically valuable explicit knowledge. 
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It is argued that, in order to build such a `techknowledgy' computer, a company 
needs a strategic knowledge manager. As Nonaka and Takeuchi make clear: 
The essence of strategy lies in developing the organizational capability to acquire, create, 
accumulate, and exploit the knowledge domain... Someone at the top will have to be able to 
see the world from a knowledge perspective, mobilize the latent knowledge power held 
within the organization, and justify the knowledge created by the firm. (1995: 227-228) 
One of Nonaka and Takeuchi's main arguments is that this `latent knowledge 
power' is not always immediately visible; instead, it is hidden in tacit routines and 
employees' skills. According to them, one of the main tasks of knowledge 
managers is therefore to locate these `hidden treasures' and make them available 
for the whole organisation. Equally, Baumard argues in his book, Tacit 
Knowledge in Organizations, that leaders need to tap into the vast pool of tacit 
knowledge in order to make it economically available to the corporation. In other 
words, the codification of tacit knowledge, or the process of making tacit 
knowledge strategically useful within the organization, is one of the main tasks of 
strategic leaders. This is, however, not simply a making available of existing tacit 
knowledge. What Baumard also envisages is knowledge managers actively 
developing tacit knowledge bases according to the strategic goals of a company. 
He maintains, "Th[e] new [strategic] architecture has to be able to privilege the 
formation of tacit knowledge, and its articulation as close as possible to the 
organization's strategic preoccupations" (1998: 223). With Baumard, then, 
knowledge management is extended right into the body of labour. This is what 
Marx's labour theory of value means; labour has to sell its whole body for capital 
to make use of. The task of management is not only to organise explicit 
knowledge that is ready to hand; the knowledge manager has to tap right into the 
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sub-consciousness of labour in order to turn hidden tacit knowledge - the 
unnameable - into economic value. 
What I have aimed at in this section is to outline the knowledge management 
discourse in its purest ideological form. Naturally, I have been very selective and 
left out a number of critical voices that have been raised against knowledge 
management (see, for example, the collection edited by Prichard et al., 2000). 
However, what I am generally concerned with in this chapter is to specifically 
engage with the mainstream knowledge management literature, in order to analyse 
the hegemonic functioning of its political setup. As I argued in Chapter Two, a 
hegemony can never be all-encompassing, which means that there will always be 
holes and gaps in a hegemonic discourse that can be engendered by resistances. I 
will discuss some of these resistances in the following sections and also in 
Chapter Four. The main purpose of this chapter, however, is to expose the 
`goings-on' of knowledge management as one particular discourse within the 
wider hegemony of the positioning project. In the remainder of this chapter I will 
make connections to some of the themes of Benjamin's work, in order to critique 
the knowledge management discourse and its particular emplacement within the 
hegemonic project of capital. 
Knowledge as `Shock' and Event 
What the above populist images of knowledge management show is that they are 
fuelled by enthusiastic scenarios of technological progress. Technology is 
portrayed by knowledge management gurus as an inevitable force necessary for 
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the growth of companies' wealth. The link between technology, knowledge and 
progress is, of course, not a new one. As I pointed out in the previous sections, 
technology has been essential for the development of scientific knowledge, 
modem forms of organisation and management; let us just remember, for 
example, Taylor's scientific management and Ford's assembly line. Knowledge 
management can be seen as another node in the long line of modern production 
systems. Leslie notes: "Technology is viewed by.. . machine-obsessed modernists 
as a magical apparatus of social refurbishment whose scientific properties can 
remedy all predicaments through technical rationality" (2000: 39). The point that 
technology is seen as technics of `social refurbishment' is important here. It would 
be a mistake to simply say that Ford's assembly line was a manufacturing system; 
instead, it was a whole apparatus to produce not only cars but also subjects and 
social milieus. The assembly line, one could say, emplaced being in particular 
ways. In the same way knowledge management is not simply a tool for managers 
and consultants to increase companies' levels of surplus value. Instead, it is part of 
a managerial discourse, a technical apparatus, which positions and emplaces `the 
social' in relation to capital and its particular value system. 
What `techknowledgies' mean today, and Ford's assembly line has meant since 
the 1920s, `the train' meant, perhaps, to Benjamin. For Benjamin, the train had 
particular significance as an image of the technical emplacement, so to say, of 
`early' modernity, the epoch of the mid-nineteenth century when the Parisian 
arcades emerged. For him, modern society is locked up in the rhetoric of a train 
that is running fast towards the light at the end of the tunnel. In his view, society 
seems to be in a dreamy state of promised progress; he calls this state the 
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`phantasmagoria of progress'. Railways and the train were signs of progress in the 
19`h century: one could suddenly move at high speed from one place to the other; 
a spatial movement that "became so wedded to the concept of historical 
movement that these could no longer be distinguished" (Buck-Morss, 1989: 91). 
What the train was to the I9`h and the car to the 20th century, information and 
communication technologies are, perhaps, to the 21s` century. Today our 
movement seems to become more `virtual': "Now speed moves into a different 
register: from the movement of people and material objects in space to the 
movement of images and signals at absolute speed" (Lash, 1999: 289). 
Knowledge management technologies are at the very heart of what has been 
called the `hyper-modem(organ)ization' of society (Armitage, 2001). Today it is 
not only the train, assembly line and car that `keep the whole thing together', to 
evoke Adorno and Horkheimer's words, 25 but `techknowledgies' such as 
(moving) images, news stories, information and knowledge. "The noise is so 
great", writes Karl Kraus (cited in KK, 243), the aphoristic anarchist who, in 
Benjamin's eyes, destructed the journalistic profession, by uncovering its 
opinionated commodity structure and its sheer lust for noise and catastrophes. 
In old engravings there is a messenger who rushes toward us crying aloud, his hair on end, 
brandishing a sheet of paper in his hands, a sheet full of war and pestilence, of cries of 
murder and pain, of danger from fire and flood, spreading everywhere the `latest 
25 Adorno and Horkheimer write: "Interested parties explain the culture industry in technological 
terms. It is alleged that because millions participate in it, certain reproduction processes are 
necessary that inevitably require identical needs in innumerable places to be satisfied with 
identical goods. The technical contrast between the few production centers and the large 
number of widely dispersed consumption points is said to demand organization and planning 
by management... No mention is made of the fact that the basis on which technology acquires 
power over society is the power of those whose economic hold over society is greatest. A 
technological rationale is the rationale of domination itself. Automobiles, bombs, and movies 
keep the whole thing together... It has made the technology of the culture industry no more 
than the achievement of standardization and mass production, sacrificing whatever involved a 
distinction between the logic of the work and that of the social system. This is the result not of 
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news'... Full of betrayal, earthquakes, poison, and fire from the mundus intelligibilis. (KK, 
239) 
During Benjamin's lifetime it was mainly the newspaper that served as 
`techknowledgy' for the entertainment of mass society. Today the newspaper is 
accompanied by television, the Internet and other `techknowledgies', which 
deliver the `latest news' as a stream of information directly into people's homes. 
In knowledge management, as well as in society in general, technology is thus 
often fetishised. That is, technology is seen to have magical, determining powers 
that one cannot escape. To speak with Benjamin, the subject is seen to sit on a 
train, a technology, which irresistibly leads into the future. Technology is thus 
portrayed to be external to human agency; it is situated outside society as 
transcendental power. What remains for the subject is to respond to the needs of 
the technology-fetish. In this view, then, the subject is subsumed by technology; 
the subject becomes a mere extension to the `machine'. The knowledge worker, as 
portrayed in knowledge management, can be seen as such a `machinic' subject 
that plugs into the system in order to `mine' and `harness' knowledge from it - 
knowledge management's subject is a `Borg', to use Land and Corbett's (2001) 
metaphor. The subject is thus subject-less; it is a machinic `thing' that merely 
exists because it is held alive by technology. 
Machinic subjects, enhanced with prosthetics, wired up and plugged into inflowmation (a 
version of Marinetti's futurist rhapsody for a postindustrial age). What happens in this 
cyber-conception of material is that the distinction between machine-technology-worker -a 
technician producing within technical relations of production - is collapsed into a single, 
mythic, postnatural subject. (Leslie, 2000: x) 
a law of movement in technology as such but of its function in today's economy" (A GS 3: 142; 
1979: 121). 
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As Leslie points out, the problem with such a conception of the subject is that the 
concrete technical relations of production between subjects and objects are all 
collapsed into an all-encompassing flow. Subjects and objects lose their 
distinctiveness and are now seen as part of a cybernetic knowledge system that is 
said to inevitably lead towards progress. 
Within such a system knowing becomes a matter of information processing 
between computers - very much like the `Human Information Processing' school 
of psychology proposes. Scholars in this school of thought refer to knowing as the 
process of mediation between input (stimulus) and output (response) within a 
system. 26 In such a view, then, knowing is a mechanical process of controlling 
information inputs and outputs. It thus becomes clear why much of knowledge 
management rhetoric is centred on codifying knowledge: in order to be able to 
transfer and therefore use knowledge as an economic asset, it has to be made 
explicit and measurable. As Kirkeby (2000: 107) points out, the perfect scenario 
for knowledge management is when all knowledge available in a company is 
transferable to a computer system, which can then be accessed and `harnessed' by 
`knowledge workers'. He argues that the ideal model for such a system is Turing's 
principle of the `universal machine'. As I mentioned, companies, especially large 
management consultancies, have been keen to exploit knowledge management 
26 For an analysis of the `Human Information Processing' school, see, for example, Anderson 
(1990) and Winograd and Flores (1986). The purpose of this school's rather mechanical 
understanding of knowing becomes clear when one looks at its connection to artificial 
intelligence (Al): "Al aims at understanding cognitive processes in such a manner and to such 
a level of detail that it can build artificial devices that perform the same cognitive function in a 
way that, in principle, makes it possible to substitute them for human performers" (De Mey, 
1982: 5). 
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technologies, such as intranets and knowledge maps, to construct precisely such a 
`universal knowledge machine'. 
What I would like to suggest, then, is that knowledge management can be seen as 
a technology that is only the latest in a long line of, what Benjamin calls, modem 
reproduction technologies that have promised progress. For Benjamin, technical 
reproduction must be seen as one of the defining moments for the passage into 
modem mass-society, which he sees, on one hand, as an event of possibility - the 
possibility of constructing an entirely new knowledge and experience - but, on the 
other, as an event of `tremendous shattering of tradition': 
The technique of reproduction, to formulate generally, detaches that which is reproduced 
from the realm of tradition. By multiplying the reproduction [of the work of art, the 
technique of reproduction] replaces its unique occurrence with one that is massive or mass- 
like [massenweise]. And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in 
their particular situation, it actualises that which is reproduced. These two processes lead to 
the tremendous shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and 
renewal of mankind. Both processes are intimately connected with contemporary mass 
movements. Their most powerful agent is film. (BGS 1.2,477-478; WoA, 221, translation 
modified) 
In Benjamin's words, then, technical reproduction is a process of detachment or 
displacement; in the case of art, for example, reproduction depositions art from its 
original, traditional context, or, what Benjamin calls, `aura'. One could say, 
technical reproduction is an event of destruction: established positions of the 
technics of society are destructed and subjects are repositioned to their objects. 
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This, then, brings us back to Heidegger's philosophy of positioning and 
emplacement, which I discussed in Chapter One. In Heidegger's words27 one 
could see Benjamin's event of modem technical reproduction as a new technical 
world-image of social organisation. This world-image emplaces being in 
particular ways. In Chapter Two I highlighted the inherently political nature of 
this emplacing. Like Heidegger's concept of `emplacement', Laclau and Mouffe's 
understanding of the concept of `hegemony' points to the notion that modern 
society can be seen as the forging of `the social' into a particular position, a 
position that needs to be continuously reproduced, maintained and defended. 
Modem technologies, such as knowledge management, are at the heart of this 
positioning of `being' into particular grids of knowledge that can be continuously 
reproduced. According to Cooper (1992), this is the economy of convenience 
which allows the world for the modem subject to be pliable, wieldable and 
amenable. In his view, remote control (the work not with the environment itself, 
but with its representations such as maps and models), displacement (the 
separation from that very environment) and abbreviation (the simplification of a 
complex world) are the mechanisms of this economy. In other words, the 
convenience of the modem world is organised through the gaze of remote control, 
"which reduces what is distant and resistant to what is near, clear and 
controllable" (Cooper, 1992: 268). One could say that knowledge management is 
at the heart of today's economy of controllability. 
27 See Weber (1996) as well as Benjamin and Osborne (2000) for extensive discussions on how 
and where Heidegger's and Benjamin's philosophies meet. 
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For Benjamin, technical reproduction displaces traditional social relations; it 
destructs a historical experience of the world, or, what he calls, Erfahrung, and, 
instead, produces `shocks', or, what he calls, Erlebnis. For him, Erfahrung is a 
historical experience that is a product of a long movement (the German fahren is 
related to taking a journey, exploring the unknown); it is "indeed a matter of 
tradition, in collective existence as well as private life. It is less the product of 
facts firmly anchored in memory than a convergence in memory of accumulated 
and frequently not conscious data" (BGS 1.2,608; CB, 110; I, 153-154, translation 
modified). In contrast, `shock' is more immediate than experience. `Shock' is, for 
example, the telecommunicative trauma (Sloterdijk, 1988) continuously produced 
by today's `techknowledgies': advertisements, newspapers, TV, mobile phones, 
radio, email, the Internet. For Benjamin, modem subjectivity is characterised by 
the constant `shock' therapy of mass society: 
The greater the share of the shock factor in particular impressions, the more constantly 
consciousness has to be alert as a screen against stimuli; the more efficiently it does so, the 
less do these impressions enter experience, the more they fulfil the concept of shock. (BGS 
1.2,615; CB, 117; 1,159, translation modified) 
Following Freud, Benjamin argues that `shocks' activate the subject's memory. 
Normally these `shocks' are absorbed and fused with experience and therefore 
turned into something narratable (Caygill, 1998). However, if `shocks' become 
too intense or constant, they have the potential to produce a trauma, a dream-like 
situation, in which the subject is not able to resist `shocks' meaningfully. 
Now, for Benjamin modem experience is characterised by a constant exposure to 
`shocks'. This is why he describes Parisian l9`h century life in and around the 
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arcades as `dream-time' which produces the `sleeping collectivity'28 mentioned 
above. For him, modernity is the `dream-time' of the carousel, the merry-go- 
round: one sits on a toy horse (exchanging views with fellow riders) that speeds 
around its own axis (Missac, 1995: 108), it `eternally returns' to itself, it 
announces change with every second, but it just returns to us the ever-same. The 
carousel gives its passengers the impression of being on a speedy train of 
progress, a train that relentlessly searches for the new, but it just `eternally 
returns' to the same station. The name of this station is `commodity'; it is the 
`obligatory passage point' for all passengers. This can be connected to what in 
Chapter Two I described as capital's powers of discontinuity or Deleuze and 
Guattari's (1987) notion that capital is a `machine' that continuously seeks to 
deterritorialise existing social relations. Similarly to Benjamin, they see capital as 
continuously being on a hunt for the `new'. However, this `newness' is always 
already reterritorialised within the specific value system of capital. Knowledge 
management is part of this hunt for the `new' that is supposed to deliver progress. 
To grasp the significance of nouveaute, it is necessary to go back to novelty in everyday 
life. Why does everyone share the newest thing with someone else? Presumably, in order to 
triumph over the dead. This only where there is nothing really new. (BGS V. 1,169; AP, 
112) 
28 Benjamin uses the concept of `dream-time' to describe the collective dream consciousness of 
the masses of nineteenth century Paris: "The nineteenth century, a space-time 'Zeitraum' (a 
dream-time 'Zeit-traum') in which the individual consciousness more and more secures itself 
in reflecting, while the collective consciousness sinks into ever deeper sleep. But just as the 
sleeper - in this respect like the madman - sets out on the macrocosmic journey through his 
own body, and the noises and feelings of his insides, such as blood pressure, intestinal churn, 
heartbeat, and muscle sensation (which for the waking and salubrious individual converge in a 
steady surge of health) generate, in the extravagantly heightened inner awareness of the 
sleeper, illusion or dream imagery which translates and accounts for them, so likewise for the 
dreaming collective, which, through the arcades, communes with its own insides. We must 
follow in its wake so as to expound the nineteenth century - in fashion and advertising, in 
buildings and politics - as the outcome of its dream visions" (BGS V. 1,492-493; AP, 389). 
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What Benjamin spells out, then, is the destructive programme of the commodity 
that is always already in search for the new. Yet, it is a search that is guided by the 
signifier `capital'. So, for Benjamin, in the end `there is nothing really new'. This 
relates to Benjamin's general critique of `official' history, or the history of `those 
in power', which, in his view, always already promises to be progressive. As I 
discussed in Chapter Two, Benjamin sees this history as a chronological order or 
`eternal image' that continuously promises the `new' but always delivers the 
`ever-same'. The `shocks' produced by knowledge management and other 
reproduction `techknowledgies' are at the heart of that historical continuum, 
which, in Benjamin's view, is always already maintained by `those in power'. 
When Benjamin writes in the above passage that the search for the new can be 
seen as the `triumph over the dead' he again points to the destruction of 
experience by `shock'; it is the triumph of knowledge as information over 
knowledge as experience: 
Every morning brings us the news of the globe, and yet we are poor in noteworthy stories. 
This is because no event any longer comes to us without already being shot through with 
explanation. In other words, by now almost nothing that happens benefits storytelling; 
almost everything benefits information. (BGS 1.2: 444-455; KK, 89) 
What does Benjamin mean by `triumph over the dead'? In his essay `The 
Storyteller' (ST) Benjamin shows that stories come from a deep personal inner 
experience and are embedded in a unique tradition. Benjamin notes that the 
story's authority is largely connected to (the image of) death: a dying person 
communicates an experience, a tradition, to the younger generation. The 
storyteller, Benjamin argues, borrows this image of death in an attempt to connect 
this world to the Other, to bring the profane and the sacred together. Therefore, 
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the story is embedded in a particular aura that connects to an inner sphere of 
unconscious, spiritual experience. For Benjamin, this religious side to experience 
is important, because he sees this experience as being able to transcend subject 
and object, profane and sacred, into a unity: 
There is a unity of experience that can by no means be understood as a sum of experiences, 
to which the concept of knowledge as theory is immediately related in its continuous 
development. The object and the content of this theory, this concrete totality of experience, 
is religion. (BGS 1I. 1,165) 
I would argue that Benjamin's religious experience is a historical experience that 
lies beyond `official' history. In Chapter Two I discussed how Benjamin's 
`dialectical image' tries to destruct the `eternal image' of history in the attempt to 
see history differently. When Benjamin claims that `shock' seeks to `triumph over 
the dead' he seems to point to the fact that `official' history always tries to forget 
certain images of the past that do not fit into the picture of a progressive 
continuum. Benjamin's `dialectical image' tries to reconnect to the `dead' images 
of the past that have been forgotten or rendered nameless. 
Now, Benjamin's conception of historical experience can, of course, be 
interpreted as being hopelessly romantic. Although there is certainly an aspect of 
melancholia involved in Benjamin's work, it would be a mistake to therefore 
conclude that he argues for a return to an `original' state of being, or, what 
Heidegger's names, Being (see my discussion in Chapter Two), which would 
reconnect us to death and a unique inner or religious experience. In fact, Benjamin 
is very sceptical that this type of experience can be `saved' or regained in 
modernity. Nevertheless, some aspects of his work can be seen as a speculation 
about how historical experience can be re-produced under conditions of 
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modernity. This is what earlier I referred to as the new possibilities Benjamin sees 
in modem reproduction technologies. On one hand, they destruct tradition and 
disconnect us from death; but, on the other, technologies, such as cinema, 
surrealist painting or hashish (besides Benjamin's `Work of Art' essay, see, for 
example, his `Surrealism' essay), offer glimpses of a new type of religious or 
historical experience - Benjamin also calls these glimpses `profane illuminations' 
(S). These illuminations are sudden `flashes of knowledge' that enable a crucial 
event, an event in which the world might turn, in which a new experience and a 
new type of knowledge might become possible. However, according to Benjamin, 
this new knowledge is not simply continuing the line of the `new' that is always 
already the `ever-same'. Instead, it is a novelty that has to go through death, the 
ruins of life, the destruction of `the same'. This new experience, then, is an 
experience of death that enables a new cognition, a new experience of the object, 
because the object's unity is destructed, made into a ruin. This is Benjamin's 
event of politics that I discussed in the previous chapter. In this event, the event of 
the `dialectical image', `official' history is destructed in order to enable a 
connection to forgotten images of the past. This destruction also involves a 
`shock'; as Benjamin writes: "where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration 
pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock" (TPH, 254). This 
`shock', however, is not part of the continuous stream of `shocks' produced by the 
homogenous course of history. Instead, it is a decisive intervention that aims to 
interrupt the continuum of that homogeneity. It is an event of destruction that 
enables a rereading of dead images of the past in order to produce a new historical 
experience. 
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Knowledge management does not engender such radical political possibilities. 
Instead of enabling a connection to death, that is, enabling a destruction of 
established knowledges of reality, knowledge management technologies are 
always already plugged into the specific reproduction `machinery' of capital and 
the homogenous course of history. As I have argued in this section, modernity can 
be generally seen as the denial of death and destruction - the denial of the 
negative. Instead, what is celebrated by modem reproduction technologies are 
positive notions of progress and newness that produce `shocks' that make the 
subject docile. As Sievers (1993) notes, management itself is an activity that can 
be seen as the glorification of positivity, as management's predominant intent is to 
facilitate a company's survival and immortality. Management, as today's 
hegemonic form of organisation, always already serves capital and the continuum 
of history, which urges to reproduce itself along established lines of domination 
and control. To be sure, management is a destructive activity; it axes jobs, 
destroys the environment and often simply mismanages. Yet, this destruction is 
one that is structurally inherent to the `goings-on' of capital, which searches for 
the `new' in order to reproduce the `same'. Knowledge management technologies 
can be seen as an inherent part of such a destruction; it is one that displaces, 
disorganises and produces `shocks' of information in order to reproduce capital. 
Just like Drucker's Age of Discontinuity, which I referred to in Chapter Two, 
knowledge management discontinues, or deterritorialises, to use Deleuze and 
Guattari's (1987) expression, in order to reproduce dominant discourses of 
history. What this does not engender is the possibility of a real event, a real event 
of destruction, which can politically intervene in a specific situation and read 
history differently in order to enable a new knowledge of reality. 
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Knowledge Manager, F/äneur and Prostitute 
I have argued in the section above that the process of managing knowledge, as 
theorised and practiced by mainstream knowledge management, can be seen as a 
denial of the experience of death and a privileging of information - what 
Benjamin calls `shock'. What I would like to explore in more detail in this section 
is how the `shocks' of the commodity produce modem subjectivity. I will show 
that one could speculatively relate today's knowledge manager to Benjamin's 
`heroes' of the Parisian arcades of the 19th century - namely the fläneur and the 
prostitute who, for him, are both modem subjects par excellence (see CB, AP). 
This section, then, argues that knowledge management is not simply a technology 
or a managerial tool used in companies or organisations. As I have already 
mentioned above, knowledge management must be seen to be part of a wider 
project that positions and emplaces society. This positioning project `stakes out' 
the place for the subject; it `corners' the subject, as Sam Weber (1996) puts it. The 
hegemony of this project, then, is described by the fact that it produces concrete 
subjectivities. It does not simply produce the subject in one place; instead, its 
discursive regime produces the place of the subject itself. 
The Parisian fläneur, for example, is an upper middle class, bourgeois man29 who 
walks in places where there are big crowds and `things' to see - for example in 
shopping arcades, which began to appear in Paris at around 1850 (AP). Benjamin 
29 Let me point out again that one can criticise Benjamin for his gender stereotyping. As I noted 
above, some writers have emphasised that the jläneur can indeed be a woman. However, to 
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sees the fläneur as a subject whose experience is characterised by the `shocks' of 
the modem city: commodities, advertising images, anonymous crowds. For 
Benjamin, the fläneur has a deep empathy with these objects, these `things': "The 
fläneur is someone abandoned in the crowd. In this he shares the situation of the 
commodity" (BGS 1.2,558; CB, 55). As if the commodity had a soul, it tries to 
`nestle' in the body-house of the fldneur: "Like a roving soul in search for a body" 
the commodity "enters another person" whenever it wishes (ibid. ). Benjamin 
writes that this luring sensuousness of the commodity `intoxicates' the fläneur; 
the narcotic commodity lures him into a `dream world', in which the most 
mundane things on sale can be enjoyed. 
In Benjamin's eyes, then, the commodity produces a spectacle that changes the 
experiential apparatus of the subject. The commodity, writes Marx, "appears, at 
first sight, to be a trivial and easily understood thing. Our analysis shows that, in 
reality, it is a vexed and complicated thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties 
and theological niceties" (cited in BGS V, 245; AP, 181). One usually takes the 
commodity for granted; it appears to be an objective fact, a `thing'. Yet, at closer 
inspection - an inspection that was Marx's tremendous life project - the apparent 
objectivity and normality of the commodity turns out to be a monstrous spectrality 
(Derrida, 1994), which consists 
in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour as 
objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves... lt is nothing but the definite 
social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of 
a relation between things. (Marx, 1976: 164-165) 
take into account that Benjamin's `empirical object' was indeed a man, I will, at times, refer to 
thefdneur as being male, specifically when I discuss Benjamin's text. 
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The fläneur, Benjamin's modem subject par excellence, is in the midst of these 
`things', these commodities. The fläneur translates the commodity into allegorical 
material which provides him with a profane enjoyment. This translation "is not a 
question of work or active transformation. It is passive.... The fldneur has a 
satanic Einfühlung, an empathy with commodities.... He is not the hero, but, 
instead, performs the hero; not through action, but satanically through Haltung 
(bearing, posture, style). The fldneur allegorizes commodities through 
transforming them into a drunken stream or rush" (Lash, 1999: 329-330). 
The image of the fläneur is originally tied to a specific time/space juncture: 19`h 
century Paris, the capital of modernity, the place where early bourgeois capitalism 
moved into `modern high capitalism' (Tester, 1994). However, in the process of 
the destruction of the Parisian arcades the fldneur, too, is destructed and 
transformed into other `modern heroes', such as Benjamin's 'sandwich-man'. 30 In 
other words, the fldneur-subject is not a stable entity; instead, it can be seen as an 
empty space that is - to express this in Lacanian terminology discussed in the 
previous chapter - filled by the Other, by modernity's symbolic order: the 
commodity, the market, urbanisation. With the accelerated commodification of 
life in the 20`h century the fldneur's subjectivity is transformed - from the 
strolling fldneur to the `entrepreneurial' sandwich-man. What the transformation 
of the fldneur points to is the Lacanian notion that the subject is not a stable, 
unified, even `full' entity. Instead, it is historically contingent; it is always already 
Benjamin writes: "Empathy with the commodity is fundamentally empathy with exchange 
value itself. The , 
Jläneur is the virtuoso of this empathy. He takes the concept of the 
marketability itself for a stroll. Just as his final ambit is the department store, his last 
incarnation is the sandwich-man" (BGS V, 562; AP, 448). The Parisian `sandwich-man' walks 
through the city while wearing a board full of sandwiches, which he sells to the `passer-by'. 
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somewhere else; it is divided. Hence, Lacan speaks of the `barred subject', or $, a 
subject that does not seem to be constructed but destructed (1977: 292ff). The 
`barred' or `destructed subject' is not `full' of human life but, instead, an empty 
space, perhaps a `non-place', which is filled by the Other, particularly the 
commodity (perhaps it is not a coincidence that `$' signifies Lacan's theory of the 
subject). It is the commodity-Other which turns the subject into a `lively' thing, it 
theatrically animates it and organises its pleasures and enjoyments. In this sense, 
the subject is not essentially `individual' but always already an Other. 
The purpose of this discussion of the fldneur is that, in my view, one might want 
to speculate about a reincarnation of the fldneur as today's knowledge manager. 
As I have discussed so far, both of these modem subjects have a special 
relationship with the commodity. While the fldneur is `intoxicated' by the 
`shocks' of commodities on display in 19`h century Parisian arcades, the 
knowledge manager trades with knowledge-commodities using a range of 
`techknowledgies'. The knowledge manager is thus more entrepreneurial than the 
fldneur, which continues the line of development Benjamin suggested when he 
saw the `sandwich-man' as a fldneur put into work. What these modem subject 
`types' have in common is a certain embodiment of the commodity - for both 
subjects the commodity is not only an object that exists `out there' but one that 
characterises the very makeup of their bodies, subjectivities and experiential 
apparatuses. In the case of the knowledge manager it thus becomes clear that 
knowledge management technologies are not only geared towards the production, 
circulation and consumption of knowledge commodities but, in fact, are 
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`technologies of the self in the sense that they produce particular knowing 
subjectivities. 
This embodiment of the commodity finds its culmination in the prostitute, the 
commodity that is literally alive. Whereas for Benjamin the fldneur is the `modem 
hero' par excellence to develop a close empathy with the commodity, to be 
exhilarated by the commodity, the prostitute31 is literally the personification of the 
commodity itself. The prostitute "is the becoming-human of allegory... In 
[the]... soulless, but still lust-offering body, allegory and commodity are married" 
(BGS 1.3,1151, my translation). One might therefore speculatively suggest that 
the prostitute serves, even more so than the fldneur, as role model for knowledge 
management. As I have argued above, the aim for knowledge management is not 
only to manage explicit knowledge but also to tap right into the tacit, sub- 
conscious areas of subjectivity in order to commodity the whole body and make it 
available for the production of surplus value. The prostitute is such a subject 
whose body has been turned into a commodity. One could therefore suggest that 
the prostitute is the ideal body for knowledge management. As the prostitute, the 
knowledge worker needs to sell his or her body for the purpose of surplus value 
production. As Marx suggests, "prostitution is only a specific expression of the 
general prostitution of the labourer" (cited in Buck-Morss, 1989: 184, n147). The 
knowledge worker has to offer his or her knowledge, whether explicit or tacit, to 
31 Benjamin refers to the prostitute as woman, which continues his somewhat stereotypical 
gender analysis mentioned above. Of course, the prostitute does not have to be female, nor 
does thefäneur have to be male. My attempt here is to see modern subjectivity to be related to 
the experiences of both of these Benjaminian `modern heroes'. However, it is also clear that 
the reality of the particular historical constellation Benjamin was writing about, i. e. mid- 19th 
century Parisian modernity, was probably characterised by the stereotypical gender roles 
described here. 
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clients; he or she has to sell the body as commodity. This is what Marx's labour 
theory of value suggests: labour needs to sell its body and knowledge, as 
commodity, so that capital can reproduce itself. 
This also implies that the theory of knowledge management - here I am referring 
back to my above discussion of the close (economic) interaction between 
academics, consultants and managers - cannot be seen as an independent realm 
that is hidden in business school departments only producing knowledge for 
academics. Instead, precisely because of the economics involved, knowledge 
management theory can be seen as a practice that is fully embedded in the wider 
social relations of capitalist production. What is done in the business school can 
thus be seen as theoretical practice that is directly linked to the production of 
subjects and their knowledge apparatuses. The business school and knowledge 
management theory are concrete `techknowledgies' for the production of social 
relations under capital; that is, the knowledge produced on university compounds 
cannot stand outside the technics of the dominant social relations of production. 
This, then, is not only specific to the field of knowledge management. The 
university itself is positioned within the realm of modernity and hegemonic 
discourses. Given the dominance of management discourses at large, the 
university may be seen, according to Fuller, as a corporate-sponsored training 
centre where the `cutting edge' is increasingly defined not by theory-driven 
academic qualifications but by "those who possess non-academic, specifically 
entrepreneurial, forms of knowledge" (2000: 84). In other words, the `hero' of the 
academic (student) is often no longer the philosopher, but the highly successful 
business consultant or entrepreneur, like, for example, Richard Branson, the 
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`hero' of English `entrepreneurialism'. It is also Branson who shows the way in 
terms of the `new production of knowledge': recently his business empire Virgin 
entered the `academic market' with a series of books32 aimed at small and 
medium-sized companies, co-produced and co-branded by Warwick Business 
School. It is said, that this is a `win-win-situation' for the two brands of Virgin 
and Warwick. The university, then, seems to be firmly embedded in the 
hegemonic discourse of management and `neo-liberalism' which calls for all 
knowledge production to be geared towards entrepreneurship in private and public 
sectors (see also du Gay, 2000a). 
It is the recently `successful' private/public partnership that Gibbons et al. seem to 
have in mind when they, in their internationally celebrated research manifesto The 
New Production of Knowledge (1994), argue that, as traditional disciplinary 
university knowledge ('mode 1') is not able to reflect the complexities of the new 
world anymore, knowledge should be increasingly produced by tearing down 
boundaries between disciplines as well as between theory and practice: "Mode 2 
knowledge production is characterised by closer interaction between scientific, 
technological and industrial modes of knowledge production... The spread of 
Mode 2 knowledge production... and of market differentiation ... 
is being driven by 
the intensification of international competition" (Gibbons et al., 1994: 68). The 
authors are quite explicit in whose name this apparently `holistic' approach, this 
transdisciplinarity, should be exercised: "Another important precondition is to 
have access to such knowledge and expertise, being able to reconfigure it in novel 
'Z Part of the Virgin/WBS book series are: Barrow (2001), Barry (2002), Craven (2001), 
Cumming (2001), Dickinson (2001), Wolff (2001). 
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ways and offer it for sale" (ibid.: 111). For Gibbons et al., then, `mode 2' 
knowledge should be produced for a specific purpose: for sale. Theoretical 
knowledge is here always already a pragmatic `techknowledgy', a knowledge that 
is embedded in particular socio-technical relations of capital and geared towards 
the production of surplus value. Thus, for Gibbons et al., the value of 
transdisciplinary academic knowledge is its potential economic opportunity, its 
surplus value, which should be realised by making it available to practice. 
The agenda of the theoretical practice of knowledge management is thus always 
already dominated by the restricted concerns of the commodity. What I have 
argued in this section is that this restricted economy produces specific 
subjectivities, such as those of the knowledge manager, flaneur and prostitute who 
can be seen to be `intoxicated' by the `shocks' produced by the commodity. The 
significance of this is that the way knowledge is produced today cannot simply be 
seen as something that is going on in academic departments but as something that 
has direct effects on the way social organisation is emplaced and technically 
reproduced. In this sense, knowledge management is not simply an 
epistemological tool, as is sometimes thought (e. g. von Krogh and Roos, 1995), 
but indeed an ontological practice. It is this ontological significance which 
describes the hegemony of management. Management is not only something 
which is taught in business schools, nor is it only something managers do in 
private or public organisations. Instead, it involves the production of subjectivities 
and therefore life itself. In Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, one could say that 
management has set up an enormous `chain of equivalence' among social and also 
material actors in order to produce a hegemonic discourse. It is this hegemonic 
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discourse that fills the gap of symbolic reality, the Lacanian Other, and thus acts 
as an object of identification for subjects like the knowledge manager, fläneur or 
prostitute. 
Hegemony and the Fetish Knowledge Commodity 
What I have suggested so far in this chapter is that knowledge management is 
always already positively positioned in relation to capital and management: 
knowledge is seen as a commodity that is used to generate surplus value. In the 
previous section I argued that such a positioning of knowledge produces specific 
subjectivities that are made up by the `goings-on' of the commodity. What needs 
to be explored in more detail now is exactly how knowledge management, as well 
as management and capital in general, can be seen as hegemonic practices. In 
other words, exactly how is the hegemony of management knowledge produced? 
In this section I suggest that an important aspect of the way this hegemony is 
produced and maintained is `commodity fetishism'. 
According to Marx, in a world where social relations have become thing-like, 
things have to look `beautiful'. As I argued above, Benjamin's `heroes' of 
modernity can be seen as thing-like commodities. The fäneur, for example, 
dresses up in a bourgeois wardrobe in order to be seen by the crowd and the 
commodity on display in the Parisian arcades. Equally, the prostitute has to look 
`beautiful' to attract the sexual attention of a client. The consultant, too, one could 
argue, puts on expensive business suits to sell knowledge to company managers. 
The commodity has to look beautiful, animated and divine in order to find a buyer 
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on the market. This brings to mind the image of the dancing table which Marx 
uses in the introductory paragraph of his discussion of `commodity fetishism'. At 
first sight, he writes, a `normal' wooden table is 
an ordinary, sensuous thing. But as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it changes into a 
thing which transcends sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in 
relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain 
grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will. 
(1976: 163) 
The point of Marx's dancing table is to show how an ordinary thing, the table, 
acquires an extra-sensuousness once it has been turned into a commodity. Marx's 
aesthetics of the commodity, however, is not something that is up to the subject, 
consumer or audience to interpret; the commodity's beauty is an objectivity that is 
grounded in the very way the symbolic order is shaped in capital's modernity. In 
other words, under capitalism the commodity-table is a priori aestheticised. As 
the commodity conceals social relations of production to make them appear as 
relations between things, the commodity is aestheticised, it acquires a sublime 
aura of objectivity. The table makes all sorts of wild dances not because someone 
subjectively imagines such a `grotesque idea'. Instead, such grotesqueness, one 
could argue, is structurally embedded in the way social reality works itself. 
Marx uses the concept of fetishism to show how the objective grotesqueness of 
the table, that is, the systematic (mis)perception of relations between subjects 
(people, labour) as relations between objects (things, resources), works. It is worth 
quoting the passage, in which he introduces the concept, at length: 
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that 
the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour as objective 
characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these 
things. Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labour 
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as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the 
producers. Through this substitution, the products of labour become commodities, sensuous 
things which are at the same time supra-sensible or social. In the same way, the impression 
made by a thing on the optic nerve is perceived not as a subjective excitation of that nerve 
but as the objective form of a thing outside the eye. In the act of seeing, of course, light is 
really transmitted from one thing, the external object, to another thing, the eye. It is a 
physical relation between physical things. As against this, the commodity-form, and the 
value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no 
connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material [dinglich] relations 
arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves 
which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, 
therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the 
products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their 
own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the 
world of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call this the fetishism which 
attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is 
therefore inseparable from the production of commodities. (Marx, 1976: 165) 
For Marx, then, `commodity fetishism' is the systematic substitution of relations 
between subjects by relations between objects. In everyday life one forgets that 
money, for example, is the product of complex social relations. Instead, one treats 
money as if its monetary value is a direct substitute for social value. We 
systematically fetishise money, which is an ordinary thing made out of paper or 
copper, as we (mis)perceive social relations as thing-like economic relations. 
Money thus becomes `beautiful', a magical object, a fetish. The commodity, 
although clearly a dead and empty thing, becomes `alive'; it makes all sorts of 
`wild dances' and is worshipped and treated as a `natural' Other. 
Why, then, does Marx `take flight into the misty realm of religion', why does he 
use the term `fetishism' to describe the `goings-on' of the commodity? One can 
clearly sense a certain polemic and satirical intention in Marx's writing on 
capitalist fetishism, which has been detected by a host of writers (e. g. Mitchell, 
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1986; Pietz, 1993; and Zizek, 1989,1997a). Marx seems to like the idea of 
ridiculing the bourgeoisie and its vulgar economists who believe, just like 
`primitive' African people, in magical objects, i. e. the `divine' naturalness of the 
commodity. The term `fetishism' was first used in an anthropological context to 
describe the `strange' behaviour of African people who would worship certain 
magical objects. 33 By comparing capital to `backward' cultures Marx thus seems 
to use the term to show the `primitivism' of capital, to show its irrationality 
perhaps. One could say that this is the `negative' interpretation of Marx's usage of 
`fetishism', an interpretation that portrays Marx as someone who would ridicule 
cultural differences and otherness. In contrast, a `positive' interpretation would 
see Marx's usage of the term `fetishism' in relation to his serious life-long interest 
in an analysis of the relationship between religion and economics. According to 
Pietz (1993), Marx clearly chose `fetishism' with care, as the term alludes to the 
juncture between individual `sensuous desire' and historically specific social 
divisions of labour. In other words, "like fetishist cultures, civil society achieved 
its unity not by finding a principle of universality but endlessly weaving itself into 
a `system of needs' -a libidinal economy" (1993: 140-141). Capital's specific 
`libidinal economy' finds its expression in the general form of the commodity. 
33 Anthropologically the term `fetish' was first applied by the Portuguese in the 16'h century - as 
feitifo - to idols and amulets, which were supposed to possess magical powers, and which 
were used by the natives for their religious worship. De Brosses (1760) was one of the first 
anthropologists who employed `fetishism' as a general descriptive term and he claimed that 
Egyptian hieroglyphics were the signs of a fetishistic religion. Thus, according to the 
anthropological meaning of the term, the fetishist believes the fetish to be something 
supernatural; the fetish is seen to be an objective fact - natural; transcendental. Polhemus and 
Randall describe how the Portuguese must have felt upon their arrival in West Africa where 
they first encountered the worship of fetishes: "How wide their eyes must have been, how 
confused their thoughts, as they first came into contact with ways of life untouched by 
Europe... So many things must have amazed them, but the one which history has focused upon 
is their fascination with the way the tribal peoples of West Africa believed that certain 
seemingly unmiraculous objects -a stone, a knotted string, an animal pelt, an amulet - 
possessed magical powers" (1994: 39). 
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Marx argues that the formation of the `commodity fetish' takes place with the 
general form becoming a universal form, i. e. the social, libidinal practice becomes 
generally accepted custom or law - one could say that it becomes part of the 
symbolic order, the Lacanian Other. 
What might be worthwhile in this regard is to extend the Marxian politico- 
economic analysis of `commodity fetishism' by discussing some psychoanalytic 
themes of sexual fetishism. Sexual fetishism is, according to Freud, 
psychologically triggered by a trauma, the trauma that the female lacks a penis. 
This lack, according to Freud, is compensated by some other object, a symbolic 
substitute for the penis, an object that is invested with excessive energies. Thus, in 
the mind of the fetishist 
the woman has a penis, in spite of everything; but this penis is no longer the same as it was 
before. Something else has taken its place, has been appointed its substitute, as it were, and 
now inherits the interest which was formerly directed to its predecessor. But this interest 
suffers an extraordinary increase as well, because the horror of castration has set up a 
memorial to itself in the creation of this substitute... We can now see what the fetish 
achieves and what it is that maintains it. It remains a token of triumph over the threat of 
castration and a protection against it. (Freud, 2000: 385; 1977: 353) 
In other words, fetishism is triggered by a horror (castration) that leads to the 
substitution of a sexual object with an Other. This substitution occurs because the 
Other is lacking something (a sexual object, the penis). Therefore, the subject's 
attempt to accomplish a `full' identity by identifying with a supposedly `full' 
Other is failing. Fantasy tries to fill this lack of the Other; it tries to provide a 
solution for the uncertainty that is produced by the gap between the subject's need 
for identity and the failing of the Other to provide this `full' identity. Fantasy thus 
reduces anxiety and creates something like a harmonious picture which enables 
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the subject to live without fear; it helps to obfuscate the true horror of reality (e. g. 
castration). 
`Commodity fetishism' could be seen as precisely such a fantasy. The commodity 
is the object which the subject `adopts' as something that provides security, 
warmth and company. As I discussed in the previous chapter, for Lacan the Other, 
the symbolic regime of reality, is always characterised by a lack. This is to say 
that social reality can never be fully organised. In capitalism it is the commodity 
that fills the Other's lack. As the commodity fills the gap that is left behind by a 
failing Other, it enables the subject to identify again with the Other; the 
commodity substitutes the Other to become the Other. This is the basic process of 
capitalism's ideological structuring of reality. Benjamin calls this 
`phantasmagoria' -a world that is projected like a movie on a screen. 
The property appertaining to the commodity as fetish character attaches as well to the 
commodity-producing society - not as it is in itself, to be sure, but more as it represents 
itself and thinks to understand itself whenever it abstracts from the fact that it produces 
precisely commodities. The image that it produces of itself in this way, and that it 
customarily labels as its culture, corresponds to the concept of phantasmagoria... The latter 
is defined by Wiesengrund [Adorno] `as a consumer item in which there is no longer 
anything that is supposed to remind us how it came into being. It becomes a magical object, 
insofar as the labor stored up in it comes to seem supernatural and sacred at the very 
moment when it can no longer recognized as labor'. (BGS V, 822-823; AP, 669) 
The `commodity fetish' is thus a fantastic illusion, a phantasmagoria, which 
serves the subject as a tool to imagine a harmonious structuring of objective 
reality. However, this is not a subjective illusion - it does not only work on the 
level of the imaginary. According to Marx, `commodity fetishism' must be seen 
as a systematic misrecognition; that is, `commodity fetishism' shapes the 
symbolic order, the Other itself. Therefore, for Marx this misrecognition is not a 
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`false' knowledge; there is no gap between the subject and the object here. The 
point is that `commodity fetishism' works as a power/knowledge regime that 
produces everything that one might regard as knowledge. The `commodity fetish' 
that has filled the gap of the lacking Other shapes the subject and its imaginary- 
perceptual apparatus. 
We need to remind ourselves of the Lacanian conception of the subject, discussed 
in Chapter Two, which is not a conscious, active human being. Instead, the 
Lacanian subject is - like the fldneur, the prostitute, the knowledge worker, and 
Marx's table -a `thing' that is animated by the Other. This `thing' traverses the 
boundary between subjective and objective, human and non-human, active and 
passive, alive and dead. Thus, to come back to Marx's table and its `grotesque 
ideas', one could say: 
For this table, no less than the ego, is dependent on the signifier, namely on the word, 
which, bearing its function to the general, to the lectern of quarrelsome memory and to the 
Tronchin piece of noble pedigree, is responsible for the fact that it is not merely a piece of 
wood, worked in turn by the woodcutter, the joiner and the cabinet-maker, for reasons of 
commerce, combined with fashion, itself productive of needs that sustain its exchange 
value, providing it is not led too quickly to satisfy the least superfluous of those needs by 
the last use to which it will eventually be pure, namely, as firewood.... Furthermore, the 
significations to which the table refers are in no way less dignified than those of the ego, 
and the proof is that on occasion they envelop the ego itself. (Lacan, 1977: 132, translation 
modified) 34 
What Lacan does in the above passage is to portray the subject as a thing; he links 
the subject, the ego, to a wooden thing, perhaps Marx's table, which is shaped and 
worked on by the Other. In the same way one could say that today's knowledge 
34 I have slightly amended the translation and exchanged `desk' with 'table' to make the obvious 
link between Lacan's psychoanalytical to Marx's politico-economic example. Is it a 
coincidence that Lacan refers to the same wooden `thing' as Marx? 
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worker is formed by the knowledge management discourse that is, as we have 
seen, always already geared towards commodity production. Marx's table, which, 
at first sight, seems to be an ordinary sensuous thing, acquires, once it has been 
turned into a commodity, a sublime extra-sensuousness, because it now serves as 
a magical object within a broader system of libidinal needs. Equally, the 
knowledge worker is turned into a knowledge commodity which acquires extra- 
sensuousness in today's knowledge society. As I discussed earlier, for knowledge 
management the ideal scenario seems to be when the knowledge worker's whole 
body, including his or her tacit and sub-conscious knowledge, is made explicit, 
transferable onto a computer system and made productive as a commodity. 
For Zitek (1989,1997a), a keen reader of both Marx and Lacan, `commodity 
fetishism' is an ideological fantasy. This fantasy is not a subjective misrecognition 
but indeed points to Benjamin's `sleeping collectivity' mentioned above. That is, 
for Lilek, `commodity fetishism' is a structural fantasy that produces the subject 
as such; it enables an identification with what is an otherwise failing Other. For 
Lilek (1989: 31), the collectivity is asleep because it does not realise that the 
Other is failing. This is to say that society itself is impossible and undecidable and 
the commodity is only one particular content, which has 'decided' to fill the lack 
of the Other. Liiek therefore insists that 'commodity fetishism' works on the level 
of the universal and that the ideological fantasy of the commodity is structural. 
For 2ilek, then, the commodity is a kind of 'universal machine' that organises 
social reality by way of a structural fantasy, that of 'commodity fetishism'. Now, I 
would suggest that 2i2ek's notion of universality works along similar lines as 
Laclau and Mouffe's concept of hegemony. Following Hegel, 2i2ek claims to 
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work with a "properly dialectical notion of the Universal": In his view, the 
universal is not a totality but something that can be found in the exception (2001 b: 
27). For Lilek, this exception is structurally necessary. This can be seen along the 
lines of Laclau and Mouffe's claim, which I discussed in Chapter Two, that 
society is structurally undecidable or impossible. What this structural necessity of 
the exception points to is that the rules of reality will always be characterised by 
exceptions. Social organisation will never be full and all-encompassing and there 
will always be `minorities', so to say. For Zi2ek, "the basic rule of dialectics is 
thus: whenever we are offered a simple enumeration of subspecies of a universal 
species, we should always look for the exception to the series" (ibid. ). This is 
because the exception is the symptom "which disturbs the surface of the false 
appearance" - it disturbs the apparent unity of reality. In contrast to the fetish, 
which "is the embodiment of the Lie which enables us to sustain the unbearable 
truth" (Lilek, 2001a: 13), the symptom aims to destruct the normal `goings-on' of 
the fetish by exposing a particular exception as universality. 
What we have here, then, is a politics of the particular that speculatively aims at 
the disruption of the universal and its fetish appearance. For iiek, the task of the 
dialectical process is to expose universality as particularity. In Laclau's words, it 
is the task to show that "the universal... does not have a concrete content on its 
own" (1996a: 34-35), but only one that is provided by a particularity. This, then, 
points to the notion that society, as universality, is impossible. As I discussed in 
Chapter Two, for Laclau and Mouffe, society is impossible precisely because 
hegemony can never be all-encompassing. One could say, it is impossible for the 
universal to only have one totalising content. What is possible, however, is that 
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society can be filled by a particular hegemonic content. For Ziek, the commodity 
is such a hegemonic content that has filled the universal Other of social reality. 
One could thus argue that capital's hegemony is produced and reproduced by way 
of an illusion, a fantasy, which systematically tells us that social relations can be 
universally expressed as a commodity relation. This illusion is, however, not a 
false knowledge. It is a knowledge that identifies with capital and accepts it as 
hegemonic social reality, as Other. Nevertheless, it is an illusion, precisely 
because it is only one particular content that has filled the gap, of what is 
fundamentally a society that can never be fully represented. 
This filling of the impossible gap of society is inherently political. It is political 
because it can be seen as a social `decision' about how to position and order 
society. One could say, capital and the commodity are `political machines' that 
emplace `the social' into particular formations, which need to be continuously 
reproduced and defended. Capital reproduces its hegemony; that is, it 
continuously renews its power as an object of identification. It does this by way of 
maintaining a complex libidinal economy of subjectivities, such as the fläneur, the 
prostitute or the knowledge manager, that are always already positively positioned 
in relation to capital. In this chapter I have discussed knowledge management as a 
particular technology that helps capital to position being in relation to capital and 
the commodity. This particular positioning of being can be described as 
knowledge management's hegemonic politics. In the previous chapter I discussed 
the concept of hegemony as a discourse that fills the lack of the Other; it is a 
discourse which decidedly fills, what Laclau calls, the `structural undecidability of 
society'. In this chapter I have tried to show that it is precisely the commodity 
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which is the hegemonic content aiming to be the universal representation of the 
Other. The knowledge management discourse is inherently part of this particular 
project of hegemony, which must not only be seen to shape the wider framework 
of society, but also the apparatus that shapes subjectivity and the ontological as 
such. Hegemony means that social reality, life itself, is shaped by a particular 
discursive regime of power and knowledge. In this sense, knowledge management 
is inherently political, as `the political' is the event in which a particular content is 
claiming to be the hegemonic universality. 
As I pointed out in Chapter Two, however, a hegemony cannot be seen to have 
any centre or be final in any way. This is to say, as much as capital can be seen as 
a `synthesis' that has politically positioned and emplaced `the social', this 
emplacement can never be final; it is an emplacement that is continuously 
embattled and contested. This connects, then, to Benjamin's notion of `non- 
synthesis', as discussed in Chapter Two. This concept implies that a synthesis can 
never be fully accomplished; a synthesis is continuously subverted and challenged 
by discourses of resistance. `The social', then, can never be fully positioned and 
represented; there will always be depositioning forces. It is this notion of 
depositioning and the possibility of resistance, that I will explore in more detail in 
the following chapter. 
Before we move onto the next chapter, however, let us pause for a moment. 
I began this thesis by way of introducing Benjamin's life-project, the Passagen- 
Werk, or Arcades Project. In the Preface I discussed the importance of this work 
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for Benjamin's personal passage and, generally, for an understanding of the 
emergence of modem society and the way it has been positioned and emplaced. 
Now that we have come to the half-way point of this thesis - perhaps we can say 
that we are now inside Benjamin's arcade - let us halt for a moment and have a 
look around the place we have arrived at. 
The arcade is a street-like passageway, along which there are shops selling 
`things' - commodities of all kinds. People, like thefäneur, wander along these 
shops and gaze at the commodities, which are on display in big shopping windows 
and advertised by flashing lights. The fidneur `meets' fellow Parisian city folk 
inside the arcade, but it is an anonymous meeting. One only exchanges some 
glances with the other before continuing to wander from shop to shop. The 
arcade-street is a protected place. An iron-glass construction shields off the 
elements while still letting plenty of light into the arcade. The light gives the 
impression of being `outside' on a `normal' Parisian street. However, one is really 
`inside' a `controlled' place that has been `manufactured' for the needs of 
commodity exchange. 
For Benjamin, the arcade was as `a world in miniature' (AP, 31); that is, the 
emergence of the arcade signified the passage into modernity itself. One could 
say, Benjamin saw the arcade pointing to the way modern society is emplaced, 
and the purpose of the Arcades Project was to study this particular emplacement 
in great detail. What I have tried to achieve in this chapter is to use some of 
Benjamin's themes of the arcade's analysis and `apply' them to today's 
positioning of modern society. Today, the Parisian arcade might have vanished or 
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lost in importance. Yet, its `organisational principles' are still very much with us. 
Perhaps, today's arcade is a global one. Its imaginary glass-roof spans the entire 
globe giving us the illusion of being `outside', but we are really `inside' a 
particular place, a particular emplacement that positions and `corners' society and 
life itself in specific ways. What I have tried to show in this chapter is that 
knowledge management is a discourse that is part of this particular way of 
emplacing and positioning `the social'. 
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4. Depositioning Organisation: The Politics 
of Resistance 
In the previous chapter I outlined, discussed and critiqued the particularities of the 
knowledge management discourse in organisation theory. I argued that knowledge 
management is positively positioned in relation to the restricted concerns of 
management and therefore deeply embedded in today's hegemonic relations of 
capital. Although the previous chapter engaged with the particularities of the 
knowledge management discourse, the aim was to paint a wider picture of the 
positioning project and explore the `goings-on' of the hegemony of capital. As I 
discussed, this hegemony produces specific subjectivities, for example those of 
the knowledge manager, the prostitute and the fläneur. These subjectivities are 
products of the hegemonic relations of capital; they are actors that continuously 
reproduce this hegemony within the libidinal economy of `commodity fetishism'. 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, however, a hegemony can never be all- 
encompassing; there will always be gaps in what sometimes seems to be a 
totalitarian dominance of management. This is to say that there is a multiplicity of 
resistances - perhaps one can call them `minorities' - that have been articulated 
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against the hegemony of the positioning project within the realms of organisation 
theory. In this chapter I will discuss some of these discourses of resistance that 
have been articulated against the positioning project of organisation. However, 
what could be called the depositioning project in organisation theory is not an 
`essential' category that is described by a unified discourse. Instead, the 
depositioning project is a multiplicity. I will therefore not attempt to fully 
represent the depositioning project in this chapter. All the same, I will argue that 
there is a certain tendency in organisation theory to regard social reality as 
something that is fluid, plural, transparent and locally constructed. While such a 
depositioning and resisting of established images of organisation has been a 
politically important project, which shows the precarious and undecidable nature 
of organising, this chapter aims to expose some of the limits of this project. Based 
on the theoretical conceptions developed in Chapter Two, I will argue that the 
depositioning discourses of resistance discussed in this chapter can be seen to 
have certain depoliticising effects, precisely because the political event is not seen 
as something that is related to wider questions of the hegemonic structuring and 
ordering of society. 
Organisation as Multiple Process 
In the previous chapter I showed how organisation is often restricted to the 
hegemonic practices of management and capital; that is, organisation is positioned 
in such a way that it is geared towards the production of fetish commodities and 
the specific value system of capital. This restriction of organisation, I argued in 
Chapter One, can be linked to, what I called, the positioning project of modernity, 
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which always already emplaces subjects and objects within grids of simple, 
formal, hierarchical and well-bounded locations. Within such a view, organisation 
is a `simple location', as Chia (1998b: 6) puts it; organisation is a unit(y), a 
definite place that can be administrated, represented and economically managed. 
As a response or resistance to these restricted notions, authors have increasingly 
called for a more processual understanding of organisation: "We need to see 
organization as a process", Cooper and Burrell, for example, proclaim (1988: 
106). For Chia, a processual understanding of organisation 
privileges an ontology of movement, emergence and becoming in which the transient and 
ephemeral nature of what is `real' is accentuated. What is real for postmodern thinkers are 
not so much social states, or entities, but emergent relational interactions and patternings 
that are recursively intimated in the fluxing and transforming of our life-worlds. (1995: 
581) 
The `process-view' aims to go beyond an understanding of organisation as entity 
or unity and, instead, emphasise that every reality is produced within a complex 
web of multiple relations. Cooper and Burrell (1988: 106) refer to this as the 
`production of organisation'. That is, for them organisation is not something that 
simply exists - it is not a noun - but, instead, an ongoing process of production 
"that occurs within the wider `body' of society" (ibid. ). Within such a view, then, 
organisation is a verb, a continuous process of becoming, which has been 
described as the Deleuzoguattarian algorithm of `and... and... and' (Styhre, 2002: 
464). This expresses the view that organisation is not seen as being real, or, what 
Chia calls, `being-realism' (1996: 33) but, instead, as a `becoming-realism' (ibid. ) 
which always connects and transforms. The `process-view' of organisation thus 
contrasts the continuity of stasis with the continuity of dynamis. It replaces the 
continuity of organisation as a stable entity with the notion of a "continuous 
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production of multiplicities and assemblages" (Styhre, 2002: 465), or, as 
Kavanagh and Araujo put it, a "multiplicity... constructed in a loose, dynamic 
network of tangles, mangles, ensembles and assemblages" (1995: 110). 
This processual understanding of the concept of organisation is seen by Chia as a 
resistance to modem technologies of organisation and representation: 
"Representation, through fixing and placing of fluid, amorphous, social 
phenomena in space-time, is an organizational process which works to centre, 
unify and render discrete what would otherwise be an indistinguishable mass of 
vague interactions and experiences" (1998: 4). Rather than being restricted to the 
management of modem forms of positioning and organising, organisation 
theorists adopting a so-called `process perspective' (Thanem, 2001) have thus 
attempted to develop, what Chia calls, a `social theory of organization' which 
does not neglect "the wider questions of the organizational character of modem 
social life" (1998b: 6). To see organisation as a process, then, is a realisation that 
organised reality is produced within complex webs of social relations. That is, 
organisation is not simply a positioned unity - for example, a hierarchy, 
discipline, taxonomy or institution - but indeed something that is continuously 
subject to multiple forces of depositioning and `microscopic change' (Chia, 1999; 
Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; see also Tsoukas, 2003). 
One of the most celebrated `process philosophers' of organisation is Robert 
Cooper. In a recent journal interview Cooper (2001 a) produces a rhizomatic text 
whose only space is that of the medium, the `in-between', which is a "continuous 
movement between locations and has no location itself' (2001 b: 193, emphasis in 
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original). In this text concepts appear, reappear and transform, they continuously 
connect to a plethora of his other writings. This text can be seen as an image of 
the whole of Coopers' work, which has been concerned with the displacement and 
explosion of representation (1992), the movement of in-formation (Cooper in 
Chia and Kallinikos, 1998), the collection and dispersion of parts (Cooper, 
2001 c), and the re-production of mass (ibid. ). For Cooper, "there are no unities, 
only dispersions of terms" (1998: 119); that is, for him wholes, unities and 
organisations are only ephemeral collections that disperse again into holes, parts 
and disorganisations. In his view "things come together and then fall 
apart,... relations are ephemeral, even ghost-like,... possibilities rather than 
actualities constitute the fabric of our world" (2001c: 24). One could say that 
Cooper is the thinker of depositioning par excellence because he was one of the 
first within the realms of organisation theory to engage with `post-structural' 
philosophies and critique established conceptions of organisation as formal 
entities and positive unities. For him, traditional conceptions of organisation seem 
to be "unable to recognise the obvious point that every positive - that is, 
positioned - object or event depends for its existence on a negative background 
that cannot be made obvious" (Cooper, 2001a: 336, emphasis in original). His 
quintessential point is that the seemingly positive form of organisation depends on 
a negative supplement, that of disorganisation (Cooper, 1990). 
The importance of his contribution lies in the fact that, for him, the concept of 
organisation is not restricted to a specific form or economic entity but, instead, 
assumes to be a general social process that is comprised of a heterogeneity of 
social and material actors. Cooper's attack on the specificity of organisation is 
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well developed in his work. In his view, over the past decades "the concept of 
organisation has lost its more general meaning of social organisation and has been 
increasingly narrowed down to the specific, instrumental meaning of an industrial 
or administrative work system" (2001 a: 326). He goes on to say that 
the idea of a specific organisation or institution is no more than a positioning strategy that 
we use to locate the slippery contents of our conceptual mindscapes. Seen against the 
complex, mobile mix of social reality, the image of a specific organisation or even a human 
individual is no more than a provisional placement or transient impression (2001a: 327, 
emphasis added). 
What he describes here is a view of the positioning project of organisation as the 
attempt to place social reality, which is fundamentally complex, mobile and 
transient, into a provisional order. For him, organisation is a temporary node in 
what is otherwise a disorganised mass of reality; organisation is the specific or 
particular expression of a general, more dynamic, matter (2001b). His 
depositioning strategy is thus not primarily one that critiques or resists particular 
specificities. In my view, Cooper's main contribution lies in the generalisation of 
the concept of organisation. He resists the hegemonic understanding of 
organisation, which in the previous chapter I exposed as that of management 
(although Cooper does not talk about management), by depositioning social 
reality itself and showing that organisation is a multiplicity, something that cannot 
simply be positioned in one place or expressed by one discourse, for example that 
of management. Cooper's work, then, shows that any emplacement, position or 
organisation is precarious and thus dependent on a negative movement of 
depositioning and disorganisation. We could say, perhaps, that Cooper points to 
the impossibility of fixing organisation in a permanent place. 
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Other process philosophers in organisation theory, too, see organisation as a 
temporary fixity in what is otherwise an essential flux of reality. As Linstead, for 
example, maintains, "attempts to organize in terms of stopping the flow of process 
are deathly - they kill off that which is vital and urgent in process in order to 
stabilize it temporarily and create, as a false problem, a situation where movement 
has to be reinscribed or reinserted into the system" (2002: 105). Linstead calls 
organisation a `false problem', because it artificially stops the movement of 
reality. His concern is therefore, so it seems, to prevent stops, breaks and stasis in 
order to ensure the continuity of flows, movements and dynamis. However, it 
would be a caricature of the work of process philosophers to claim that they are 
only concerned with the continuity of change and dynamis. As Linstead 
highlights, "change must always to some degree be organized to be thinkable" 
(2002: 105). He goes on to say that 
we need to bear in mind that organizations as social constructions still need some 
organizing if we are to sustain our social world in a recognizable form. The process, 
then..., might be seen as one of shifting tensions and relaxations, expansions and 
contractions, with organizing not as the opposite pole of the dualism to change, as its 
absolute other, but as a shifting qualitative relation between order and change. (Linstead, 
2002: 106) 
What Linstead describes here is a certain dialectic between order and change. 
Organisation is seen as a necessary stop to the continuous flow of reality. 
In Chia's words this stop is a decision that "acts to reduce equivocality and to 
punctuate our field of experience thereby helping to configure a version of reality" 
(1994: 803). For him, this decision is not so much about choosing a reality; 
instead, this very decision is undecidable as it "embodies and exemplifies the 
ongoing contestation between order and disorder, routine familiarity and 
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breakdown, organization and disorganization, chaos and cosmos" (ibid. ). For 
Chia, then, these decisions point to necessary breaks in the dynamis of reality: 
"the process of organizing social worlds comprises a complex and dynamic web 
of-arresting, punctuating, isolating and classifying of the essentially undivided 
flow of human experiences for the purpose of rendering more controllable and 
manipulable such phenomenal experiences of the world" (1998a: 366). What 
seems to be the essential point of the depositioning strategy of process 
philosophers, however, is that this arresting, stopping and deciding is only seen as 
a temporary, even local, intervention in what is otherwise an uncontrollable, 
disorganised flux of change: 
Whilst the breaking up of change into static states enables us to act upon them and whilst it 
is practically useful to focus on the end-states rather than on change itself, we deliberately 
create insoluble problems by failing to recognize the true changeable nature of reality. It is 
a mistake to construe reality as a sea of stability with scattered islands of change. Instead, 
the opposite is true. Stability is the exception, not the rule, especially in lived reality. (Chia, 
1998a: 355, emphasis added) 
For Chia, reality is not a stability, or a structure, but, instead, a continuous process 
of flux and transformation out of which organised stabilities emerge as an 
exception rather than the rule. These temporary organised stabilities are local and 
particular rather than universal. As Tsoukas and Chia maintain, "organizational 
phenomena are not treated as entities, as accomplished events, but as enactments - 
unfolding processes involving actors making choices interactively, in inescapably 
local conditions, by drawing on broader rules and resources" (2002: 577, 
emphasis added). 
This, then, is an ontology that sees organised reality not as a universal `being- 
realism' but as a locally enacted `becoming-realism' (Chia, 1996: 33) implying 
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that reality is something which is continuously changing rather than being fixed. 
One could also say that for process philosophers of organisation "there is no 
society as such" (Styhre, 2002: 470). At first sight this comes close to Laclau and 
Mouffe's characterisation of society as impossibility, discussed in Chapter Two. 
Laclau and Mouffe, too, see social organisation as something which ultimately is 
impossible to fix. Applied to the problematic explored in the previous chapter, one 
could say, for example, that management can never be a full representative of 
what is a multiplicity of alternative organisational regimes. In this sense, 
management is only a temporary, perhaps local, fixation of wider, more basic 
organisational forces that are continuously changing. Such a view opens up 
tremendous possibilities for seeing alternative organisational futures; it is an 
inherently positive way of engaging with the world. In relation to Benjamin's 
philosophy discussed in Chapter Two, one could say that process philosophers 
aim to deposition dominant histories and show that history can be read differently. 
Law and Benschop call this `ontological politics': "It is a form of politics that 
works in the play between different places, seeking to slip between different 
worlds. It is a form of politics that imagines that there always is such play" (1997: 
175). This, then, could be a productive reading of the politics of the `process- 
view', which continuously seeks to explore possibilities of new, local forms of life 
and different ways of reading history; it aims to show the possibility of multiple 
realities and histories. 
While this exploration of difference and multiplicity must be regarded as an 
important political project, this thesis is based on the understanding that social 
reality is not only constructed on a local basis and organisations are not only 
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temporary phenomena. As I explored in detail in the previous chapter when I 
engaged with the knowledge management discourse, management could be seen 
as an organisational regime that has become the hegemony of social reality. This 
means that managerial principles do not only work on a local basis but indeed 
have acquired a certain universality. Management has emplaced reality in 
particular ways, an emplacement which is not a temporary form but something 
which endures over time and space. This does not suggest that management is all 
there is - otherwise there would be no depositioning project - but, nevertheless, it 
means that there is a tendency for management to structure, shape and govern 
social organisation discourses. As a number of organisation theorists have pointed 
out recently (e. g. Parker, 1995; Reed, 1997; Willmott, 1998; Hancock and Tyler, 
2001a), process philosophies of organisation seem ill-equipped to analyse those 
structural forces that form social reality on a universal level. 
Reed, for example, maintains that the world of process philosophers of 
organisation 
seems to consist almost totally of verbs and hardly any nouns; there is only process, and 
structure is regarded as its passing effect. Structure is denied any kind of ontological status 
or explanatory power as a relatively enduring entity that takes on stable institutional and 
organizational forms generating scarce resources that actors, both individual and collective, 
have to draw on in a selective and constraint manner before they can `move on' and `make 
a difference'. We are left with an entirely process-driven conception of organization in 
which any, even residual, sense of social structure... dissolve[... ] away in the analytical 
fascination with the local, contingent and indeterminate. (1997: 26) 
Reed's concern is that a `process-view' of organisation denies us the ability to 
analyse and critique those concrete structures, "such as capitalist corporations and 
bureaucratic control regimes" (1997: 35), which, in his view, shape social reality. 
He fears that because process philosophers fail to look beyond the local and 
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contingent to see how organisational forms and discourses endure over time and 
space, `others', such as `the party', `the market', or `the nation', will always shape 
life according to their restricted political ends (1997: 29). In his view, process 
philosophers of organisation see no need 
to look beyond these micro-level processes and practices because, as far as their advocates 
are concerned, there is nothing, ontologically or analytically, `there'; flat ontologies and 
miniaturized local orderings construct a seductive vision of the social world in which 
everything and everybody is constantly in a `state of becoming' and never in a `condition of 
being'. This socio-organizational world is disassembled into some of its elemental 
constituents, but these are never re-assembled with a view to gaining a broader 
understanding of and explanatory purchase on the structural mechanisms through which 
they were originally generated and are subsequently elaborated. (Reed, 1997: 29) 
Although Reed's critique is generally well targeted, one could accuse him of 
somewhat caricaturing the `process-view' of organisation. As I showed in my 
above discussion, process philosophers do indeed privilege becoming over being, 
change over structure, but their position is not as naive as Reed wants it to be. 
What Reed does not seem to fully acknowledge is that a large aspect of the 
`process-view' of organisation is a general resistance against those `modern' 
structures - such as institutionalism and rationalism - that always already 
determine today's reality. In contrast to Reed's claim, cited above, that there is 
`literally nothing there' (i. e. there is no ontology) which process philosophers can 
engage with, one needs to see the political importance of their general critique of 
restricted economies of organising. While he rightly critiques process 
philosophers for not analysing and critiquing concrete social structures in any 
great detail, Reed does not seem to appreciate enough the imaginative and creative 
potential of process philosophies to see completely different life forms, different 
social organisation, organisations that are not yet nameable within the existing 
structures of consciousness. In my view, the main contribution of process 
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philosophers of organisation is their attempt to imagine difference, multiplicity 
and change on a general level. Read affirmatively one could say that they do not 
engage with concrete social structures because their main concern is to show how 
these structures are always already contingent and changeable. 
Having said this, I feel broadly sympathetic towards Reed's attack on the 
`process-view' of organisation precisely because his critique importantly points to 
some of its limitations and restrictions. In my view, the generalisations of the 
concept of organisation that have been suggested by process philosophers have 
become too restricted for four reasons: first, although the main contribution of the 
`process-view' is to show the general fluidity of social structures, process 
philosophers are ill-equipped to understand the specific forces of restriction that 
prevent concrete changes and transformations of social reality; second, the lack of 
an analysis of hegemonic forces of domination lead to an idealised notion of 
social reality, which is portrayed as continuous, transparent and somewhat 
harmonious; third, because emphasis is overwhelmingly put on movement, 
multiplicity and becoming, speculative thought is not being used for the creation 
of specific events and unities that can potentially enact specific situations of 
change and transformation; and, fourth, the celebrations of ephemeral and local 
ontologies are in constant danger of being subsumed by those structural forces 
that always already seem to shape modern life, for example, capital or the state. 
To further qualify these restrictions of the `process-view' of organisation, one 
could note, for example, that capital, as a force that structures contemporary 
reality, does not seem to exist in the language of many process philosophers. 
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Indeed one could claim that capital, although very real in its structuring effects, 
assumes the role of the Lacanian Real, which I discussed in Chapter Two as that 
which cannot be made explicit, represented or symbolised (2ilek, 1997a: 93-95). 
This is to say, with process philosophers of organisation we are often in the odd 
position that, while they are keen to speculate about the organisational Real (that 
which is currently not part of `normal' organisational reality), very real 
organisational forces of contemporary reality, such as capital, seem to be relegated 
to the Real and hence rendered unnameable. If one wants to be affirmative about 
such a movement between the real and the Real, one could say that this is indeed 
part of any speculation. That is, the speculative power of the `process-view' of 
organisation lies precisely in its ability to move forces of the real to the Real and 
vice versa. However, there are questions of effectiveness and strategy that need to 
be asked about such a movement, which I already touched upon in Chapter Two 
when I discussed Adorno's critique of Heidegger. For Adorno, Heidegger's 
philosophy, although impressive, amounts to a `jargon of authenticity', or indeed 
to idealism, precisely because the jouissance of the Real, or Heidegger's Being, is 
not connected to the real, or any concrete modes of being that can be intervened 
and transformed. For Adorno, Heidegger's philosophy has very little 
transformational or affirmative potential because it cannot name the objects and 
subjects that are supposed to be affirmed. Equally, one could say that the process 
philosophies, discussed above, although generally affirmative in nature, lack 
concrete transformational powers as they are not able to name and specify the 
modes and forms of organisation to be transformed. As the specific `goings-on' of 
capital are rendered unnameable by the `process-view', it lacks the language to 
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transform those concrete social relations that, as we have seen in Chapter Three, 
describe the hegemony of organisation as management. 
One could thus say that, today, most process philosophies of organisation are very 
effective in describing the movement from the real to the Real; this movement is 
one of questioning unified positions of organised reality and showing that these 
are dependent on a multiplicity of forces of the Real, which are not currently 
symbolised by the real. In other words, what seems to be very well argued 
nowadays is that organisation, as a general concept of social organising, is not 
only an entity, a noun, but indeed a process of differentiation, a process of 
disorganisation, which cannot be fixed or symbolised in a single place. As Cooper 
(1990) argues, organisation is always dependent on a negative movement of 
disorganisation; perhaps one could say, the real of organisation is always 
complemented by a Real, that which is not or cannot be named or made visible. 
To show generally that organisation is dependent on forces of disorganisation has 
been, in my view, an important project of resistance against those modem forces 
of organisation, which always already position reality in specific ways. However, 
one of Reed's critiques of the `process-view', which I cited above, was that 
although process philosophers seem to be very effective in disassembling, 
disorganising and depositioning, very little has been done to reassemble the 
remaining fragments in order to gain "a broader understanding of... the structural 
mechanisms" of organised reality (Reed, 1997: 29). 
This coincides with Hardt who maintains that it is not enough to conceptualise the 
production of difference in a generalised manner. One should also see how these 
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potential processes intersect again and form a passage that is a new critical 
actuality (1993: 45). In my view, then, what would be necessary is not only the 
creation of multiplicities, differentiations and disorganisations, but also a 
movement oriented towards the production of new unities and organisations. In 
Chapter Two I discussed a range of philosophies which see politics as something 
that, not only disorganises established realities, but is indeed able to collect forces 
in such a way that a new organisational actuality is made possible. For me, the 
dialectical process is not only about depositioning established truths but working 
towards the construction of a new synthesis of forces. As Benjamin writes: "Being 
a dialectician means having the wind of history in one's sails. The sails are the 
concepts. It is not enough, however, to have sails at one's disposal. What is 
decisive is knowing the art of setting them" (AP, 473). In my view, the `process- 
view' has been essential in exposing the undecidable nature of reality and 
showing that any synthesis will always be incomplete, a `non-synthesis', so to 
say. What I highlighted in Chapter Two, however, is that despite the impossibility 
of a synthesis, and the impossibility of society, there is still a need for a political 
decision about how to organise `the social'. This aspect seems to be largely 
missing in the depositioning discourses in organisation theory. 
The 'Psychologism' of Social Construction ism 
As discussed in the previous section, one of the main contributions of the 
`process-view' of organisation has been to show that organisations are only 
temporary nodes in what is otherwise a disorganised matter of becoming. This 
implies that organisation must always be thought in relation to change. Within the 
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conceptual framework of process philosophers change is not in the first instance a 
systemic event - it is not a rupture, a fundamental discontinuity or break of reality 
- but, instead, something that is ongoing at a local level. As I discussed in Chapter 
Two, for Benjamin, a rereading and change of history has to involve a destructive 
movement of stopping the flow of `official histories'. His `dialectical image' is 
not merely one which enables us to see the continuous flow of multiplicities of 
history. Instead, it seeks to discontinue the history of `those in power' by way of a 
decisive `shock', in order to read those `minor' histories that are always already 
forgotten by dominant discourses. In contrast, process philosophers highlight the 
continuity and locality of change. Tsoukas and Chia, for example, speak of 
`microscopic change' (2002: 580). While `microscopic change' is seen to be 
continuous, social reality can, in a way, never be determined itself. In this section 
I would like to suggest that such an emphasis on `the local' can be connected to 
some social constructionist discourses, which have been of particular popularity in 
organisation theory. To be clear, social constructionism is not a unified discourse 
that one can clearly define, pigeonhole or locate in any fixed explanatory 
category. Instead, it is a discourse that is characterised by a multiplicity of 
disciplinary languages as well as epistemological, ontological and political 
positions (see, for example, the book collections by I. Parker, 1998, and Velody 
and Williams, 1998). One could say that social constructionism is ridden with 
antagonisms, which, to be sure, are not strictly internal to it, but are clearly 
connected to wider antagonistic debates in society. Yet, what I would like to 
suggest in this section is that, despite these antagonisms, there is a tendency for 
some social constructionist discourses in organisation theory to rely on 
psychological conceptions of reality construction. 
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Regardless of the multiplicity of views held by social constructionists one could, 
perhaps, give a general approximation of their position and say that they are 
deeply suspicious of realist ontologies and positivist epistemologies. In their view, 
reality does not pre-exist the human being; it is not something given by nature; 
instead, reality is constructed socially. This implies that the subject - whether 
individual, group, community or society - is not seen to be pre-given or derived 
from the nature of the world (Gergen, 1995a). This translates into, what one could 
generally call, an anti-positivist epistemology which maintains that social 
constructionists do not seek to understand the natural pre-given foundations and 
essences of the world but, instead, try to understand the contested dynamics of the 
way knowledge of the world is socially constructed. In Gergen's view, social 
constructionism can be defined as follows: 
Drawing importantly from emerging developments most prominently in the history of 
science, the sociology of knowledge, ethnomethodology, rhetorical studies of science, 
symbolic anthropology, feminist theory and post-structuralist literary theory, social 
constructionism is not so much a foundational theory of knowledge as an anti-foundational 
dialogue. Primary emphases of this dialogue are based on: the social-discursive matrix from 
which knowledge claims emerge and from which their justification is derived; the 
values/ideology implicit within knowledge posits; the modes of informal and institutional 
life sustained and replenished by ontological and epistemological commitments; and the 
distribution of power and privilege favoured by disciplinary beliefs. Much attention is also 
given to the creation and transformation of cultural constructions: the adjustment of 
competing belief/value systems: and the generation of new modes of pedagogy, scholarly 
expression and disciplinary relations. (] 995b: 20) 
Precisely because social constructionism is characterised by a multiplicity of 
views, Gergen's definition has been contested on a number of fronts. It is not the 
task of this section to evaluate and compare all of these contestations in detail. 
Instead, the starting point of my discussion is Gergen's claim that `social 
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constructionism is not so much a foundational theory of knowledge as an anti- 
foundational dialogue'. 
By emphasising dialogue Gergen highlights that, in his view, reality is always 
embedded in conversations and social interactions within communities rather than 
a pre-existing entity. Such a view has been particularly popular with those 
knowledge management scholars who have sought to look for alternatives to the 
technology oriented, or `techknowledgy', discourse, that I discussed and critiqued 
in the previous chapter. What has been increasingly emphasised are `people- 
centred' knowledge management approaches, that is, approaches that understand 
knowledge as something situational, local and socially distributed. Instead of 
knowledge as `techknowledgy', authors argue that knowledge must be 
conceptualised as an activity-oriented (Engestrom, 1989; Blackler, 1995), 
situational and practice-oriented process (Scribner, 1986; Suchman, 1987; Lave 
and Wenger, 1991), which is embedded in communities of knowing (Boland and 
Tenkasi, 1995) and communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Brown and 
Duguid, 1991). 
Such views of knowledge correspond to the critiques that have been put forward 
against cognitivism or what in the previous chapter I have referred to as the 
`Human Information Processing' school. Varela, for example, points out that 
"cognition consists not of representations but of embodied action. Correlatively, 
the world we know is not pregiven; it is, rather, enacted through our history of 
structural coupling" (1992: 336). He therefore sees knowledge having a 
distributed and appropriated character as it is constantly `worked on' and 
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transformed within changing social contexts. Hence, some social constructionists 
do not necessarily speak of knowledge but of knowing; that is, knowledge is not 
seen as a `thing' but as a process. The role of language must be emphasised in this 
context. Cognitivism, the information processing mode of cognition (Boland and 
Tenkasi, 1995), portrays communication as a message-sending and message- 
receiving process that uses language as its transmitter of reality. Many social 
constructionists reject the view that sees language as a chronological process of 
stimulus, information processing and response. As an alternative to such a 
formalist understanding of language one often relies on Wittgenstein's (1978) 
`language game' metaphor which is explained by Boland and Tenkasi: "Through 
action within communities of knowing we make and remake both our language 
and our knowledge.... In a language game there is no fixed set of messages or 
meanings from which to choose in communicating" (1995: 353). Many social 
constructionist discourses thus see language not as a transmitter of predefined and 
prepositioned meanings but as a constantly evolving process; hence, Maturana 
(1978) prefers to use the term `languaging' (the process of creating language) as 
opposed to `language' (a pre-existing symbolic schema). 
For these social constructionists, then, language does not reflect reality; instead, it 
constitutes it. That is, reality is constructed (inter-)subjectively through the 
communal construction of language, or `languaging' (see, for example, Fiske and 
Taylor, 1991; Gergen, 1992; Kvale, 1992; Hosking et al., 1995). As Boland and 
Tenkasi point out, "words gain sense only through actual use in a community, 
meanings are symbolic and inherently ambiguous, and the power of social 
processes, storytelling and conversation is emphasized" (1995: 353). Thus, 
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"language is essentially a consensual domain of agreement" (Mingers, 1995: 110). 
Lave and Wenger argue that knowledge construction "crucially involves 
participation as a way of learning - of both absorbing and being absorbed in - the 
`culture of practice"' (1991: 95). This implies "participation in an activity system 
about which participants share understandings concerning what they are doing and 
what that means in their lives and for their communities" (1991: 98). As another 
example one could mention the `community networking model' by Swan et al., 
which 
highlights the importance of relationships, shared understandings and attitudes to 
knowledge formation and sharing... it is precisely the sharing of knowledge across 
functional or organizational boundaries, through using cross-functional... inter-disciplinary 
and inter-organizational teams, that is seen as the key to the effective use of knowledge. 
(1999: 273) 
For the social constructionists discussed here, then, knowledge is constructed 
within organisational communities. It is said that this construction process is 
based on dialogue, consensus, shared understandings and a `culture of practice'. 
What is thus strongly emphasised are local knowledges that are said to be 
embedded in `communities of practice'. This emphasis on `the local' is seen as a 
reaction against and critique of positivist claims that knowledge is an objective 
and transcendental truth and that reality is a pre-given object (Kilduff and Mehra, 
1997). 
In the wider realms of organisation theory Karl Weick has been one of the most 
prominent proponents of social constructionist approaches that emphasise local, 
community-based knowledge construction processes. More than twenty years ago, 
he already called for people to stamp out nouns, as he calls it (1979: 44). In a 
passage, which reminds us of the `process-view' of organisation, Weick writes: 
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Nouns such as environment and organization conceal the fact that organizing is about 
flows, change, and processes... Fixed entities are things that people fix, and once fixed, 
they are supposed to stay fixed. That is the world of nouns. It is a perfectly consistent world 
of structures. The trouble is, there is not much in organizations that corresponds to it.... 
Verbs keep things moving and that includes the structures involved in sensemaking and the 
shifting demands to which those structures are trying to accommodate. Verbs remind 
people that they confront the activity of the environment rather than resistance.... People 
who think with verbs are more likely to accept life as ongoing events into which they are 
thrown, and less likely to think of it as turf to be defended, levels of hierarchy to be 
ascended, or structures to be upended. (1995: 187-188) 
For Weick, then, organisation is not a structure in any sense. Instead, organisation 
is a sensemaking process that is "grounded in both individual and social activity" 
(Weick, 1995: 6). In his view, "the organization makes sense, literally and 
figuratively, at the bottom" (1995: 117). He thus strongly emphasises the notion 
of the ground at which reality is constructed decentrally by social actors, as 
opposed to organisational reality being pre-given or imposed by a central place, 
for example, a top-management team (ibid. ). In his view, organisations might be 
rational, hierarchical and structural on the surface, but deep down on the ground 
things are loosely coupled, even messy (Weick, 1995: 134). Weick's ground, then, 
is not a concrete foundation but, perhaps, a `swamp'; it is a place where 
individuals and communities `muddle through', where organisation is loosely 
coupled, where people have to make sense of and renegotiate and recreate their 
realities in every second. However, in Weick's world of social psychological 
sensemaking not everything is in process all the time. In a chapter called `The 
Substance of Sensemaking' (1995: 106-132) he discusses `substances' or `content 
resources' such as ideologies, decision premises and paradigms which, for him, 
are vocabularies that simplify realities and influence sensemaking behaviours. 
Yet, in his view, "there is no such thing as a fixed meaning for the content 
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resources of sensemaking" (1995: 132) and, ultimately, it is up to the individual or 
group to choose which substances it wants to consider for the process of 
sensemaking. 
Let me, then, turn to a critique of such social constructionist discourses. In his 
essay `The Sociology of Knowledge and its Consciousness' Adorno (1967) 
attacks the work of Mannheim (1951) who was one of the prime figures of the 
German `sociology of knowledge' field. Mannheim's writing played an important 
role in German social science during the 1920s and 30s and subsequently had also 
a defining impact on the writings of Berger and Luckmann (1966) whose book, 
The Social Construction of Reality, is often referred to by social constructionists 
in organisation theory. Adorno detects a clear `psychologism' in Mannheim's 
writing; that is, for him, Mannheim concentrates his analysis on the individualistic 
facade of society, where individuals are characterised as agents that construct and 
reconstruct reality on a local basis. This, Adorno claims, "is based on the 
somewhat transcendental presupposition of a harmony between society and the 
individual" (1967: 41, emphasis added). For him, it is this idealism of a harmony 
between underlying societal power relations and the actuality of their subjective 
experience that describes the agenda of the German sociology of knowledge field 
championed by Mannheim. 
Such a levelling off of social struggles into modes of behaviour which can be defined 
formally and which are made abstract in advance allows uplifting proclamations concerning 
the future: `Yet another way remains open - it is that unified planning will come about 
through understanding, agreement, and compromise'. (Adorno, 1967: 42) 
Understanding, agreement, compromise, dialogue - as I have shown, these are 
often the terms used in social constructionist discourses. Reality is seen as a 
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subjective or inter-subjective phenomenon which is enacted by individual and 
communal techniques of knowledge construction. 
For Weick, for example, a trained psychologist, everything seems to come down 
to psychological processes. Although there are some `substances' in his view of 
reality, he portrays them to be merely `content resources' for the psychological 
processes of reality construction. For him, there are no social structures, such as 
ideologies, which endure over time and space and produce subjectivities in 
specific ways. Weick's language recalls the `psychologism' Adorno speaks of; the 
`psychologism' that assumes a non-antagonistic and harmonic relationship 
between individual sensemaking processes and wider societal forces of reality 
construction. It seems odd, for example, that when Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) 
study the work of flight operators aboard an US navy aircraft carrier they pay no 
attention to the wider socio-political context of that particular workplace. The 
aircraft carrier is seen as just another workplace that, like, for example, the fire 
fighter station, nuclear power station and hospital, operates in a high-risk 
environment. Their study is concerned to see how people make sense of 
potentially dangerous workplace situations and generally operate in a place that is 
ridden with tensions between routine operations and potential disaster. While 
Weick and Sutcliffe have a great deal to say about the psychological and social 
processes of sensemaking within the local community of flightdeck operators, 
their analysis does not attempt to connect local psychologies to wider social 
structures that produce the specific workplace called `aircraft carrier' in the first 
place. According to Adorno, such a `psychologism', then, "remains in the spell of 
the disaster without a theory being capable of thinking the whole in its untruth" 
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(AGS 10/2,470). That is, while Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) are concerned to study 
how workplace disasters can be prevented, they have no grasp of the `disaster' of 
the military-industrial complex itself, they have no political way of seeing the 
wider social structures their flightdeck operators are embedded in. 
Weick's particular social constructionism is by no means the only example of 
`psychologism' that can be observed in some areas of organisation theory; let us 
briefly consider another one. The cover of the 1999 edition of Lave and Wenger's 
bestseller Situated Learning shows a picture by Bent Karl Jakobsen featuring a 
stylist scene of jazz musicians. One could claim that jazz and social 
constructionism have formed a `successful' symbiosis in recent years. Evidence 
for this are a dedicated special issue of Organization Science (1998), named `Jazz 
improvisation and organizing', as well as the writing of Mary Jo Hatch (1997, 
1999) who has been attempting to `Jazz[... ] up the theory of organizational 
improvisation' (1997). Hatch argues that "jazz musicians do not accept their 
structures as given" (1999: 83). Instead, they improvise and create `empty spaces' 
for imagination, innovation and change, which they fill with `amazingly' creative, 
largely uncoordinated, inspirational jazz. She translates her jazz metaphor into a 
`jazz-based view' in organization theory, in which she advocates the notion of the 
`ambiguity of structure'; that is, structure is not supposed to be seen as given but 
as something that is resisted by individuals who, according to Hatch, collaborate 
together in teams, engage in processes of sensemaking, improvise and create 
`empty spaces' that are filled by `new' inspirations. With her jazz metaphor she 
therefore seems to continue the `psychologism' detected in the social 
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constructionist discourses discussed above: supposedly free subjects can construct 
their own worlds by making sense of social structures and being creative. 
In his essay `About Jazz' (AGS 17: 74; see also 1967) Adorno attempts to decode 
the ideological significance of jazz as art form by analysing both its inner 
structure and the manner of its popular reception in society. For Adorno, jazz is 
foremost a mass-produced and mass-consumed commodity: 35 "Jazz is a 
commodity in a strict sense" (AGS 17: 77). Improvisation and interruption of the 
structural logic of jazz, Adorno argues, are masks that conceal the demand- 
oriented commodification of music and therefore the structural imperative of the 
capitalist music market. He calls it `pseudodemocratic' as it is clearly part of the 
commercial propaganda `machine' of the market. 
The improvisional immediacy, which makes half of its success, is clearly part of such 
attempts to break out of the fetishistic commodity world that try to get away from it without 
changing it, and therefore will be sucked into its entanglement even deeper... With Jazz an 
unconscious subjectivity falls out of the commodity world into the commodity world; the 
system does not allow a way out. (AGS 17: 83, my translation) 
He therefore questions the naturalness and creative potential of jazz as forms of 
resistance against dominant structures, as Hatch would have it. What, in fact, is 
`natural' about jazz, he argues, is its commercial logic. According to Adorno, the 
freedom from structures and the dynamism, flexibility and flux of jazz are 
illusions. Instead, jazz is rooted in a rigid and timeless immobility and the 
repetitive sameness of the exchangeable commodity (Lunn, 1982). For Adorno, 
therefore, jazz is deeply rooted in the technics of capital: by trying to escape the 
3s Adorno must have specifically referred here to the extreme commercial success of Swing Jazz 
in the 1920s and 30s. 
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ideology of `commodity fetishism' the jazz-subject only ends up being entangled 
in the commodity world even more. 
In Adorno's view, then, jazz is embedded in the `goings-on' of `commodity 
fetishism'. Although it gives us the impression of producing ever new styles and 
themes, there remains an `objective' commodity relation. Just like knowledge 
management, Jazz's purpose as commodity is to sell newness. Adorno's point is 
that this repeated `newness' is, in fact, the `eternal return' of the `ever-same', the 
commodity. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Benjamin sees the very purpose of 
the commodity to `announce change with every second'. Like the merry-go- 
round, however, it always already returns us to the same point of departure. And, 
just like the `techknowledgy'-oriented knowledge managers discussed above, 
Hatch and her colleagues are quite explicit about the qualification of this point of 
departure which one always returns to. In Lewin's (1998) account, for example, 
the jazz-based view should improve the flexibility of human capital. The jazz 
metaphor is therefore not value free; instead, it is aimed at making organizational 
members more creative and flexible for capital's production process. While 
Adorno is often criticised for his elitist prejudices against jazz - and while such a 
critique might, at times, even hit its target - it should be clear that his critique is 
especially insightful in times when notions like community, creativity, social 
construction, innovation, etc. are on top of the agenda for many organisation and 
management scholars (see also Jones and Böhm, 2003). Adorno's critique, then, 
points us to the idea that, although reality is seen to be invented by jazz musicians 
and other creative people, there are some social structures which shape the way 
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reality is constructed. As I argued in the previous chapter, one of these dominant 
social structures is capital. 
What I have argued in this section, then, is that social constructionists have 
resisted the positioning discourses discussed in the previous chapter by 
emphasising `people-centred' techniques of reality construction. Rather than being 
produced by `objective' relations, subjects are seen to construct their own realities 
by engaging with each other socially within local `communities of practice'. What 
these social constructionist discourses share with the `process-view' is that reality 
is seen as a contingent, precarious and local process. While process philosophers 
do not necessarily see the individual as the prime enactor of these processes - 
note, for example, Cooper's decentred and material conception of subjectivity 
(1999,2001a) - the social constructionist views discussed here emphasise the 
social nature of reality construction. Reality is seen as something that is produced 
by individuals reaching consensus and shared understanding through dialogue. In 
this section I argued that such views are based on a certain `psychologism', which 
remains blind towards those social structures that endure over time and space and 
traverse local communities. One of these social structures is, for example, capital 
that always already shapes reality in specific ways and produces subjectivities 
along specific lines. The so-called `jazz-based view' shows that social 
constructionist discourses do not exist in a value-free environment in which reality 
is only constructed on local levels. What Hatch and other protagonists of 
organisational jazz make clear is that the creative potentials of improvisation and 
ambiguity are geared towards the interests of companies and capital. The `jazz- 
based view' is articulated as a `theory of the firm', which aims to improve its 
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efficiency and effectiveness. It is clear that this takes us back into the restricted 
realms of the hegemony of capital and management, discussed in Chapter Three. 
Within the language of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) one could say that the social 
constructionist discourses discussed here, which aim to deposition centralised, 
bureaucratic and rational understandings of reality construction, are always 
already reterritorialised on the level of capital. This is to say, as social 
constructionists confine their agenda to local, community-based understandings of 
reality, they seem particularly ill-equipped to discuss, critique and resist those 
social structures which shape social reality on a universal level. Therefore, social 
constructionism, the way it is often articulated within the realms of organisation 
theory, seems to be a depositioning discourse that is easily incorporated into the 
restricted agendas of the positioning discourse, which in the previous chapter I 
discussed as the hegemony of capital and management. The `people-centred' 
knowledge management discourses, Weick's sensemaking language and the jazz- 
based view' do not challenge or even discuss this hegemony precisely because 
within their conceptual framework social reality is produced on `the ground' or 
the local level. 
The Pluralistic Politics of Social Constructionism 
While the discourses discussed above seem to see reality as something that is 
mainly consensus-oriented and non-conflictual, one should not assume that social 
constructionism is per se apolitical. On the contrary, many social constructionists 
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see local reality and identity constructions as a vital broadening of the realm of 
politics. Gergen, for example, writes: 
Most acutely needed are innovative forms of political action. In my view, one of the most 
significant innovations derived from the identity politics movement was to broaden 
extensively the arena of the political. In particular, political practice ceased to be reserved 
for the arena of politics formally considered - campaigning, voting, office holding - and it 
ceased to be centrist - that is moving from the top down. Rather, politics moved into the 
arena of the local and the immediate - into the streets, the classrooms, business, and so on. 
Further, as we have slowly learned - particularly from feminist activists - there is no arena 
of daily life that is not political in implication - from the cartoons our children watch to our 
purchase of shampoo and shirts. In this sense, political action does not require either 
aggressive action or broad visibility to be effective. It seems to me that the future of 
relational politics might promisingly be shaped by conjoining these realizations. Most 
particularly, we may see relational politics as diffused (in terms of its expansion into all 
corners of society) and defused (in terms of reducing its aggressive or alienating posture). 
Politics in the relational mode should be both subtle and unceasing - not the work of 
specific groups on specific sites identified as `political, ' but the work of us all, on all fronts. 
(1995) 
For Gergen, then, local processes of reality, or what he calls identity 
constructions, are always already political because they involve the construction 
of different life forms. For him, "constructionism is deeply pluralistic. There are 
no foundational grounds for discrediting any form of discourse, and because 
discursive practices are embedded within forms of life, to obliterate a language 
would be to threaten a form of humanity" (1998: 45). Thus, in Gergen's view, 
social constructionism is indebted to a pluralism of different life forms and "the 
co-habitation of a multiplicity of disparate voices" (1998: 46). What he calls 
`relational politics' is a politics which aims to maintain this multiplicity of voices 
by encouraging dialogue and collaboration between groups, thus overcoming, 
what he calls, a `contentious politics', which separates communities and 
artificially establishes barriers of `us' vs. `them' (Gergen, 1995). 
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Gergen's political scenario is thus one that imagines the `friendly' co-existence of 
different communities, which is established by developing a shared language that 
does not alienate, antagonise or escalate. Instead of fuelling antagonistic 
languages, his `relational politics' calls for the creation of "a new range of 
poetics" (Gergen, 1995), that can work across different discursive fields and 
establish understanding between conflictual parties. He names four examples of 
this `relational politics': collaborative education, family therapy, community 
focused institutes and appreciative inquiry. The latter is a distinct management 
technique to solve conflicts in organisations: 
When organizations confront conflict - between management and workers, men and 
women, blacks and whites and so on - appreciative inquiry shifts the focus from who is 
right and wrong, fostering tolerance, or developing rules of proper conduct, to modes of 
collaborative action. More specifically the attempt is to work with the organization to locate 
instances of desirable or ideal relations - cases in which groups work well and effectively 
with each other. Further, as these appreciated instances are brought into public 
consciousness, the organization is brought into discussion of the kind of future they might 
build around such cases. In the very process of instancing the positive, and forging an 
image of a desirable future, the divisive constructions lose their suasive capacity. (Gergen, 
1995) 
Gergen's `relational politics' thus attempts to overcome organisational conflicts 
by mediating and establishing dialogue between opposed parties. This is based on 
an understanding that the organisation is fundamentally an open and somewhat 
transparent terrain that can be managed using a set of management principles, 
such as `appreciative inquiry' mentioned above. Gergen's `relational politics' is 
about making organisational relations transparent, by establishing shared 
understandings, and enabling the acceptance and respect of difference. `Relational 
politics', then, is indebted to a pluralistic understanding of organisation, which 
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maintains that conflicts can be overcome by way of an open and transparent 
dialogue between oppositional parties. 
Such pluralism can also be observed in other organisation theory discourses (see 
also De Cock and Böhm, 2003). For example, let us briefly look at the `paradigm 
debate', which has been staged for more than two decades now, and which 
originally erupted in response to Burrell and Morgan's (1979) book Sociological 
Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. Burrell and Morgan contend that 
organisational analysts are embedded within the realms of four sociological 
paradigms: functionalism, interpretativism, radical structuralism and radical 
humanism. These paradigms come into existence, they argue, because of two 
fundamental splits: first, the split between subjectivist and objectivist ways to 
view the world, which is marked by different philosophical assumptions about 
ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology; and second, the split 
between regulation and radical change. Now, according to Burrell and Morgan, 
these four paradigms are not intended to represent images that can be chosen by 
individuals. Instead, they are described as being incommensurable; that is, there 
cannot be any dialogue or compromise between these four paradigms. In other 
words, because of fundamental philosophical differences, sociological and 
organizational research is, according to Burrell and Morgan's argument, divided 
into four incommensurable communities that all view the world differently. The 
notion of incommensurability is thus one that emphasises antagonistic difference 
between world-views that cannot be bridged. Although it is not my task here to 
fully engage with Burrell and Morgan's argument, it is noteworthy that for Burrell 
"the belief in incommensurability.. 
. 
has its origins in politics" (1996: 650). For 
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him, incommensurability is strategic in nature and can be seen as a response to a 
particular situation in the 1970s when functionalist orthodoxies of organisation 
threatened to overtake the social sciences. Hence, one could say that Burrell and 
Morgan's notion of paradigm incommensurability attempted to `open the field' 
(Cooper, 1976) and establish antagonistic camps of radical thought, camps that 
would be heavily guarded against functionalist agendas. This opening, however, is 
not a celebration of openness itself. Instead, it could be argued that 
incommensurability attempts to open up possibilities for antagonistic struggles by 
establishing a logic of `us' against `them'. 
While the `paradigm grid' is often used to pigeonhole organisational theories 
according to their philosophical assumptions, the original political significance, 
which lies in the resistance against established functionalist theories of 
organisation theory, is sometimes not seen or acknowledged. In opposition to 
Burrell and Morgan's (1979) notion of an incommensurability between paradigms 
of organizational analysis, writers have increasingly argued for paradigm 
commensurability; that is, what has been emphasised is that multiple paradigms 
can co-exist alongside rather than in opposition to each other. Hassard (1991), for 
example, puts forward a `multi-paradigm' view that aims to go beyond binary 
oppositions of `modernist' social science agendas. He advocates a `postmodemist' 
view of organizational analysis, which, being allegedly based on Derrida's notions 
of undecidability and differance, would not be oppositional in nature but 
"developing the middle ground". In his eyes, this would be somewhat "more 
closely attuned to the spirit of the times" (1991: 19). And it certainly is, given the 
recent `success' of political discourses of `The Third Way' (e. g. Giddens, 1998). 
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A similar view is put forward by Aldrich who argues for a communication model 
when he says: "we should be pleased that people in different cultures... [find] a 
common ground around which to organize their discourse" (1992: 38). For 
Aldrich, then, incommensurability needs to be overcome because today's 
multicultural world requires strategies of mediation, dialogic communication and 
consensus building. In organisation theory such a call for diversity and pluralism 
has been a popular response to the notion of incommensurability; see, for 
example, McKinley and Mone (1998), Kaghan and Phillips (1998) and Weaver 
and Gioia (1995) and Knudsen (2003). What seems to be at the heart of the call 
for pluralistic dialogue is the idea that it would be possible for all cultures (and 
paradigms) to, on one hand, maintain their individual differences, and, on the 
other, develop a common language which would help to reconcile all existing 
antagonistic differences. 
Such a pluralistic approach to understanding organisation can be related to 
Morgan's metaphoric view developed in his bestseller Images of Organization. In 
there he describes his particular way of seeing organisational reality as follows: 
When we look at our world with our two eyes we get a different view from that gained by 
using each eye independently. Each eye sees the same reality in a different way, and when 
working together, the two combine to produce yet another way. Try it and see... The way of 
seeing itself transforms our understanding of the nature of the phenomenon. (Morgan, 
i9ß6: 340) 
This means that, for Morgan, reality can be looked at through different eyes. For 
him, there is not one reality but many; reality can be constructed by looking at it 
differently. The ambition of Images of Organization is to support this type of 
multiple seeing by offering a set of `vision tools' in the form of metaphoric 
images of organisation. These images are not fixed or incommensurable like the 
174 
4. Depositioning Organisation: The Politics of Resistance 
paradigms from 1979 supposed to be; instead, they are continuously constructed 
and reconstructed to serve pluralistic aims: "There can be no single theory or 
metaphor that gives an all-purpose point of view, and there can be no simple 
`correct theory' for structuring everything we do" (1997: xxi). Thus, as Morgan 
claims, images are relativistic tools (1986: 283). This implies that, in his view, 
everybody has the potential to transform his or her being and the world through 
individual and collective constructions of new images and worldviews. One 
question, then, seems to be crucial to answer for social constructionists like 
Morgan: who or what selects the images that construct our world? For Morgan, 
the answer to this question seems to be: "If one really wants to understand one's 
environment, one must begin by understanding oneself, for one's understanding of 
the environment is always a projection of oneself' (1997: 243). In other words, in 
Morgan's view, the self-reflecting individual constructs his or her own image of 
the world, which he describes as a strategy of `personal empowerment' that 
enables the self to deal with the complexities of the contemporary world. Morgan 
defends his somewhat self-centred approach by expressing his vision to develop a 
theory that "encourages people to see and grasp the liberating potentials of new 
individual and collective enactments" (1997: 274), while, for example, 
`Foucauldian' analytical frameworks of seeing the `deep' structure of power 
relations would, according to Morgan, lead to a world with a "resilient logic of its 
own" (ibid. ). It is this fear of totalitarianism which makes him explicitly choose 
not to engage in an act of seeing underlying power relations (1997: 275) and, 
instead, emphasise the practical realm of organisational creativity and `imagin-i- 
zation'. 
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The relativistic velocity of Morgan's metaphoric images is even increased by 
Alvesson (1993) who introduces the concept of `metaphors of metaphors'. He 
argues that our usage of metaphors is usually informed by second-level metaphors 
that guide the way we see metaphors. He writes: 
By drawing attention to second-level and possibly other levels of metaphors, we challenge 
the simplified assumption that the images of the research object which guide research are 
clear, distinct and well structured, and that the researcher completely masters his or her 
project through conscious choices of `seeing as'... Ideas and frameworks are much more 
complex, ambiguous and inconsistent. (1993: 130) 
Although Alvesson's intervention rightly suggests that one cannot simply 
consciously and rationally choose a worldview and reality, his main point seems 
to be that `reality is complex, ambiguous and inconsistent' and thus inherently 
unknowable - there is always another metaphor behind our back. This, then, 
seems to be another celebration of undecidability, which prevents us from making 
any decisions in relation to the pressing issues of contemporary social reality. One 
could, perhaps, speculatively suggest that it is this undecidability that lets Hugh 
Willmott "hesitate and reflect a little before we do things" (in Boje et al., 2001: 
307), Mike Reed to be careful to not "rush to judge" (ibid.: 310), and David 
Knights to not wanting to have "too great of an ambition" (ibid.: 309). In a way 
this carefulness and undecidability is, of course, part of any critical inquiry into a 
phenomenon. As I argued in Chapter Two, this undecidability can even be seen to 
be structural on a societal level. However, while Morgan's and Alvesson's 
metaphoric approach seems to suggest that a decision about which image should 
represent reality can never be made because there is an inherent plurality and 
multiplicity of images available, my discussion in Chapter Two clearly suggested 
that politics is about making a decision about how to fill the gap of undecidability. 
This is to say, rather than celebrating the pluralism and undecidability of reality, 
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the philosophies discussed in Chapter Two all suggest, in one way or another, that 
a decision, or what I also referred to as synthesis, is possible and even necessary. 
The necessity is derived from the fact that without such a decision, there would be 
no society or organisation and thus no question of politics. 
There have been a number of authors who have questioned the alleged plurality of 
the type of pluralism celebrated by the social constructionist discourses discussed 
above. For example, in response to the call for a dialogic commensurability 
between paradigms, Jackson and Carter (1991,1993) have been arguing for 
paradigm incommensurability, because, in their view, it "serves to protect actual 
plurality" (1991: 110). They maintain that the dialogic pluralism of social 
constructionists actually serves the purposes of orthodox functionalist approaches; 
that is, in their view, dialogic pluralism cannot traverse existing power relations 
and establish a fully transparent society. As Burrell says, "dialogue is a weapon of 
the powerful" (1996: 650). What Jackson and Carter spell out is that dialogic 
pluralism seems to have become a tool for the powerful who are not interested in 
real plurality but the maintenance of existing power relations. In contrast to the 
proponents of a dialogic commensurability between paradigms, Jackson and 
Carter see paradigm incommensurability as a concept that renders the possibilities 
to protect `actual plurality'. It 
allows the potential of divergent opinions to develop without them being automatically 
proscribed by the orthodoxy, and that the denial of incommensurability denies this 
plurality, thereby leaving the way open for such subordination. (1993: 721) 
They go on to suggest that "each paradigm can be seen as representing an 
ideology" (ibid. ). For Jackson and Carter, then, reality is fundamentally 
characterised by competing, antagonistic ideologies that cannot be simply 
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traversed by establishing dialogue. In their view, dialogue between these 
ideologies is not possible precisely because they are ideologies that form specific 
paradigmatic identities. This seems to fit well with Laclau and Mouffe's political 
theory discussed above, which maintains that the articulation of difference, for 
example a paradigmatic worldview, is always connected to wider processes of 
identity construction which renders these differences socially antagonistic. This is 
to say, paradigms are incommensurable because they are not simply different 
images that can be chosen by individuals to view the world, as Morgan (1986) 
would have it. Instead, they are ideological in nature and thus emplacements that 
cannot be easily traversed, for example by dialogue. 
Social constructionist celebrations of pluralistic dialogue, then, rely on a certain 
belief in what can be called a `happy family' status of the world (Gabriel, 1999). 
That is, what seems to be at the heart of the call for dialogue and pluralism is the 
idea that it would be possible for all cultures (and paradigms) to develop a 
common and transparent language which would help to reconcile all existing 
differences. Yet, as Jackson and Carter and others have suggested, this pluralism 
is often one that serves specific interests of `those in power'. This is indirectly 
confirmed by Scherer when he says: 
A pluralism of perspectives is not in itself problematic, either for researchers or for 
managers, as long as there is a comparison standard or procedure available to reasonably 
decide which perspective is preferable. But pluralism does present a problem when it ends 
in a situation of incommensurability. (1998: 151) 
For Scherer, it seems, pluralism needs to be managed; one needs a `procedure' to 
`reasonably decide' which pluralistic image of reality is to be preferred. In this 
view, pluralism can never be an absolute plurality, which involves the existence of 
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incommensurable worldviews; instead, it is always confined to an established 
space of `management' or `rational decision making'. Such pluralism is described 
by Lizek (1998) as `pars-politics', which, for him, is a politics that works along 
the logic of the police. What this means is that, although the existence of political 
conflict might be acknowledged, even accepted, it is often reformulated as a 
competition among respected parties. This competition is within a clearly defined 
representative space, which is monitored by specific rules. This clearly resembles, 
for example, Hassard's logic of `multi-paradigms' or Gergen's `relational 
politics'. Both seem to accept conflict between images of reality, a conflict which 
can, however, be traversed by establishing dialogue between the oppositional 
parties. What never seems to be questioned by such a dialogic approach are the 
relations of power and knowledge that produce the logic of `dialogue' in the first 
place. As we have seen, dialogue is often controlled by specific standards and 
procedures; that is, the police are always already present: they set the rules of 
engagement; they make sure that certain principles are not jeopardised and 
fundamental values not questioned. 
This is partly what Banerjee and Linstead (2001) point to in their critique of 
today's globalisation discourses, which, besides strong economic rhetoric, often 
contain aspects of multiculturalism, pluralism and diversity. They argue that 
contemporary global capitalism works partly on the register of diversity without 
fundamentally challenging the status quo of capital and the way society works 
today; they write: 
In a global economy, diversity in terms of race, ethnicities and nationalities has to be 
managed' for the market economy to function smoothly. This reductionist view of 
diversity is the basis of the multiculturalist doctrine, corporate, state-sponsored or 
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otherwise. Multiculturalism aims at preserving different cultures without interfering with 
the `smooth functioning of society'. (200): 702) 
What Banerjee and Linstead highlight here is that diversity and pluralism have 
become normal management techniques that, on one hand, accept difference, but, 
on the other, never seem to question the fundamental functioning of society. Hardt 
and Negri, too, argue that `Empire' is dependent on the proper management of 
diversity (2000: 152). They show that `Empire' is a hegemonic force precisely 
because it is able to include diverse forms of gender, race and culture. However, 
as I argued in Chapter Two and Three, this diversity - this assemblage of diverse 
forces of deterritorialisation - is always already reterritorialised to serve particular 
hegemonic aims of global, managerial organisation. Multiculturalism, or 
pluralism, thus becomes yet another management technique to further the reach of 
capital into the very heart of the ontological production of societies and cultures. 
Yet, just like the process philosophers discussed above, social constructionists 
rarely mention capital and other structural forces of society precisely because, in 
their view, reality is constructed through pluralistic dialogue within local 
communities. 
Discourse and the Possibility of `Post-dualistic' 
Transparency 
What I suggested in the last section is that social constructionists often emphasise 
the pluralistic nature of reality. Pluralism maintains that reality is not constructed 
in one, centred position but in a multiplicity of local places, enacted by a diversity 
of individuals, groups, communities and organisations. Within such a view, 
politics is the attempt to reconcile possible differences and conflicts between 
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communities. It is important to realise that, for the social constructionists 
discussed above, politics is always happening on the local level. That is, if there is 
conflict occurring between `communities of practice', it is a conflict which can be 
resolved by dialogue, `languaging' and conflict management techniques. What 
should have become clear in Chapter Two, as well as in my discussion above, is 
that such a belief in a certain transparent harmony of society is illusionary. As I 
have argued, conflict is always connected to wider social and historical identity 
constructions, which traverse local boundaries of time and space. In this sense, it 
cannot simply be solved by establishing dialogue between oppositional parties. 
`Resolving' social conflict, that is, bringing about a final synthesis, is impossible. 
As I suggested in Chapter Two, Benjamin's concept of `non-synthesis' and Laclau 
and Mouffe's understanding of the concept of impossibility highlight the fact that 
society can never be forged into a final place; there will always be a certain gap 
and openness. This does not imply, however, that society is not possible. What the 
philosophies explored in Chapter Two seem to suggest is that the political event is 
precisely when a certain synthesis of social actors is made possible, a synthesis 
which politically emplaces `the social' itself and thus transgresses the level of `the 
local'. Yet, as I suggested in the previous sections, many social constructionists 
and process philosophers are ill-equipped to connect politics to the societal level. 
The missing link to the societal level, which can be noted in many social 
constructionist approaches to understanding reality, has been pointed out by a 
number of scholars. Hardy and Phillips, for example, have argued in their study of 
the Canadian refugee system that refugees are not "produced solely by the 
discourse that takes place within the refugee system; they are also produced by 
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much broader discourses that occur at a societal level, and that act as a resource 
and a constraint for actors within the field" (1999: 2). Their point is that identities 
and realities are not only constructed within local `communities of practice', such 
as refugee systems, but within wider discursive formations of society. For Hardy 
and Phillips, then, subjects do not construct their own world by way of 
`languaging', dialogue and consensus-building, as many social constructionists 
discussed above would have it; instead, through a series of societal discourses the 
world ontologically produces different subject positions (see also Hardy et at., 
2000). The difference between `languaging', which is often emphasised by social 
constructionists, and `discourse' is important here. While `languaging' points to 
the construction of reality through dialogue and consensus-building in local 
communities, `discourse' highlights the point that the language which is deployed 
by individuals and groups is itself a product of historical discursive formations. 
As I mentioned in the Preface, as well as Chapters One and Two, this 
understanding of `discourse' is largely based on Foucault's work (e. g. 1970, 
1972), which has had a great influence on many organisation theorists in the past 
two decades (e. g. Burrell, 1988; Knights, 2003; Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994; 
Knights and Willmott, 1989; Kondo, 1990; O'Doherty and Willmott, 2001; 
Townley, 1994). Foucault's social constructionism is guided by the notion that 
reality and thus any truth claims are historically produced. This historical 
production brings about discursive formations, or apparatuses, that organise 
relations of power and knowledge in such a way that they operate both at the 
`subjective' and `objective' level of reality. This is to say, on one hand, an 
apparatus is historically produced by inter-subjective relations, but on the other, as 
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much as it is a product of social relations it also reproduces them as an `objective' 
force. This, then, goes beyond the social constructionist view that mainly seems to 
see reality as something that is constructed by active, conscious and intentional 
subjects who engage with each other through dialogue. In contrast, Foucault's 
subject is produced by discursive regimes which are emplaced in and enacted by 
modem institutions such as prisons, hospitals and refugee asylums. That is, in 
Foucault's view, the subject is a product of an apparatus; it is `folded' out of the 
regime of relations of power and knowledge, as Deleuze would have it in his book 
Foucault (1988). As I discussed in the previous chapters, this coincides with 
Benjamin's conception of the subject; for him, the fläneur and the prostitute, for 
example, are subjects that emerge out of the particular apparatus of 19th century 
Paris. 
Within the realms of organisation theory Foucault's work has been read in many 
different, often competing, ways. While there is not enough space here to engage 
in detail with these competing readings of Foucault - for a close analysis one can 
consult, for example, Jones (2003b) - it has been noted that the concept of 
discourse is often not connected to wider societal relations of power and 
knowledge. This is to say that, despite Foucault's insistence on `discourse' being a 
social formation, which transgresses the objective and subjective, it sometimes 
seems to be seen merely as being the same as the abovementioned notion of 
`languaging', which suggests that reality is constructed within local `communities 
of practice'. Reed, for example, maintains that `Foucauldians' often "retreat into a 
form of micro-contextual reductionism in which institutional power and control 
are always derived from below, rather than from the social structural mechanisms 
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and locations that generate such practices and through which such structures are 
elaborated and/or transformed" (1997: 28). Similarly, Thompson and Smith 
(2001; see also Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995; Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999) 
suggest that `Foucauldians' tend to overemphasise the ongoing subjective 
processes of local identity constructions rather than seeing social categories that 
`objectively' produce subjects as `labour' and `employees'. They particularly refer 
to Knights and Willmott (1989, see also Knights, 1992,2001) who have put 
forward the notion of `identity work', highlighting the multiple, `micro-political' 
processes of identity construction (see also my discussion in Chapter Five). On 
one hand, such critiques of `Foucauldians' seem somewhat over-generalising, 
especially if one considers that some `Foucauldian' organisation theorists have 
specifically tried to show how dominant capitalist discursive regimes produce 
management techniques (e. g. Townley's, 1994, study of Human Resource 
Management), other critiques seriously try to use Foucault's work to extend, for 
example, Marxist theories of work and subjectivity (e. g. Willmott, 1990,1994, 
1997; Marsden, 1993), and further critiques highlight that "we need to relate our 
microstudies to the big picture, to take on board social and political issues" 
(Hardy, 2002: 17). This is to say, not all `Foucauldians' merely fetishise `the 
local', as some critics would have it. On the other hand, however, the critiques 
produced by Reed, labour process theorists and others are useful, because they 
point to a certain tendency of some `Foucauldians' to reproduce the restrictions of 
the `process-view' and social constructionists, that were discussed above. Let me 
explain this by briefly looking at an example. 
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David Knights has consistently argued for a permanent deconstruction of, what he 
calls, dualistic relationships (e. g. 1992,1997,2001). For him (1992: 520), 
deconstruction is about the permanent questioning of reality and subverting the 
institutional apparatuses that govern modern lives. In his view, the main 
contribution of Foucault's and Derrida's philosophies has been to show that 
identities and truth claims are always fallible, contingent and thus local (1997: 2). 
According to Knights, dualisms, such as individual/society, female/male, 
micro/macro, mind/body and subjective/objective, need to be deconstructed 
because they are almost always maintained by desires for secure identities and 
orderly structures (ibid. ). To call these identities and structures into question and 
render them fragmentary, provisional and uncertain (1997: 12) is, in his view, the 
task of, what he and others call, a `postmodern' organisation theory. This, then, 
reminds us of the `process-view' of organisation whose main contribution is to 
show that organised reality is always already a contingent process. While I have 
already stressed the political and philosophical importance of such a resistance 
against established positions, or dualisms, I am concerned that such a 
depositioning only describes one aspect of the deconstructive movement. As I 
discussed in Chapter Two, deconstruction can be seen as a dialectical, bifurcated 
movement between the possible and the impossible. The first movement shows 
the limits of any fixed reality and exposes the relations of power and knowledge 
that produce and maintain any organised positions - such as the dualisms Knights 
is concerned about. One could say that this is what Knights' work has done very 
effectively; his deconstructive approach seeks to permanently unsettle established 
dualisms, render any structures contingent and show how `truths', such as 
identities, are locally produced (1997: 7). However, according to my discussion of 
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the deconstructionist philosophies of Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe, this cannot be 
the end of the matter. While deconstruction renders reality impossible or 
undecidable, it also shows how a decision is possible and necessary to structure 
and order society. Equally, for Benjamin as well as Adorno, the movement of 
destruction is not only negative; its aim is also to construct new places. This is the 
political event that I attempted to conceptualise in Chapter Two. It is guided by 
the realisation that society is not simply the permanent play of local differences, 
but the political ordering and emplacing of these differences. The concept of 
hegemony points to the idea that society, while fundamentally impossible and 
undecidable, is historically structured through particular discursive formations that 
endure over time and space. 
Knights' position seems to be that he wants to continuously deconstruct structures 
and identities in order to expose their precariousness. That is, as the `process 
philosophers' discussed above, Knights seems to be mainly concerned with 
showing the contingency and process character of any structures. His `post- 
dualistic' approach, as Parker (1999: 34) calls it, aims to be more reflexive about 
the way `truths' and identities are constructed. This post-dualistic reflexivity 
claims to take into account local concerns and `save' these localities from the 
imposition of `external discourses'; as Knights writes: 
It may well be impossible to reconcile conflicting interpretations that localized situations 
throw up by methods entirely internal to those narratives, but it should not entail imposing 
an external discourse on those narratives. By definition, discourse is a matter of debate and 
dialogue not imposition. (1997: 6, emphasis in original) 
With Knights, then, discourse assumes the character of something that can be 
chosen; it can either be imposed or translated into something meaningful for local 
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levels, by way of debate and dialogue. Here we seem to be in the realm of 
`languaging' again. Knights' `post-dualistic' politics assumes that dualistic 
structures can be resolved on the local level by being dialogic, reflexive and 
deconstructive. Following Parker (1999: 37ff), one can respond to Knights by 
asking: What is the ground of this dialogue and reflexivity? Is this ground not 
always dependent on certain political positions, and is not the question of politics 
precisely one about the disagreement with certain (dualistic) positions and 
structures rather than their `post-dualistic' reconciliation? Knights' `post-dualism' 
seems to put forward a politics that is mainly oriented towards continuously 
depositioning established positions. As I argued above, when I critiqued the 
`process-view' of organisation, one needs to acknowledge that such a view is 
politically important as it renders social reality impossible; that is, it shows that 
the current `goings-on' of society are not eternal and ultimate. However, the 
concern is that such a view loses sight of the fact that society only becomes 
possible by way of politically ordering and structuring reality, which ultimately 
also involves certain dualisms. It seems to me that Knights' deconstructive 
movements are ill-equipped to think the political event as something that makes 
such structures possible. 
Pace iek (1997b, 1998), one could, perhaps, refer to Knights' `post-dualism' as 
`post-politics'. For izek, `post-politics' is the politics which aims to reconcile the 
differences between established ideological positions, such as those between `left' 
and `right'. For example, he names New Labour's `Third Way', which, in his 
view, attempts to go beyond established political dualisms and, instead, face 
social problems practically. This pragmatism is supposed to develop the `middle 
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ground' and have an impact on people's actual lives. For 2i2ek, the belief in the 
`post-political' `middle ground' has depoliticising effects because is it based on 
the idea that ideological differences and conflicts can be resolved by way of 
pragmatic actions, such as establishing dialogue between conflicting parties. This 
reminds us, then, of Fukuyama's `end of history' thesis, briefly discussed in 
Chapter Two, which states that since the fall of the `communist project' the world 
is no longer held hostage by competing ideologies but, instead, is characterised by 
the worldwide success of liberal-democratic politics and capitalism. For 2ilek 
(1997a, 1998), this belief in the possibility of a post-ideological, liberal society is 
itself an ideology that is based on the assumption that social relations can be made 
transparent, that is, society can be fully represented and thus finalised. I am not 
suggesting here that Knights' `post-dualism' is as nave as suggesting that society 
and history can be finalised by integrating all dualisms into a coherent whole. 
However, there is a tendency in Knights' work to believe in the possibility that a 
certain transparency of social relations can be achieved, as he hopes, by 
continuously deconstructing dualisms and dialogically and practically translating 
reality onto local grounds. 
In i2ek's view (1997a: 101 ff), such a belief in the possibility of a transparency of 
social relations is a significant feature of today's `post-ideological-end-of-history' 
discourse. In my view, however, this belief in transparency is not an `invention' of 
our so-called `postmodern' world, as Lizek seems to suggest. As I mentioned in 
the Preface, Benjamin's Parisian `phantasmagoria', the arcade, the world of the 
strolling f dneur, was made out of glass; for Benjamin, the arcade is a world of 
transparency (AP, 546). As Missac (1995) suggests, the arcade can be seen as the 
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predecessor of the atrium which features in many company headquarters and 
hotels today. As does today's glass architecture, the glass roof of the arcade 
`enlightens' dark interiors in order to transgress the boundary or dualism between 
inside and outside, house and street. In Benjamin's view, this transparency of the 
arcade is an essential feature of the way the commodity world is able to 
`intoxicate' the fldneur and give the phantasmagoric illusion of being `the world'. 
The glass architecture of the arcade, then, opened up the dark houses of traditional 
Paris; traditional architecture was deterritorialised in order to make room for the 
commodity rush and strolling fläneurs, the subjects of early modernity. As 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest, capital is a `machine' that continuously 
deterritorialises. Part of what I have attempted to suggest in this chapter is that 
today's depositioning project of organisation, which is characterised by `post- 
dualism', `processualism' and `pluralism', can be seen, in a way, as the 
continuation of this deterritorialisation process, a process from which the `goings- 
on' of capital cannot be disconnected. Depositioning can be seen as the call for 
transparency. As Benjamin showed in the Arcades Project, this transparency can 
be seen at the heart of the `goings-on' of capital, which always already 
reterritorialises this transparency for the purposes of commodity production. 
Impossibilities of Depositioning: The Event of Resistance 
In this chapter I have discussed a range of depositioning discourses within the 
realms of organisation theory. Generally one could suggest that what these 
discourses have in common is a suspicion of positions per se; that is, their main 
contribution is to put established positions of truth into question and to show that 
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all positions are contingent arrangements. Following Derrida, one could 
characterise depositioning as a movement that claims that "every position is of 
itself confounded" (1987: 95, emphasis removed). Derrida calls this movement 
differance, which could be seen as a questioning, or deconstructing, of the present 
positioning of what is taken for granted as the full presence of reality: 
Deconstruction means, among other things, the questioning of what synthesis is, what 
thesis is, what a position is, what composition is, not only in terms of rhetoric, but what 
position is, what positing means. Deconstruction questions the thesis, the theme, the 
positionality of everything. (1990: 8). 
Differance thus points -to a certain undecidability towards the presence of objects 
of reality, such as `position' or `organisation'. Djerance questions the basic 
presence of any position and organisation; it puts into doubt the apparent synthesis 
of the reality of organisation that seems so firmly positioned and emplaced in 
modernity. The depositioning project is generally based on such an understanding 
of differance and must be seen, as I have pointed out, as an important resistance 
against those positions that always already emplace and restrict organisation. 
As every position is generally seen as being contingent, the depositioning 
discourses discussed above emphasise the local and processual nature of reality 
construction. That is, the point of depositioning organisation is to see the 
fallibility of every organised position. For Cooper, for example, "concepts such as 
differance, undecidability and supplement `decompose' or `decon-struct' the 
ordered and organized character of social systems to reveal their essentially 
precarious foundation which founders on the process of differentiation" (1990: 
181). Cooper calls this `precarious foundation' `disorganisation', which, for him, 
always already resists order and organisation (1990: 182). This is what in Chapter 
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Two I have discussed as the Lacanian Real, that which cannot be organised or 
symbolised. For Laclau and Mouffe as well as Lilek, organised reality can never 
be complete; there will always be an aspect of the Real that subverts the fullness 
and the complete transparency of reality. This is why social organisation is 
impossible; it can never be fully accomplished; it is a never ending task. Laclau 
refers to this as the `structural undecidability' of society, which can be related to 
Benjamin's concept of `non-synthesis'. This implies that social organisation can 
never be forged into a final synthesis. Cooper calls this the "zero degree of 
organization" (1990: 182), which, for him, is the "finite, limited nature of the 
signified which is seen as a lack that must be filled in" (1990: 183). This, then, I 
would describe as the main contribution of the depositioning project: to show the 
precarious nature of any organisation and the impossibility of its finality. When 
Knights, for example, calls for a `post-dualistic' approach he aims to call 
established positions or dualisms of organised reality into question. When social 
constructionists emphasise the local and plural nature of reality their point is to 
show that there is more than one way of organising the world; there is a 
multiplicity of possible worlds. The politics of the depositioning project, then, is 
to show that order always already means disorder and that order always implies, 
as R. Munro puts it, "the reversibility of any order. " In short, "not everything that 
is taken as normal remains so" (2001: 397). 
My concern has been, however, to argue that, despite the precariousness of any 
order and the processual nature of organisation, structure is always being found 
(R. Munro, 2002). That is, social organisation is not simply a never-ending 
process that is characterised by multiple, local realities; instead, there are, as 
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Meier Sorensen puts it, "machines that do define, do cut off, do signify" (2001: 
371, emphasis in original) - not only on the local level but, in fact, on the level of 
`the social' as such. This is to say, there are structural forces of power and 
knowledge that do shape society. In Chapter Two I discussed a range of 
philosophies that conceptualise politics as something that not only continuously 
depositions reality and shows the precariousness of any order, but indeed shapes 
reality and gives social organisation an order. In Chapter Three I discussed the 
powerful hegemonic politics of management and capital; a hegemony that not 
only works on a local level but, in fact, on a global one. In this chapter I have 
expressed my doubts whether the depositioning project's emphasis of `the local', 
pluralism, dialogue and transparency are effective resistances against this 
hegemony, which always already seems to work along the registers of these 
resistances. To be more specific, part of what I have tried to argue in this chapter 
is that capital is always already plural and transparent; capital is a 
deterritorialisation `machine' that produces `the local'. As we have seen in 
Chapter Three, capital and management are not simply local phenomena; instead, 
they have universal ambitions. As Cooper rightly points out: "social power 
(authority, law, organization) is the forcible transformation of undecidability into 
decidability" (1990: 188); "organization is the appropriation of order out of 
disorder" (1990: 193). Capital and management can be seen as this social power 
that always already decides for us, how society is to be organised. This decision 
can never be all-encompassing; that is, there are antagonisms and resistances that 
are implied by this decision. My critique of the depositioning project has been that 
these antagonisms are not merely conflicts that can be resolved by way of a 
dialogic `languaging' within local communities. Instead, a hegemonic decision 
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involves social antagonisms, which imply the production of identities that endure 
over boundaries of time and space. I have suggested that a resistance that simply 
celebrates local constructions of identity, undecidability and disorganisation will 
find it hard to engender those political struggles that seek to challenge hegemonic 
relations as such. As I discussed in Chapter Two, the political event of 
organisation is to enable a decision about a different social order, an order that 
produces different localities, subjectivities and organisations. 
In sum, then, one could argue that the depositioning project has been important 
because it has exposed the undecidability of organisation. What has been missing, 
however, is the will to expose the ground on which a decision is made possible, a 
decision that can reposition `the social'. As one critic of Cooper's work, 
particularly referring to his essay `Assemblage Notes', has put it: 
[W]hat is lacking is a positive affirmation, a will to power, indeed a will to another life, 
another people. The productivity of `Assemblage Notes', that is, its capability to connect to 
extratextualities and disconnect unproductive passions..., is to a very large extent thwarted 
by its endless deconstructions: rather than building a war machine, an immanent `counter- 
Fordism' perhaps, the threat of a paralysing flow of debris is alarmingly real. The 
deconstructions themselves are indeed vivid, surprising and thoroughly encyclopaedic and 
scholared in the most positive of senses, but the whole endeavour avoids the affirmative 
and hence the political project of countering, pointing towards new ways of struggle. 
(Meier Sorensen, 2001: 372-373) 
If this critique of Cooper can, perhaps, serve as a general critique of the 
depositioning project, one could suggest that what has been missing is the `will to 
another life'. Relating back to my discussion in Chapter Two, when I 
conceptualised the political event, one could say that the depositioning discourses 
have been very effective in negating established positions and questioning their 
uniformity. However, what often seems to be missing is an affirmation of this 
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negation, a political project of pointing towards the production of new 
subjectivities and a new `social'. In Chapter Two I suggested that the political 
event is not simply an exposition of the undecidability of reality. Instead, the 
deconstructive movement renders possible and necessary a decision concerning 
how `the social' is to be politically positioned or, indeed, repositioned. The task of 
the following chapter is to discuss the possibilities of such a project of 
repositioning. 
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Impossibilities of `The Movement' 
In the previous two chapters I engaged in some detail with a range of organisation 
theory literatures. I discussed two main discourses: the positioning and the 
depositioning projects of organisation. While the politics of positioning mainly 
serves the established hegemony of capital and management knowledge, the 
depositioning project resists positioning discourses by emphasising the 
precariousness, plurality and locality of processes of organising. On one hand, 
these resistances have been theoretically and politically important because they 
point to the contingent and undecidable nature of all positions of organisation. On 
the other hand, however, these depositioning discourses can be seen to have 
certain depoliticising effects, because they seem ill-prepared to effectively engage 
with those positioning discourses, such as capital, that always already emplace 
and `corner' social organisation on a wider societal level. 
A project of repositioning aims to go beyond the restrictions of the depositioning 
discourses. If the depositioning project is primarily about showing the 
undecidability of all organised phenomena, the repositioning project is based on 
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an understanding that the notion of undecidability, as I discussed it in Chapter 
Two, enables and even makes necessary political decisions about how to organise 
and position society itself. To discuss the various aspects of the repositioning 
project I will, first, engage with two organisation theory discourses, namely labour 
process theory and liberalist institutional theory, and, second, analyse the 
organisation and politics of the so-called `anti-capitalist movement'. 
What these discourses have in common is the understanding that politics is not 
only a displacing or depositioning of taken-for-granted realities, but also an 
emplacing or positioning of concrete alternatives to the order and constitution of 
`the social'. While labour process theory is largely indebted to Marxian discourses 
of social and organisational change, liberalist theories of bureaucracy are 
predominantly based on Weberian discourses. Following the historical analysis of 
organisation theory put forward by Burrell and Morgan (1979), one could argue 
that both Marxian and Weberian discourses have played an important part in the 
radical theoretical exploration of alternative organisational regimes. It is for this 
reason that I have chosen to engage with some aspects of these two bodies of 
organisation literature in this chapter. As will become clear, however, there are 
important theoretical and political limitations and contradictions embedded within 
these organisation theory discourses. These will be discussed and critiqued by 
way of engaging with the `anti-capitalist' discourse, which explicitly challenges 
today's hegemonic positioning of society and seeks to explore alternative, 
repositioned regimes of social organisation. 
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Labour Process Politics 
Labour process theorists have been among the most explicit defenders of the need 
for a political critique of society and the way it has been shaped by dominant 
forces of capital. I am not attempting here to put forward a `major' commentary 
on the historical development of labour process theory and its contemporary 
debate. This would be quite an impossible task in the space available since this 
debate is multifaceted, and, as Grugulis and Knights note (2001: 3), there are, 
indeed, multiple labour process perspectives (for an overview of these 
perspectives see, for example, Knights and Willmott's collection Labour Process 
Theory [1990], and the special issue of International Studies of Management & 
Organization [2001]; see also Parker's [1999] commentary on labour process 
theory). However, what I do attempt in this section is to discuss the politics of two 
`camps' of labour process theorists. The first `camp' defends the importance of 
the labour process and the workplace for the reproduction of capital; a political 
critique of capital therefore has to be concentrated on the analysis of the `goings- 
on' of the capitalist workplace. The second `camp', the so-called `Foucauldians', 
would like to expand the notion of production beyond the workplace and show 
how identities are shaped in a variety of locations in society. Although I have 
already discussed some general themes of `Foucauldian' organisation theory in 
the previous chapter, I would now like to revisit these in connection with the 
particularities of the labour process debate. 
Firstly, what is the `labour process'? We find a very detailed analysis of the 
capitalist workplace and its processes of production in Marx's Capital (1976), 
particularly volume one. Without going into a detailed discussion of Marx, one 
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could generally say that his conception of the labour process shows how capital 
produces surplus value by employing workers who have to sell their labour power 
as a commodity in order to reproduce themselves. According to Marx, the 
capitalist is able to extract surplus value, that is, profit, from labour power by 
employing labour longer than necessary to reproduce the various inputs of the 
production process. As the capitalist owns the means of production and labour 
only owns its own labour power, labour has no choice but to sell itself to the 
owners of the production process. For Marx, this basic ordering of workplace 
relations, which is not a local organisational principle but something that is 
structurally inherent to capitalism, brings about two main antagonistic classes, 
labour and capital. 
I am aware that I am entering this debate at speed. All the same, one could say, 
perhaps, that for some labour process theorists the antagonisms between capital 
and labour are primarily expressed in the workplace, where management, as an 
extension of capital, seeks to produce surplus value by exploiting labour power. 
Thompson and Smith, for example, write that "management must, under 
competitive, standardizing, and differentiating conditions, seek to release and 
realize productive labor from living labor power" (2001: 61). For them, it is 
management's daily struggle to make the labour process more effective and 
efficient. According to Thompson and Smith (2001: 62) and other labour process 
theorists (e. g. Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Rowlinson and Hassard, 2001; and 
Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995), a critical understanding of this daily struggle and 
its social consequences leads through the analysis of the workplace because it is 
the original place where the antagonistic classes, labour and capital, are produced 
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and reproduced. What one can thus suggest is that for these labour process 
theorists the workplace is the prime location of `the political'. 
As a point of critique one could say that, while there can be no question that the 
labour process of the workplace is one of the most important sites of capitalist 
accumulation, it is by no means the only one. As I argued in Chapter Three, 
capital produces a host of different subjectivities; for example, I showed how 
`commodity fetishism' produces the fläneur, the 19th century bourgeois stroller 
who does not work but consumes images of commodities and mass society. What 
the particular subjectivity of the fläneur shows is that one can take part in the 
reproduction of capital without being embedded in the specificity of the labour 
process of the workplace. One could say, perhaps, that the flaneur's consumption 
is a different type of production; yet, it is an essential aspect of the `goings-on' of 
capital's reproduction `machinery'. This interdependence of consumption and 
production is, in fact, what Marx points to, particularly in the second volume of 
Capital (1992; see also Marx and Engels, 1970). One of the points I tried to make 
in Chapter Three is that the `goings-on' of `commodity fetishism' produce a 
hegemonic emplacement of social relations, which must be understood as a 
libidinal economy of desires that `intoxicates' people, to use a Benjaminian 
expression. In Marx's (1976) view, the commodity is a `sensuous thing' with 
specific desires to `look beautiful' - we remember Marx's 
discussion of the 
`grotesque table'. This aesthetic beauty of the commodity hopes to attract buyers 
and consumers. Marx's point is that this consumption aspect is an integral part of 
the production of an ideological structuring of society, which includes the 
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production of a range of different subjectivities such as those of the fläneur, 
prostitute or labourer. 
What is important to realise is that this ideological structuring of `the social' does 
not have a single centre. This is the point I discussed in relation to Laclau and 
Mouffe's (1985) concept of `hegemony', which highlights the impossibility of 
fixing society in a single place. In their view, society is continuously embattled 
and contested not only in the workplace but in a multiplicity of places. This is also 
one of the quintessential points of Hardt and Negri's (2000) `Empire', a concept 
that refers to today's globally integrated capitalism. For them, `Empire' 
is a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the 
entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, 
flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii) 
In Hardt and Negri's view, `Empire' is a place that is depositioned or 
deterritorialised, a term they adopt from Deleuze and Guattari (1987). It is a `non- 
place' (Auge, 1995) which is characterised by a multiplicity of forces that cannot 
be represented in a single place. For them, this does not mean, however, that there 
are no positions or territories within `Empire'. They argue that the depositioning 
powers of `Empire' are both complete and particular. This is to say that the 
depositioning works along specific lines; there are specific `folds' that are created 
by forces of `Empire'. For them, one of the most significant positions is capital, 
which always already reterritorialises all deterritorialised fragments on the 
stratified plane of an abstract signifier. Yet, in Hardt and Negri's view, this 
reterritorialisation does not produce an Orwellian super-state where everything 
and everybody is subsumed into one totality. Instead, `Empire' is a dynamic 
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system of "radical contingency and precariousness" (2000: 60-61), a language 
which reminds us of Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) conceptualisation of 
`hegemony'. Similarly to Laclau and Mouffe, Hardt and Negri maintain that this 
hegemonic regime, or `Empire', should, in the first instance, be celebrated for its 
precarious dynamism: it produces breaks with traditional organisational 
apparatuses, which opens up possibilities for the production of new figures of 
resistance. This is what I showed in Chapter Four: the depositioning project in 
organisation theory is characterised by a plethora of `micro-political' resistances 
that produce difference and plurality in various local shapes and forms. 
Within the realms of the labour process debate, as well as organisation theory at 
large, one of the most valuable contributions has been the `Foucauldian' 
realisation that struggle and resistance not only work along the lines of class 
contradictions but indeed various other lines of identity construction. As I 
discussed in Chapter Four, a `Foucauldian' understanding seems to highlight that 
resistance can appear everywhere where power is producing specific subjectivities 
- not just in the workplace but indeed in various other places of everyday life. As 
Fleming points out, 
this Foucauldian sensibility seems to have shifted our attention away from class politics to 
those subtle micro-practices that do not necessarily aim for `revolution' but nevertheless 
allow subordinates to construct counter-spheres within forms of domination, change the 
trajectory of controls and quietly challenge power relations without necessarily leaving 
them. (2002: 194) 
Two of the labour process theorists who were among the first to introduce a 
`Foucauldian sensibility' to the debate are Knights and Willmott (1989; see also 
Knights, 1997,2001, and Willmott, 1990,1994,1997). In their view, power 
cannot be "reduced to a property of persons, a dominant class, a sovereign or the 
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state. Rather, it is dispersed throughout the social relations of a population in a 
diverse set of mechanisms and a multiplicity of directions" (1989: 553). Their 
concern is to show that social reality is the constitutive product of a plurality of 
disciplinary techniques of power and knowledge (1989: 549) rather than simply 
determined by the economic laws of capital. Following Foucault, they argue that 
"forms of power are exercised through subjecting individuals to their own identity 
or subjectivity, and are not therefore mechanisms directly derived from the forces 
of production, class struggle or ideological structures" (1989: 553, emphasis 
added). What is thus important for Knights and Willmott is the emphasis of 
individual subjectivities and the way people become tied to themselves by self- 
discipline and self-knowledge (1989: 550). They coin the term `identity fetishism' 
to point to the process of self-identification "solidifying meaning through the 
objectification of self in fetishised identities" (1989: 555). These identities, they 
argue, often involve questionable senses of security and belonging whose 
inconsistencies and contradictions they call on labour process theorists to expose 
(ibid. ). In summary, one could argue that Knights and Willmott are interested in 
broadening the question of subjectivity beyond the restricted concerns of the 
economic relationship of the workplace by showing that, rather than solely being 
forged into `labour', subjects are engaged in multiple `identify fetishisms' that are 
produced by a range of decentred disciplinary power and knowledge forces. 
For some labour process theorists, such understandings are very suspect for a 
range of reasons. Ackroyd and Thompson, for example, maintain that Knights and 
Wilimott and other so-called `Foucauldians' reduce the antagonism between 
capital and labour to a `local site of struggle', "and labour is not regarded as a 
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distinctive or significant agency" (1999: 158) that can resist the domination and 
exploitation by capital. The specific character of capitalist employment relations 
in the workplace, they argue, is therefore lost (ibid. ). Furthermore, they critique 
the focus of some `Foucauldians' on individual identities rather than collectivities. 
This is to say, Ackroyd and Thompson (see also Thompson and Smith, 2001; and 
Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995) are concerned that the `Foucauldian' emphasis on 
individual identity processes tends to lose sight of the way `labour' and 
`employees' are produced as collectivities or classes within `objective' capitalist 
categories. In sum, they say that their "objection is, precisely, that when 
Foucauldian theory is applied to the workplace, it treats it as just another terrain of 
the individual's struggle for identity" (1999: 164). According to Ackroyd and 
Thompson, this is inadequate because "there are conditions and struggles specific 
to the labour process and the employment relationship" (ibid. ). 
Coming back to Hardt and Negri's (2000) concept of `Empire' one could respond 
to Ackroyd and Thompson by highlighting the distributed character of capital. As 
I already mentioned above, for Hardt and Negri, global capital is a `non-place' 
that must be understood as network that is linked by a multiplicity of flows. They 
call these flows `communication': "Communication not only expresses but also 
organizes the movement of globalization. It organizes the movement by 
multiplying and structuring interconnections through networks" (2000: 32). For 
them, communication is the complete "dissolution of the relationship between 
order and space"; it is a `non-place', it is "the form of capitalist production in 
which capital has succeeded in submitting society entirely and globally to its 
regime, suppressing all alternative paths" (2000: 347), In Hard and Negri's view, 
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communication works across classes, cultures and other `territories'. One could 
say that communication is that which turns `the social' into, what Marx calls, 
`total social capital' (1976). Hardt and Negri's point, then, is that global capital 
works along multiple lines of production that cannot all be represented by the 
labour process in the workplace. For them, the concept of production must be seen 
more widely than the traditional industrialist meaning, which still seems to be 
central to some labour process theorists. The concept of communication 
introduces the idea that capital not only reproduces itself in the workplace, but 
also across multiple networks, which, as Hardt and Negri argue, have become 
increasingly global. This, then, seems to support Knights and Willmott's view that 
identities are produced along multiple lines of production. As I discussed earlier, 
their `Foucauldian' framework highlights the fact that people are forged into 
multiple forms of `identity fetishism'; that is, their subjectivities are produced by 
a plurality of disciplinary techniques of power and knowledge. 
This notion of a plurality of productions and discourses is at the heart of the 
concept of hegemony. As I discussed in Chapter Two, hegemony highlights the 
plurality of discursive fields and the impossibility of fixing social discourses into 
a final place of representation. However, the concept also emphasises the 
possibility and even necessity of emplacing `the social' into particular social 
structures. Chapter Three highlighted the fact that there are hegemonic positions, 
such as capital, which always already emplace `the social' in specific ways - in 
particular I discussed the `goings-on' of `commodity fetishism' and showed how 
it produces subjects such as the fldneur. Now, within the conceptual framework of 
Knights and Willmott, the fldneur's subjectivity would be, presumably, a 
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particular or `local' form of `identity fetishism'. However, what I was concerned 
to show in Chapter Three is that the subjectivity of the fläneur must be seen 
within the wider hegemonic `goings-on' of `commodity fetishism'. This is to say, 
while the notion of `identity fetishism' maintains that there are multiple ways of 
how identities can be produced, and while this is a politically important aspect, 
my concern is that it over-emphasises individual aspects of identity construction 
and loses sight of the fact that forces of capital and the `goings-on' of `commodity 
fetishism' always already emplace `the social' in specific ways. 
This is to say, then, that, while the `Foucauldian' depositioning of the site of 
identity production has been a valuable contribution, it seems to me that Ackroyd 
and Thompson (1999) and others do have a point when they say that some 
`Foucauldians' tend to over-emphasise individual identities and neglect certain 
forces of capitalist production, namely those that always already produce 
subjectivities and therefore emplace `the social' along specific lines of 
domination. Having said that, in this section I have also critiqued Ackroyd and 
Thompson and other labour process theorists for restricting their analysis and 
politics to the workplace. What one can thus find in labour process theory are two 
`camps' that seem to engender the two aspects of Laclau and Mouffe's 
understanding of the concept of hegemony: while one `camp' emphasises the 
political plurality of different identity productions, the other restricts its view of 
`the political' to a particular place, the workplace. Perhaps this corresponds to 
Laclau and Mouffe's `logic of difference' and `logic of equivalence' respectively. 
Their point is that both of these logics are inherent to the concept of hegemony; 
that is, one has to understand a hegemonic positioning of society as being 
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simultaneously `open' and `closed'. What I have attempted to show is precisely 
this: in order to understand the hegemony of capital one can see capital as both an 
`open' regime, which emphasises plurality and difference, and a `closed' one, 
which does, despite its plurality, organise, emplace and `corner' `the social' in 
specific ways. 
Liberalist Politics in Praise of Bureaucracy 
One of the concepts I discussed in the above section is Hardt and Negri's (2000) 
`Empire', which, for them, points to, what they call, today's `decentred apparatus' 
of global capital. In their view (2000: xii), `Empire' is an open, communication- 
driven regime which continuously deterritorialises hierarchies, stable identities 
and other structures in order to expand its frontiers. Hardt and Negri argue that 
this expansion is partly driven by theories and practices of business organisation 
and management, which, in their view, are at the forefront of the mobilisation and 
flexibilisation of traditional bureaucratic structures: 
The corporations seek to include difference within their realm and thus aim to maximize 
creativity, free play, and diversity in the corporate workplace. People of all different races, 
sexes, and sexual orientations should potentially be included in the corporation; the daily 
routine of the workplace should be rejuvenated with unexpected changes and an 
atmosphere of fun. Break down the old boundaries and let one hundred flowers bloom! The 
task of the boss, subsequently, is to organize these energies and differences in the interests 
of profit. (2000: 153) 
Hardt and Negri make reference, for example, to a book collection by Boje et al. 
(1996) on so-called `postmodern management', which includes a range of theories 
and descriptions of practices of how to manage organisations in so-called `post- 
bureaucratic' times. These `new' times are said to be characterised by complexity 
and ambiguity. `Breaking down old hierarchies', `dialogue' and `diversity 
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management' are examples of the techniques that are supposed to enable a more 
`successful' management of today's organisations. In Chapter Four I also 
discussed various organisation theories that hope to deposition established 
bureaucratic structures of organisation. The `process-view' of organisation, the 
community-based approach to the social construction of reality, the `jazz-view' of 
managing, the emphasis of plurality and multiculturalism as well as the `post- 
dualism' approach can all be seen, to an extent, as attempts to call traditional 
hierarchies of organisation into question. While many of these theories can be 
seen as resistances against established positions of social reality, Hardt and 
Negri's understanding of `Empire' points to the view that these resistances are, in 
fact, part and parcel of the `goings-on' of global capitalism. This is to say, capital 
must be understood as an open apparatus that is continuously deterritorialising 
established hierarchies; it thus incorporates and, in fact, welcomes the type of 
resistances discussed in Chapter Four. It is for this reason that I expressed doubts 
over the political effectiveness of the depositioning project. 
Following du Gay (2000a, b), the depositioning discourses of organisation can be 
seen, perhaps, as part of a wider attack on bureaucratic ways of organising. "In 
popular usage", du Gay says, "the term `bureaucracy' is most strongly associated 
with the defects of large organizations in both public and private sectors" (2000a: 
80). Naming an organisation `bureaucratic' popularly implies inefficiency, 
slowness, hierarchical decision-making, waste of resources, rules, rationality and 
impersonality, to name but a few terms that spring to mind. In the past two 
decades a burgeoning management and organisation literature has emerged that is 
explicitly `anti-bureaucratic'. Du Gay (2000a: 61ff) engages particularly with 
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what could be called the `thriving on chaos' literature (Peters, 1987), a managerial 
literature that Tom Peters sums up by saying: "I beg each and every one of you to 
develop a passionate and public hatred of bureaucracy" (cited in du Gay, 2000a: 
61). Du Gay argues that this `hatred of bureaucracy' is characterised by a 
contemporary management discourse which sees "work not as a painful obligation 
imposed upon individuals, nor as an activity undertaken for mainly instrumental 
purposes, but rather as a vital means to individual liberty and self-fulfilment 
(2000a: 64). The bureaucracy is thus seen as something that restricts personal 
freedom. What is somewhat ironic is that `anti-bureaucratic' writers often 
exchange the `bureau' with some form of `strong' company culture that is led by 
charismatic leaders - let us remember, for example, Peters and Waterman's In 
Search for Excellence, which dominated managerialist writing in the 1980s 
(Armbruster, 2003). What is often not explained by these writers is how such 
`strong' community-based cultures, characterised by teamwork, dialogue, 
company visions and `bottom-up' management, ensure more `freedom' than the 
bureaucracy. In fact, as Parker (2002a: 79-80) notes, communities are often as 
normative and coercive as bureaucracies. Du Gay (2000a: 66) and Armbruster and 
Gebert (2002) thus detect in the `anti-bureaucratic' discourse a certain romantic 
belief in communitarian ways of a supposedly organic life. Besides the 
community approach, `anti-bureaucratic' writers often emphasise continuous 
change (e. g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), complexity (e. g. Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2001) and chaos (e. g. Peters, 1987). Such terms highlight the view that organised 
reality is seen as indeterminate, which, it is argued, unlocks the creative potentials 
of individuals (e. g. Biggart, 1977; Morgan, 1997). In the view of these writers, the 
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bureaucracy is regarded as something which hinders the creative development of 
organisational members and thus the economic performance of the company. 
Du Gay (2000a: 81 ff) also shows how the `anti-bureaucratic spirit' has taken hold 
in the `public sector'. In times of global competitiveness between nations the 
bureaucratic state is often seen as something that hinders economic activity within 
and between national economies. What is generally understood as `neo- 
liberalism', which is sometimes also referred to as `market liberalism', advocates 
the view that there is no alternative to the capitalist market, which is said to have 
proven to be an efficient and effective way of ordering economic activity. Within 
the logic of `neo-liberalism' individuals are their own sovereigns and pursue 
things for their own economic self-interest; subsequently, any government is seen 
as an unnecessary interference with the process of self-realisation (Grugulis and 
Knights, 2001: 19); this is also referred to as libertarianism (Armbruster, 2003). 
With the rise of `neo-liberalism' as one of the most dominant politico-economic 
ideologies over the past two decades, du Gay (2000a) shows that there have been 
consistent attacks on state bureaucracies, which are seen to limit the libertarian 
self-interests of individuals. He discusses, for example, a range of attempts to 
manage public service organisations more like entrepreneurial corporations, which 
are characterised by flat hierarchies, teamwork, internal markets and self- 
responsibility. This entrepreneurialism is supposed to make public services more 
agile and cost the taxpayer less money to run. However, not only are public 
services run as if they are companies; increasingly they are also run for profit. The 
1980s and 1990s saw immense privatisation programmes and, today, even state 
schools and hospitals are operated by companies that are not only interested in 
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delivering a good public service but also in their profit levels (Monbiot, 2000). 
This has not only been a national phenomenon but indeed a global one. As many 
critics of globalisation show (e. g. Frank, 2000; Hertz, 2001; Klein, 2000), 'neo- 
liberal' policies now set the agenda in many parts of world - often enforced by the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other non-governmental 
organisations controlled by Western governments and business interests. One can 
thus speak of `neo-liberalism' as a hegemonic discourse that has emplaced 
sociality in specific ways. This emplacement points precisely to Hardt and Negri's 
`Empire', which can be seen as today's globally integrated regime of capital that 
aims to turn every territory into a `market'. 
Now, the response by du Gay (2000a) and other so-called `liberalists' (e. g. 
Armbruster, 2002,2003; Armbruster and Gebert, 2002; and Adler and Borys, 
1996) to the attacks on the bureaucracy by `anti-bureaucratic' management 
writers, `neo-liberalists' and `Empire' at large, is one that stresses the need for a 
return to the bureaucratic ethos. When one speaks of `liberalism' one has to be 
careful to distinguish it from `neo-liberalism' and `libertarianism'. In contrast to 
the latter two, liberalists emphasise the need to organise democratic society 
through bureaucratic institutions. As one liberalist writes, "from a liberalist 
viewpoint, there are no means other than institutional ones for securing plurality", 
that is, freedom and democracy (Armbruster, 2003: 23). At the heart of liberalism 
is a belief in the plurality of life forms, which are governed by contingent political 
and ethical rules. On one hand, the bureau is seen as one of these life forms itself; 
following Max Weber, du Gay, for example, asserts that the bureau must be seen 
as an institution that is guided by its own moral conduct (2000a: 5,10). On the 
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other hand, the bureau is also seen to ensure the plurality of different life forms in 
society at large. The bureaucrat is characterised as someone who has a "strict 
adherence to procedure, commitment to the purpose of the office, abnegation of 
personal moral enthusiasms, [and] acceptance of sub- and super-orderination" (du 
Gay, 2000a: 44). The bureaucrat is thought to be someone who can make 
impartial and impersonal decisions by way of the bureau being a separate and 
rationally operating life-world in its own right. The bureaucrat is seen to be able to 
mediate between conflicting groups of society and ensure a plurality of competing 
life forms. 
Such a discourse is generally valuable because it points to the need of organising 
and institutionalising society. In contrast to the depositioning discourses discussed 
in Chapter Four, liberalists are very critical of conceptions of society that 
emphasise local, community-based processes of social organising and of accounts 
that simply celebrate the indeterminacy and disorganised nature of organisation. 
Within a liberalist viewpoint, society only becomes possible through an 
institutional organisation of the various antagonistic forces that characterise social 
reality. In Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) language, one could say that liberalists 
point to the need to establish `chains of equivalence' between antagonistic forces, 
in order to politically enact the `structural undecidability' of society. This 
equivalence thus fills the inherent lack of `the social' and enables identification 
with a particular organisation of social reality. The bureaucracy can be seen within 
this `logic of equivalence'; it is a particular social decision about how to make 
society possible. The bureaucrat is a subject that reproduces this social decision 
through a conduct of impartiality and impersonality. What du Gay (2000a) tries to 
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achieve with his book In Praise of Bureaucracy is to defend this social decision 
against the host of `anti-bureaucratic' discourses that have emerged in recent 
times, some of which I have mentioned above. 
Du Gay defends the bureaucracy largely by reminding us of the `original' 
bureaucratic ethos that he reads in Max Weber, which could be interpreted as an 
inherently conservative move. This is, in fact, acknowledged by du Gay (2000b) 
who is, however, quite happy to be associated with this type of `conservatism'. 
Yet, in Parker's view (2002b: 131), du Gay runs the danger of presenting a 
nostalgic and idealist image of the bureaucracy and the bureaucrat. Du Gay 
(2000a), as well as Armbruster and Gebert (2002), seem to imply, for example, 
that, if the bureaucracy had functioned `properly', the Holocaust would never 
have happened. They argue that it was not the bureaucracy that enabled the 
Holocaust, as Bauman (1989) would have it. Instead, it was the undermining of 
the bureaucratic ethos, as imagined by Weber, which led to the totalitarian state of 
the Third Reich. While it might be the case that Hitler disassembled the 
bureaucracy of the Weimar Republic, Bauman's point seems to be that the 
organisation of the Holocaust only became possible because of modem ways of 
organising rationally and bureaucratically. Without fully engaging with the debate 
between du Gay and Bauman, my concern is that both writers do not seem to 
properly acknowledge that any institutional setup is embedded in particular 
political as well as economic contingencies. This is to say, there is no such thing 
as the bureaucracy per se; instead, it is a contested terrain that is employed for 
various political ends. While Bauman sometimes seems to regard the bureaucracy 
as something that can be made responsible for all the `evil' of modern society, du 
212 
5. Repositioning Organisation: Impossibilities of `The Movement' 
Gay tends to defend the bureaucracy on equally essentialist grounds by 
emphasising an `original' bureaucratic ethos that exists outside all economic and 
political contingencies. 
What is missing in du Gay is the concrete analysis of the ends of bureaucratic 
organising across various socio-political and historical terrains. By adhering to 
Weber's `original' bureaucratic ethos, he might be able to resist contemporary 
`anti-bureaucratic' discourses and show that modern society only becomes 
possible by way of an institutional setup. However, he simultaneously runs the 
risk of not critically engaging with those often violent social outcomes that have 
been produced and continue to be produced by this very bureaucratic ethos. This 
is partly Benjamin's point in his essay `Critique of Violence' (Cop) in which he 
associates the state's power with a reproduction of violence (the German word 
Gewalt means both `violence' and `power'). Benjamin (CoV, 288) argues that it is 
necessary for the state, after it has been brought violently into power, to 
institutionalise this violence in order to reproduce itself. This can be linked, 
perhaps, to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the `war-machine' which is 
appropriated by the state (1987: 420ff). In their view, too, there is violence at the 
heart of the state. The point I am trying to make is that du Gay does not engage 
with the violent production processes of the state bureaucracy in order to ethically 
and politically evaluate the ends of this violence. 
Although this might stretch the point too much, my critique could be illustrated by 
considering the cover photograph of du Gay's In Praise of Bureaucracy, which 
shows a woman going through some files in a document cabinet in a vast 
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Pentagon office. Du Gay does not make reference to this image in the text nor 
does he mention the Pentagon; so, it is difficult to judge whether he has been 
involved in selecting it. Whether intentional or not, the Pentagon picture points, 
perhaps, to du Gay's politics. While defending the role an institutional setup plays 
for the democratic governing of society is generally a very worthwhile project, du 
Gay fails to politically evaluate the particular ends bureaucratic institutions can be 
put to. That is, his idealist image of a bureaucratic ethos makes him somewhat 
lose sight of the particular regime of violence and power that is produced and 
reproduced by states and governments. This critique can be extended by 
suggesting that du Gay's analysis is firmly embedded in the contemporary 
`goings-on' of bureaucratic institutions of the state. His main aim seems to be to 
contribute to the public services debate and defend the status of the `civil servant', 
which has come under intense attack by both politicians and the `new 
managerialism' that has taken hold in the `public sector' (du Gay, 2000a: 114ff). 
While I would not want to suggest that this is not an important political and 
theoretical contribution, my concern is that because he does not evaluate in detail 
the political ends of bureaucratic organising he seems to have very little time for 
alternative institutional setups other than governments and modem public 
bureaucracies. 
In my view, then, du Gay and other liberalists can be seen to restrict `the political' 
to established places such as state bureaucracy. This restriction seems to minor 
the politics of some labour process theorists who, as I discussed in the previous 
section, restrict `the political' to the capitalist workplace. In both cases it seems 
that the terrain of politics is restricted to a definite place. In Derrida's language, 
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one could say that for both liberalists and some of the labour process theorists 
discussed above `the political' is not an undecidability but something that is 
always already decided. As I discussed in Chapter Two, however, for Derrida, the 
political event is when a social decision emerges out of an undecidable situation 
which cannot be pre-positioned in any way. Yet, liberalist and labour process 
politics seem to be pre-positioned in the state bureaucracy and the workplace 
respectively. This restriction of `the political' becomes obvious when we consider 
that within the realms of organisation theory both liberalists and labour process 
theorists have been somewhat quiet about the politics of new social movements. 
In particular the `anti-capitalist movement', which has emerged over the past four 
years, and which I will consider later on in this chapter, has only found minute 
attention in organisation theory. However, as I will show in the remaining part of 
this chapter, the analysis of the organisation and politics of these new social 
movements is of vital importance, precisely because they can be seen to engender 
those spaces of politics that are not normally considered by liberalists and labour 
process theorists. 
The Political Organisation of New Social Movements 
In the previous two sections I have considered two organisation theory discourses 
that are not concerned with simply repeating the depositioning of organised 
reality, as practiced by the authors discussed in Chapter Four. If the depositioning 
project is primarily about exposing the precariousness and undecidability of all 
organised phenomena, labour process theorists and liberalists emphasise the need 
for particular political decisions about how to order and constitute `the social'. 
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These discourses can be associated with, what I term, the repositioning project 
because they are explicitly concerned with exploring new political positions along 
which society might be organised. While the politics of both labour process 
theorists and liberalists have been important contributions, I have pointed to some 
of the limitations of these repositioning discourses. 
In the remaining sections of this chapter I will explore possibilities of how one 
might go beyond these limitations by engaging with what can be called one of 
today's most radical movements for social change, namely the `anti -capitalist 
movement', which has gained increasing momentum over the past four years. I 
will contextualise this social movement historically, consider its political aims and 
discuss the organisational challenges it currently faces. The aims of this 
engagement with the `anti-capitalist movement' are three-fold: First, there is a 
practical need for this social movement to question its organisational and political 
aims, and, in my view, organisation theory has a lot to offer in this regard. 
Second, this empirical engagement will illustrate the theoretical argument of this 
thesis, which has been concerned with the exploration of possibilities of a political 
repositioning of social organisation. I will argue that the `anti-capitalist 
movement' can be seen as a political event, which is not only aimed at changing 
social organisation on a local level - the main purpose of the depositioning project 
- but indeed at the level of hegemony or universality. Third, this engagement can 
be seen as an event itself, which aims to explore possibilities for a repositioning of 
organisation theory. That is, by engaging with the `anti-capitalist movement' I 
hope to contribute to a project that can effectively resist the hegemony of capital 
and management knowledge and affirm the field of organisation theory as a 
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practice for radical social change. However, before I turn to the specificities of the 
`anti-capitalist movement', let me start by discussing some literatures that have 
been explicitly concerned with theorising social movements. 
According to Scott, a social movement 
is a collective actor constituted by individuals who understand themselves to have common 
interests and, for at least some significant part of their social existence, a common identity. 
Social movements are distinguished from other collective actors, such as political parties 
and pressure groups, in that they have mass mobilization, or the threat of mobilization, as 
their prime source of social sanction, and hence of power. They are further distinguished 
from other collectivities, such as voluntary associations or clubs, in being chiefly concerned 
to defend or change society, or the relative position of the group in society. (Scott, 1990: 6) 
In recent history one can identify a stream of social movements that have sought 
to radically change society. Let us think, for example, of the labour movements 
that sprung up in most industrialist countries as the result of the advancement of 
industrial capitalism in the late 19`h century; the socialist revolutions, or their 
attempts, in Russia, Germany, Italy and elsewhere in the 1910s and 1920s; the 
suffragettes movements, also at the beginning of the 20`h century; the nationalist 
movements in Germany, Italy, Japan and other countries in the 1930s and 1940s; 
the anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s; the student protest and anti- 
war movements at the end of the 1960s; the Black civil rights, women's and gays' 
liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s; the anti-nuclear and Green 
movements of the 1980s; and the anti-state socialism movements in the former 
Eastern-bloc countries at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. 
This list is, of course, not exhaustive. An extended list of social movements could, 
for example, also include pre-capitalist movements such as peasant revolts. The 
general point to make here is that the `anti-capitalist movement', which has 
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formed since the late 1990s, is embedded in a long history of social movement 
activities. 
Recently, some social movement theorists (e. g. Crossley, 2002; Farrell, 1997; 
Kriesi et al., 1995; Larana et al., 1994; Melucci, 1989,1996; Scott, 1990; and 
Tarrow, 1998) have distinguished between `old' and `new' social movements. 
Whilst the term `old social movement' tends to be reserved for workers' or labour 
movements, the movements that started to appear in the 1960s, for example 
feminist, gay, green and pacifism movements, are usually referred to as `new 
social movements'. Workers' and labour movements are referred to as `old' social 
movements because they largely enact `traditional' categories of antagonistic class 
struggles, which emerge out of the specificities of the labour process discussed 
above. The struggles of the labour process are structured around the antagonistic 
relationship between capital and labour, between those who own all resources and 
are traditionally represented by the bourgeois political caste system and those who 
only own their labour power and have traditionally not been represented 
politically. One of the main purposes of labour movements, which started to 
appear during the time of Marx's writing in the mid-19`h century, has been the 
adequate representation of workers, in order to improve their relative economic 
position within society. According to Scott (1990: 5), the movements that emerge 
out of antagonistic class struggles have generally been assumed to be the 
paradigm of social movements. 
However, the social movements that have appeared since the 1960s have sparked 
a rethinking about how and why social movements are formed. These movements 
218 
5. Repositioning Organisation: Impossibilities of `The Movement' 
have been coined `new social movements' (NSMs) because their struggles cannot 
only be seen along traditional lines of labour politics and economics. As Scott 
(1990), Melucci (1989) and others have argued, NSMs embrace struggles in a 
variety of different cultural and everyday spaces. According to Crossley (2003: 
302), NSM theorists argue that society and its constitutive struggles have moved 
beyond traditional class antagonisms, and NSMs are thought to be replacing the 
working class as new political challengers. Whereas Crossley suggests that NSMs 
could be seen to create a new political conjuncture, other NSM theorists believe 
that the `newness' of these social movements is that they are not `political' but, 
instead, seek cultural innovation. As Melucci argues: 
Social movements... seem to shift their focus from class, race, and other more traditional 
political issues towards the cultural ground. In the last thirty years emerging social conflicts 
in complex societies have not expressed themselves through political action, but rather have 
raised cultural challenges to the dominant language, to the codes that organize information 
and shape social practices.... The action of movements deliberately differentiates itself 
from the model of political organization and assumes increasing autonomy from political 
systems; it becomes intimately interweaved with everyday life and individual experience. 
(1996: 8-9) 
In Melucci's view, then, NSMs do not aim for political power by being politically 
represented or, indeed, by overthrowing an established political system. He 
maintains instead that NSMs are located within civil society and are engaged in 
the production of a wide variety of values, symbols and identities. This, according 
to Melucci, takes account of the fact that contemporary capitalist relations are not 
only concerned with the production of economic resources and the fight for 
representation on a political level, but also with the production of social 
relationships, symbols and identities in multiple situations of the everyday. This 
can be related to the concerns of the so-called `Foucauldian' organisation theorists 
discussed above. Writers such as Knights and Willmott, and others, also point to 
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the fact that social struggles do not only emerge out of the economic necessities of 
the labour process. Instead, individuals and groups engage in a range of different 
identity struggles. In contrast to Melucci, however, `Foucauldians' would regard 
these struggles as being deeply political. That is, Melucci seems to work with a 
conception of politics that is restricted to the level of political party representation. 
The point of the identity struggles of new social movements, one could argue, is 
that `the political' is displaced and its terrain widened. 
While the distinction between `old' and `new' social movements might be a useful 
starting point to think about the type of struggles characteristic of contemporary 
society, and how they might be differentiated from other historical periods, there 
are, in Scott's (1990) view, numerous problems with such a crude categorisation. 
For him, the concerns of labour movements and NSMs have intersected and 
indeed influenced each other's agendas. He uses the example of the German 
Greens, a social movement that has developed into a political party. I might add 
that this party is currently governing in Germany in coalition with the Social 
Democrats who have originally emerged out of the early labour movements of the 
19`h century. So, the point Scott makes is that, rather than debating how `new' 
certain social movements are, it might be more productive to engage with the 
concrete organisational and political challenges they face. Now, according to 
Scott (1990), one of the main organisational issues of social movements is the 
question of institutionalisation. As I have already discussed in the previous 
section, this is not simply an organisational question but indeed a political one. 
Let me, then, turn to a discussion of the problematic of institutionalisation, which 
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will be of importance when we analyse the challenges faced by the `anti-capitalist 
movement'. 
NSMs are said to be marked by `grassroots'-type network structures (Scott, 1990: 
19). That is, one reason why NSMs are thought to be `new' is that, in contrast to 
traditional labour movements, which are said to be organised in formal 
hierarchies, `new' social movements organise on local levels and often mobilise 
their resources on an `ad hoc' basis. More specifically, in Scott's view the social 
movement literature has characterised the organisational principles of NSMs as 
follows: 
(1) locally based or centred on small groups; (2) organized around specific, often local, 
issues; (3) characterized by a cycle of social movement activity and mobilization, i. e. 
vacillation between periods of high and low activity (the latter often taking the form of a 
disbandment, temporarily or permanently, of the organization); (4) where the movement 
constructs organizations which bridge periods of high activity they tend to feature fluid 
hierarchies and loose systems of authority; (5) shifting membership and fluctuating 
numbers. (1990: 30) 
NSMs are thus described as social networks that are seen to be highly flexible, 
fluid and adaptable. Crossley (2002) points out that NSMs are often purposefully 
anti-authoritarian, because `grassroots' democracies - as these types of local 
movements are sometimes called - are thought to be more inclusive, pragmatic 
and quicker in responding to specific local issues. NSMs are therefore often 
organised in groups or cells, which gather spontaneously and in an `ad hoc' 
fashion around single issues. "Such groupings are often organized to oppose the 
local consequences of higher-level political decisions with respect", for example, 
"to road building, factory installation" or "local pollution problems" (Scott, 1990: 
31). Germany, for example, has a long tradition of so-called `citizens' initiatives' 
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(Bürgerinitiativen), which organise themselves on a local basis around single 
issues, such as those just mentioned. According to Scott (1990) and Melucci 
(1989), such local initiatives can be seen as a response to the failure of traditional 
political systems to account for and incorporate the diverse agendas of the new 
cultural movements that have appeared since the 1960s. That is, while established 
political systems seem to be organised around grand signifiers, such as `left' and 
`right', labour versus conservative, people have increasingly defected from 
parliamentary democracy to invent their own local politics that traverse traditional 
political categories. 
Generally, then, one can see `grassroots' politics as being embedded in a wider 
process of decline of traditional institutional spheres. As Blaug maintains, "In the 
places of our everyday lives, a new anti-institutional orientation is in evidence" 
(Blaug, 1998: 34). While liberalists bemoan this development and seek to return 
to the bureaucratic ethos of institutional politics, Blaug embraces decentralised, 
fluid networks of political action but warns: "we need to know whether the 
localized, fragmented, face-to-face and strongly anti-institutional orientation of 
such initiatives could ever hope to deliver a radical practice which might change 
the world, or whether it will turn out to be yet another bloody cul-de-sac" (Blaug, 
1998: 34). He goes on to affirm this question by engaging with the battle in the 
Teuteburg forest, in which seemingly `disorganised', anarchic German hordes 
defeated a hopelessly outnumbered, well-organised and disciplined legion of 
15,000 Roman soldiers in the 9th century. In his discussion of this battle Blaug 
shows how, what he calls, `rhizomatic movements' can effectively coordinate 
their actions, intervene in a particular situation of social struggle and bring about 
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change. What he provides is a theory of a social movement that challenges 
established orders precisely because it organises differently: it is not a hierarchical 
order but a `disorganised', rhizomatic order that is perceived as disorder. In his 
view, it is because of this organisational otherness, so to say, that any seemingly 
`disorganised' or anarchic movement is seen as a `problem' that needs to be dealt 
with by the ordered and organised forces of the state. 
The age old accusation of utopianism, levelled at rhizomatic action from within the 
confines of hierarchism, cannot be sustained by the charge that it cannot co-ordinate action. 
It is not this that explains the failure of political science to take seriously these radical 
forms, nor does it explain the absence of any serious attempt to stimulate and nurture grass- 
roots democracy, to develop ways that networks of groups might overcome the problems of 
partiality which always beset local actors in global systems, to make democracy real. 
Rather, at the heart of the accusation of utopianism is the charge that rhizomatic action is 
too effective, dangerously so, and thus prone to violent disorder. As such, it must be 
controlled, protected against. Otherwise, and here is the rub, it cannot provide the safety 
and stability required by elites to maintain their power, in other words, by the state. (Blaug, 
1998: 51) 
Blaug's valuable analysis shows how effective political action can be taken by 
rhizomatic, `grassroots' movements, which operate outside established 
institutional spaces of the state. In his view, the state is suspicious of these 
movements because they do not work along the same lines of organisation. The 
state thus often confronts `grassroots' movements with hostility. 
In what is a powerful plea for organisation theory to refocus its attention - away 
from global corporations, state bureaucracies and managerialist discourses 
towards local movements of resistance for radical social change - Fournier (2002) 
uses some of Blaug's insights to praise the disorganised, anarchist and rhizomatic 
nature of the organisation of `grassroots' movements. 
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Dissensus, disunity, multiple points, far from diluting the strength of these grass-root 
movements stand as effective weapons against the seduction of closure, the snugness of 
comfort. The juxtaposition of disconnected grass-roots alternatives serves as a reminder 
that any form of organizing has to establish itself against others, that there are always 
alternatives. (Fournier, 2002: 209) 
Similarly to Blaug, Fournier provides a powerful critique of hierarchism and 
established modes of organising, which, in her view, always already privilege the 
powerful. It is her attempt to give voice to those who live their lives at the 
margins of society. For her, these margins can never be fully incorporated into the 
centre, as there will always be resistance and utopian alternatives to hegemonic 
organisational regimes. Fournier's argument has much in common with anarchist 
organisational principles, which have a long tradition but only recently seem to 
have seen renewed attention due to the `success' of post-structural theories of 
organisation. Reedy (2002), for example, is keen to `hoist the black flag' to argue 
for anarchist modes of organising that always resist hegemonies, hierarchies and 
other dominant organisational practices. For him, anarchism is an effective 
practice of resistance because it goes nowhere: it is not confined to established 
lines of bureaucratic communication and organisation; instead, it renders static 
forms fluid by permanently subverting the agendas of hegemonic discourses. This, 
then, reminds us of some of the depositioning discourses discussed in Chapter 
Four, which highlighted the processual, fluid and precarious nature of 
organisation. 
Reedy, and also Blaug and Fournier, seem to argue that `grassroots' movements 
of resistance are about a permanent disruption and subversion of state institutions 
and established political spheres. They see these movements as something 
disorganised, ephemeral, rhizomatic, uncontrollable and ungovernable; in their 
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view, these movements aim to "challenge the machine of the state with viral 
micro-operations" (Blaug, 1998: 45). Blaug, in particular, bases his understanding 
of such `micro-political' operations on Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) 
understanding of rhizomatic action. In Blaug's view, rhizomatic action cannot and 
is not interested in running the state; "Indeed, running a state is not, after all, a 
suitable task for the spontaneous and ephemeral, nor for the joyful, the committed 
or the autonomous" (1998: 51). As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) make quite clear, 
however, every movement of deterritorialisation, of change, should not simply 
end in chaos or complete nothingness - such nothingness could all too easily be 
retemtorialised on the plane of already established signifiers, such as capital. This 
was one of my points of critique I levelled at the depositioning project in Chapter 
Four. In response to Blaug's reading of Deleuze and Guattari one could say that in 
Thousand Plateaus they do not simply talk of rhizomatic movements but of 
strategies. For them, the question is not simply one of deterritorialisation, 
especially given that capital is always already characterised by forces of 
deterritorialisation. Instead, movement, in order to have strategic effects, needs to 
be able to create specific events. Events are not only about deterritorialising and 
moving, but also about `invading a territory'. While Blaug's `rhizomatic hordes' 
are successful in enacting a specific situation, the military defeat of the Romans in 
the Teuteburg forest, they are not fully `invading a territory' in the sense that they 
stop the rule of the Romans and set up their own governing structures. While 
rhizomatic movements might not be interested in running the state, this disinterest 
might incorporate the danger of only causing a temporary setback for the Roman 
Empire. 
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As I discussed above, Hardt and Negri conceptualise `Empire' as a `non-place'. In 
their view, `Empire' cannot simply be resisted within the realms of 
deterritorialisation, multiplicity and hybridity, or what I have described as 
depositioning. They maintain that "hybridity itself is an empty gesture, and the 
mere refusal of order simply leaves us on the edge of nothingness - or worse, 
these gestures risk reinforcing imperial power rather than challenging it" (2000: 
216-217). In other words, a resistance on the level of hybridity, multiplicity or 
Blaug's `rhizomatic hordes' might not be effective precisely because it always 
risks being reterritorialised by dominant forces of `Empire'. Thus, in Hardt and 
Negri's words, "Empire can be effectively contested only on its own level of 
generality" (2000: 206). This implies that it would be necessary to organise an 
"enlarging, inclusive movement oriented toward the future capable of producing a 
new unity" (Hardt, 1993: 20). In this movement towards a new unity "the 
multiplicity of society is forged into a multitude. The multitude remains 
contingent in that it is always open to antagonism and conflict, but in its dynamic 
of increasing power it attains a plane of consistency; it has the capacity to pose 
social normativity as civil right. The multitude is multiplicity made powerful" 
(1993: 110). 
The concept of the `multitude', which Hardt first used in his book on Deleuze 
(1993), also features in Empire. In Hardt and Negri's (2000) view, the `multitude' 
is a force of resistance against `Empire', which does not simply work on the level 
of rhizomatic action but is indeed able to challenge `Empire' on its own `level of 
generality'. The `multitude' can be seen as a multiplicity that has gained in power 
by being forged into an `organised mass' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 348). Pace 
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Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the `multitude' can be seen, perhaps, as an event that 
enables a new hegemony of social organisation. As I discussed in Chapter Two, 
for Laclau and Mouffe, the political event is when an established, hegemonic 
emplacement of society is questioned and a new hegemony is made possible. The 
conceptualisation of this event is based on the understanding that resistance 
against a hegemonic content cannot only be effective through, what Laclau and 
Mouffe call, the `logic of difference'. In their view, a force of resistance also 
needs to engender the `logic of equivalence' which forges different social actors 
into a unity. Similarly, for Hardt and Negri, the movement from multiplicity to the 
`multitude' is the event of creating a political subject that can effectively resist 
`Empire' on the level of generality, or universality. It is the event in which a force 
is created capable of "not only organizing the destructive capacities of the 
multitude, but also constituting through the desires of the multitude an alternative" 
(2000: 214). Thus, if `Empire' is a `non-place', the question Hardt and Negri ask 
is how to construct "in the non-place, a new place" (2000: 217). `A new place' 
needs to be built, constructed - Hardt and Negri seem to see the `multitude's' task 
in repositioning `the social' and emplacing it along different lines to the 
contemporary hegemony of `Empire'. One could argue that this `emplacing' 
necessarily involves certain institutionalisation processes. That is, `a new place' 
can only be built on some sort of fundaments, which effectively provide the 
positions about which a society is organised. This, then, is the valuable 
contribution of liberalist thought, discussed in the previous section. While some 
liberalists, like du Gay for example, seem to somewhat fetishise a certain 
`original' bureaucratic ethos, what can be taken from their position is the insight 
that society only becomes possible through certain institutionalisations. 
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What I have discussed above can be described, perhaps, as the political necessity 
of institutionalisation. Related to this is what can be called the organisational 
necessity of institutionalisation. This is to say, social movements face the question 
of institutionalisation because they usually involve the mobilisation of a large 
amount of people. In order to be effective, these masses need to be organised. 
According to Scott (1990: 129), social movements often look for possibilities of 
lowering the cost of collective action, which pulls them towards a more formal 
organisation and even a political party scenario. He uses the example of the 
German Greens who have developed from a largely uncoordinated movement to 
the third biggest political party (in terms of its electoral success in the 2002 
elections) over the course of about 25 years. For Michels (1962), however, the 
development of the Greens from movement to political party would probably 
demonstrate the inherent dangers of institutionalisation. For him, the development 
from social movement to a fully institutionalised political party is a conservative 
move because, in his view (1962: 338), organisation moves from being a means 
(in the case of social movements) to becoming an end in itself (in the case of 
political parties). Michels observed this in the case of the early labour movements, 
which developed into socialist or communist parties in the late I9`h and early 20th 
centuries. 
The history of the international labor movement furnishes innumerable examples of the 
manner in which the party becomes increasingly inert as the strength of its organization 
grows; it loses its revolutionary impetus, becomes sluggish, not in respect of action alone, 
but also in the sphere of thought. (1962: 337) 
Michels, then, warns of the dangers of institutionalisation: the `revolutionary 
impetus' of a social movement, as he calls it, might get lost within the political 
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party machinery. Certainly the Germany Greens, for example, seem to have lost 
many of their radical ideas and become entangled by the somewhat conservative 
party political system in Germany. 
However, despite these dangers of institutionalisation, Michels admits that "it is 
none the less true that social wealth cannot be satisfactorily administered in any 
other manner than by the creation of an extensive bureaucracy" (1962: 347). Now, 
what I highlighted above was the idea that there is no such thing as the 
`bureaucracy', or the `bureaucratic ethos', as some liberalists might have it. 
Instead, an institutional setup is always a process of contestation. This 
contestation generally involves two aspects: first, the contestation about how to 
organise an institution; and, second, the contestation about the political ends 
institutions should be put to. For Laclau and Mouffe (1985), it is precisely the role 
of `the political' to engender these processes of contestation, to bring about a 
social decision about how to institutionalise society and, thus, to make it possible. 
The development of a social movement into a political party is only one of the 
possibilities, which is to say that there are many different ways of 
institutionalising political action and society at large. Yet, what seems to be 
important to recognise is that institutionalisation is generally possible and even 
necessary. 
The `Anti-Capitalist Movement' 
Now that I have discussed some perspectives of the political organisation of social 
movements, I will turn to the specificities of the `anti-capitalist movement', which 
229 
5. Repositioning Organisation: Impossibilities of `The Movement' 
is a social movement that has gained momentum over about the past four years. 
While in this section my main aim is a general introduction to the `anti-capitalist' 
discourse and some of its organisational and political themes, the next section will 
engage with the organisational and political challenges of the `anti-capitalist 
movement' in much more detail. One of its significant `founding' dates is 
November 1999. At this time the World Trade Organization (WTO) held one of 
its annual meetings in Seattle and a new round of global trade liberalisation talks 
was supposed to be launched. Although the WTO was used to dealing with 
frequent opposition from individual non-governmental organisations and pressure 
groups, it was not prepared for the massive protests on the streets outside the 
Seattle hotel hosting the meeting: 
40,000 demonstrators, drawn from a wide spectrum of constituencies that extended from 
core sections of American organized labour.. . to a plethora of non-governmental 
organizations and activist coalitions campaigning around issues such as the environment, 
fair trade, and Third World debt. The numbers and militancy of the protesters, and the 
innovative methods of organizing they used, took the authorities by surprise. (Callinicos, 
2003: 4, emphasis added) 
Whereas the WTO has always had to deal with opposition against its policies - 
opposition that has come from groups with diverse geographical and social 
backgrounds as well as political agendas - the `innovation' of the Seattle 
demonstrations was that for the first time protesters were able to organise 
themselves in such a way that, out of the multiplicity of their demands, a 
powerful, albeit temporary, unity was formed. The common aim was an effective 
disruption of the WTO meeting and to give voice to alternative views of 
organising global trade. The Seattle protests were regarded as a success because 
that particular WTO meeting was discontinued, and thanks to massive media 
coverage, the discontentment with the `neo-liberal' politico-economic agendas, 
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which have been shaping societies around the world since the early eighties, when 
Reagan and Thatcher came to power, could be heard worldwide. 
Seattle could be seen as a trigger, an event of politics. Suddenly, there was talk of 
`the movement' against globalisation and `neo-liberal' capitalism: 
Since Seattle, and reinforced by Genoa, a broader picture has come into view which shows 
we are no longer alone in our privatised, downsized, deregulated lives - we are part of a 
movement that is determined to respond, that understands an alternative is possible. We 
have come to understand that the system which oppresses us in one corner of the world, or 
in one aspect of our lives, is the same system wreaking its havoc elsewhere. We have 
realised that a fundamental change in society is required. (Bircham, 2001: 3, emphasis 
added) 
What has followed Seattle are numerous protests that have coincided with 
meetings regularly staged by various inter- and extra-governmental organisations; 
for example, the G8, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union (EU), 
World Bank, to name but the most important and powerful ones. The cities that 
have hosted these meetings have gone into the history books of the 'anti- 
capitalist' protest calendar: Washington, Melbourne, Prague, Gothenburg, Nice, 
Quebec City, Genoa and Evian. In these and numerous other places massive 
protests and counter-summits have been staged attracting millions of 
demonstrators worldwide. What this sequence of events has increasingly produced 
is a language of `us' against `them'. This is apparent in the language of Bircham 
cited above: `us', the oppressed, exploited and deprived, who have to live in a 
society that is increasingly characterised by the disappearance of public spaces, 
against `them', the global corporations, which are only responsible to their 
shareholders, and the `neo-liberal' politicians who only help to further the 
interests of capital. One could say that this language of `us' against `them' points 
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to the construction of a political identity (Laclau, 1994), that of the `anti-capitalist 
movement'. As I discussed in Chapter Two, this identity can be seen as an 
articulation that hopes to expose certain antagonisms of a particular social regime; 
it reduces the plurality of society to some specific `chains of equivalence' (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985: 130). 
The identity of the `anti-capitalist movement' has also been shaped by a string of 
recent book publications. Principally, Hardt and Negri's Empire has contributed to 
the analysis of today's constellation of social struggles, and could be seen to have 
helped to reignite many people's imagination of the possibility of radical social 
change. If Empire is explicitly a theoretical endeavour, Klein's No Logo (2000) 
journalistically presents a plethora of detailed facts to expose the ways global 
corporations, such as Nike, McDonald's, Starbucks, Shell, Wal-Mart and others, 
have often become more powerful than national governments. In her view, these 
corporations have entangled social life in a web of brands from which there seems 
to be no escape; even traditional public spaces - such as city squares, schools and 
universities - are now becoming spaces of brand commodification. However, 
Klein does not paint a picture of an Orwellian totalitarian state that is all- 
encompassing and non-escapable. Almost half of her book is committed to 
showing how the corporate `brand bullies', as she calls them, can be resisted by a 
range of innovative activist strategies. For example, she talks about the `culture 
jamming' activities of Adbusters who turn corporate ads into subversive anti- 
corporate images; she engages with activism networks such as Reclaim the Streets 
that aim to reclaim public spaces, that have been increasingly turned into private, 
commercial properties; she also reports on anti-corporate activism against 
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companies such as Nike, Shell and McDonald's whose labour relations and 
environmental practices have come under fierce attack. While Klein's book can be 
regarded as mainly `non-theoretical' (Parker, 2002c), it offers a review of 
`practical' strategies that have been used by activists to expose and resist 
hegemonic corporate practices. No Logo has been translated into more than forty 
languages and has sold in millions. One could, perhaps, claim that this book has 
been one of the most important tools for the formation of the identity of the `anti- 
capitalist movement'. Because of its global reach, No Logo, has helped to create, 
firstly, an awareness of and sensibility towards issues such as unequal 
globalisation processes, the disappearance of public spaces and the social costs of 
'neo-liberal' socio-economic policies, and, secondly, a sense of the possibility of 
resistance against today's hegemony of capital. 
There has been a plethora of other writings that have described, conceptualised 
and critiqued today's politico-economic constellation; writings which have also 
played an important role in the formation of the identity of the `anti-capitalist 
movement'. First and foremost one should mention the work of Chomsky (e. g. 
1992,1998,2000) who, in his long career, has published dozens of books many of 
which have attempted, in one way or another, to expose and challenge the 
hegemony of global capitalism. Bourdieu (e. g. 1998,1999), too, has used his 
standing as a leading French intellectual to publish books that explicitly try to 
expose and critique the workings of today's `neo-liberal' economic policies and 
its global social consequences. There has also been a growing `anti-corporate' 
literature that challenges the hegemony of market capitalism and the increasing 
privatisation of all aspects of public life (e. g. Bovd, 2001; Frank, 2000; Hertz, 
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2001; Monbiot, 2000,2003; Schlosser, 2002; and Stiglitz, 2002). More explicitly 
concerned with the dynamics and organisation of `the movement' have been the 
edited collection by Birchman and Charlton (2001) and Callinicos' An Anti- 
Capitalist Manifesto (2003). While all these books have contributed, in one way 
or another, to the formation of `the movement', it has been the Internet that has 
served as the main distributor of information about the various resistance 
movements worldwide. Websites or networks of websites such as Indymedia, 
Znet, SchNEWS and many others have reached millions of people with their 
alternative news and analyses of contemporary social reality; they have been 
important technologies for the identity formation of the global `anti-capitalist 
movement' and have helped to create a sense of possibility and the need for a 
struggle of `us' against `them'. 
Yet, despite the political discourse of `us' versus `them', `the movement' is often 
described as an inherently multiple and pluralistic social body. Bircham and 
Charlton's (2001) edited guide to `the movement', for example, makes explicit its 
geographical and cultural diversity as well as its heterogeneity in terms of the 
multiple, sometimes contradictory agendas it seems to encompass. Their guide 
shows that the `anti-capitalist movement' is made up of a number of different 
actors and discourses: anti-corporatism, environment or Green movements, labour 
and union movements, women and feminist movements, student movements, 
anarchists, socialists, anti-GM and organic food movements, anti-war and 
pacifism movements. Whereas Bircham and Chariton's classification of `the 
movement' is organised in terms of its different actors and the social issues that 
are enacted, Callinicos (2003: 67-105) distinguishes between different political 
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orientations of `anti-capitalist movements' and judges them in terms of their 
radicality. For him, there is: (1) reactionary `anti-capitalism' - the nostalgic and 
romantic movement for an idealist, perhaps, organic past; (2) bourgeois `anti- 
capitalism' - the opinion that capitalism is still the most productive (i. e. the best) 
system, which, however, has gone too far in many respects; (3) localist `anti- 
capitalism' - the supporters of a radical reorganisation of trade and the economy 
in order to redirect power towards small-scale communities - this movement often 
organises itself around green issues, supports fair trade and campaigns against the 
power of global corporations; (4) reformist `anti-capitalism' - the liberalist 
assertion that today's global capitalism needs to be strictly controlled by 
international governmental and other democratic organisations; (5) autonomist 
`anti-capitalism' - which organises decentrally and anarchically - it aims to obey 
and actively fight against any central or hierarchical control; and (6) socialist 
`anti-capitalism' - which organises itself around some traditional Marxist (or even 
Stalinist or Maoist) conceptions of struggle to bring about change by 
revolutionising the working class. While Callinicos' categorisation of different 
strands of `anti-capitalist movements' can be contested on various grounds, it is, 
perhaps, still a good starting point to show that this `movement' is anything but 
singular; instead, it is plural, multiple and ridden with antagonisms. 
The multiplicity of `the movement' is especially apparent in the numerous social 
fora that have been set up recently. The social forum movement, which is 
sometimes referred to as `the movement of movements' was started when in 2001 
the first World Social Forum (WSF) took place in Porto Alegre, Brazil, to 
coincide with, and form an opposition to, the World Economic Forum (WEF). 
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The WEF is an annual meeting of leaders from the world of politics, global 
business, science and culture that has taken place in Davos, Switzerland, for the 
past three decades. 36 The explicit aim of the WSF organisers was to establish a 
counter-forum that would give voice to those social groups and organisations that 
are not represented by the hegemonic discourse of the WEF. Yet, the general aim 
of that forum was not only to oppose the WEF, but to generally launch a new 
stage of global resistance and "offer specific proposals, to seek concrete responses 
to the challenges of building `another world"' (Whitaker, 2002). In other words, 
the WSF was set up to simultaneously build on the growing protest movements 
and offer affirmative alternatives to today's hegemony of `neo-liberal' capitalism. 
Since the first WSF in 2001, the forum has taken place twice more, both times 
also in Brazil. In order to further internationalise `the movement' and represent its 
global multiplicity, the fourth WSF will take place in Mumbai, India, in January 
2004. 
One of the main outcomes of the second WSF was the call for the setup of local 
social fora around the world. Since then social fora have been created in many 
cities, regions and countries around the world. For example, in November 2002 
the first European Social Forum (ESF) took place in Florence, Italy. Up to sixty 
thousand people (Khalfa, 2002) gathered in numerous workshops, seminars and 
conferences to discuss strategies of opposition and civil disobedience against 
`neo-liberal' globalisation agendas and a European order based on corporate 
power. However, they were also at the ESF to explore alternative ways of 
36 For more details about the origins of the World Social Forum and its oppositions to the World 
Economic Forum, see www. forumsocialmundial. org. br and Teivainen (2003). 
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organising `the social'. Rather than a traditional representative space, the ESF sees 
itself as a dialogical space for a great variety of movements. Social fora, it is 
claimed, are not political coalitions "in the traditional sense of various 
organizations building an alliance for some pre-given common aim". Instead, 
according to the London Social Forum organisers, social fora "are organizational 
devices that continuously redefine their aims. The people participating are open to 
learn from each other, to recognize and respect each other, and to put aside 
disagreements over political/ideological lines". 37 In other words, social fora are 
not thought of as political spaces which legitimise themselves through a series of 
traditional representative and organisational criteria. Instead, their organisers 
stress the openness and multiplicity of aims: social fora are thought of as 
movements, or as gathering points of movements, rather than traditional 
representative spaces such as political parties. In fact, political parties are 
explicitly not allowed to take part in social fora, because of the fear of their 
contamination with the agendas of traditional party politics (Teivainen, 2003). 
The point which is clearly visible in the discourse of the `anti-capitalist 
movement', then, is the emphasis on organisational multiplicity, which cannot and 
should not be represented or infiltrated by traditional political spaces, such as 
political parties. Commentators on the protests in Seattle, Genoa, Prague and the 
other places of recent `anti-capitalist' activities, as well as the organisers of these 
events themselves, are always keen to point to the diversity of action groups 
present at these protests: trade unions, community movements, international 
solidarity organisations, organisations working against social exclusion, human 
37 Quoted from www. Iondonsocialforum. org/about-why, htm. 
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rights organisations, organisations of environmentalists and ecologists, farmers' 
organisations, economic networks offering social solidarity, youth organisations, 
migrant organisations, cultural networks, feminist networks, networks of 
researchers and lecturers. 38 The Florence ESF, for example, specifically 
highlighted its "respect for diversity"39 and indeed the different, often opposing 
agendas of the groups present at the ESF were clearly felt. 40 The image of the ESF 
was one of a melting pot of multiple, rhizomatic `grassroots' movements that 
temporarily come together for an ephemeral event. This fits, then, the rhetoric of 
`grassroots' movements discussed in the previous section. Indeed, the 'anti- 
capitalist movement' is sometimes described as a rhizomatic and nomadic 
network (e. g. I. Munro, 2001; Wood, 2003). 
As I showed in my `montage' (Böhm, 2001) of the London Mayday 
demonstrations in 2001, `anti-capitalist' protests are temporary events. One of the 
aims of the paper was to show how a diverse range of `anti-capitalist movements' 
can come together in a temporary arrangement and collection of forces to gain 
maximum strength on a particular protest day. According to Blaug (1998), it is 
this temporary, ephemeral arrangement of rhizomatic movements that is seen as 
being dangerous by the established political system, because there are no 
hierarchical structures nor any leaders with whom one can rationally negotiate. 
These protest actions are designed to disrupt, disobey and express anger, which 
38 These are the type of organisations and groups that the organising committee of the second 
European Social Forum in Paris plans to address (see the French Mobilisation Committee's 
`Proposal to create a European organisational structure' posted to 
http: //lists. mobilise. org. uk/old-archives/esf-uk-info). 
Quoted from the Call of the European Social Movements, 12 November 2002, http: //www. fse- 
esf. org. 
238 
5. Repositioning Organisation: Impossibilities of `The Movement' 
often, as in the 2001 Mayday protests in London, as well as many other `anti- 
capitalist' protests, leads to violent clashes with the police. Perhaps one can say 
that precisely because of the lack of common goals, leaders and unified decision- 
making structures amongst the protesters traditional, `democratic' means of 
conflict resolution, such as dialogue and negotiation, cannot be applied by the 
state, which means that it has to exercise its monopoly of violence. Without 
attempting to discuss the question of violence in any more detail, the question, 
however, that emerged out of my discussion in the previous sections is whether 
such a temporary, rhizomatic protest event can be regarded as being the most 
effective resistance against `Empire', especially if we follow Hardt and Negri's 
view that `Empire' is always already rhizomatic in nature. The question is, then, 
whether the `anti-capitalist movement' needs to institutionalise itself more in 
order to be effective in its resistance against the contemporary hegemony of 
global capital. It is this question to which I will now turn in the final section of 
this chapter. 
The Impossible Event of Repositioning 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, for Laclau and Mouffe, society is an inherently 
open space (1985: 95); they refer to society as an impossibility (1985: 114). This 
inherent openness of society makes it possible to align `the political' not only with 
what is usually regarded as politics, i. e. parliamentary democracy or party politics, 
but indeed with a wide range of multiple or plural `identity politics' that occur on 
many different levels and in many different places of society. In such a view, then, 
40 I participated in the first European Social Forum, which took place in Florence, Italy, between 
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politics is inherently undecidable as it faces a multiplicity of possibilities. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, however, this undecidability requires a decision to establish 
links, or, what they call, `chains of equivalence', between a range of different 
social actors in order to represent `the social'. It is this decision that describes 
their event of hegemonic politics; this can be related to Hardt and Negri's call for 
the construction of a place in the `non-place' of `Empire'. In my view, it is this 
decision, this event, which describes the possibility of the `anti-capitalist 
movement'. According to Laclau and Mouffe, 
it is clear.. . that a left alternative can only consist of the construction of a different system 
of equivalents, which establishes social division on a new basis. In the face of the project 
for the reconstruction of a hierarchic society, the alternative of the Left should consist of 
locating itself fully in the field of the democratic revolution and expanding the chains of 
equivalents between the different struggles against oppression. The task of the Left 
therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen 
and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy. (1985: 176, emphasis 
removed) 
Following Laclau and Mouffe, one could say that the question the `anti-capitalist 
movement' faces is not whether to institutionalise itself or not. Instead, the 
question is how to institutionalise `the movement' in order to work towards a 
different institutionalisation of society itself. According to them, this is the 
radicalisation of the liberal-democratic view which maintains that society needs to 
be institutionally organised and represented on a political level. The difference 
between this position and the views of liberalists in organisation theory, which I 
discussed above, is that Laclau and Mouffe try to lay the theoretical ground that 
enables the imagination of a radically different social organisation. This is to say 
that they do not base their hopes on a bureaucratic ethos that has produced the 
the 6 `h and I0`h of November 2002. 
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current political system, but indeed strive for the possibility of organising `the 
social' differently, for institutionalising modern life in a different way. In their 
view, institutionalisation has to go through, what they call, the `logic of 
difference' (1985: 129). This logic sees the question of `the social' and `the 
political' as inherently open, and does not share the liberalist idea that society can 
be fully represented within given political structures. In this sense, then, the 
possibility of the `anti-capitalist movement' could be seen in its task to embrace 
the `logic of difference' and construct a `new place' for `the social' and `the 
political'. When I say that this is the possibility, then I imply that there is no 
inevitability that the `anti-capitalist movement' will, indeed, be able to fulfil its 
promises. As I argued above, resistance requires organisation and not all 
resistances are equally effective. 
One of the tasks of `theory', in my view, is to analyse how resistance is organised 
and how effective the strategies and tactics employed are. This is why it is not 
enough to produce books such as Klein's No Logo, which is sometimes celebrated 
for its `journalistic' style and `practical' reviews of resistance strategies (e. g. 
Parker, 2002c). What `theory' can contribute is not only an analysis of the 
effectiveness of resistance strategies and an evaluation of the organisational 
means and political ends of social movements but also a questioning of the 
concepts and assumptions that underpin the practices of resistance movements 
(Böhm, 2002). `What is politics? '; `What is a political event? '; `What is society? ' 
- These and other broad questions were at the heart of my theoretical explorations 
of Chapter Two. Although one might never be able to get definite answers to these 
questions, in my view their explorations are nevertheless important for the 
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analysis of social struggles the way they are manifested, for example, by the 'anti- 
capitalist movement'. Let me, then, expand my analysis of the `anti-capitalist 
movement' and evaluate whether it has yet been able to turn itself into a political 
subject that can embrace the possibilities described above. 
As I discussed above, the `anti-capitalist movement' is often described as a 
multiplicity that incorporates a diverse range of groups that articulate different, 
sometimes contradictory, demands. In this sense one can hardly talk about `the 
movement' as an homogeneity; instead, it works along the `logic of difference'. 
As Callincos (2003) and others have shown, there are many `anti-capitalisms'. 
This coincides with Laclau and Mouffe's view that society is not a fixed entity but 
an impossibility that is characterised by multiple sites of antagonistic struggles. 
The struggle against capitalism can thus not be reduced to one politics; instead, 
there are many political struggles that are immanent to the `anti-capitalist 
movement'. This multiplicity or articulation of difference is of importance to 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 179), as it moves us away from the traditional view that 
politics is only about, for example, workers' emancipation or political 
programmes of the `left' or the `right'. According to them, there is no unity of the 
`left' or the `right'. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe maintain that social struggles are 
inherently multiple, diverse and plural and cannot, therefore, be represented by 
singular programmes. This insight is of importance here, as it lets us understand 
`the movement' as something that is not unified or something that follows a strict 
programme. It is, rather, a multiplicity, which coincides with Hardt and Negri's 
(2000) understanding of the network character of the `multitude'. In their view, 
the potential strength of the `multitude' - which we have to remember to 
be a 
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concept rather than an empirical category - is that it continuously seeks to enlarge 
its networks, to increase its diversity, to include as many people, groups and 
movements as possible. In Klein's language, the "key to this process is developing 
a political discourse that is not afraid of diversity, that does not try to cram every 
political movement into a single model" (2002: 245). For Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985: 179), this understanding of the multiplicity of struggle is of importance as 
it enables the embracing of the `logic of difference', which maintains that the 
traditional places of political representation - such as the Houses of Parliament - 
should be decentred and that politics should be seen as being inherently open and 
undecidable. However, how multiple and open is the `anti-capitalist movement'? 
Crossley (2003) critiques the social movements literature for having a "distinctly 
Western and national bias" (2003: 302). In his view, what is unique and `new' 
about the `anti-capitalist movement' is that it is not only centred in Western cities 
and university campuses but indeed includes a diverse range of Third World 
movements, such as the Zapatistas in Mexico or the movement of landless 
peasants in Brazil. While it is certainly true that the `anti-capitalist movement' is 
not only a First World movement, and clearly has global ambitions, one also 
needs to acknowledge that many `anti-capitalist' protest actions and social fora are 
still mainly comprised of Western-white-middle-class-type activists and social 
critics. The first European Social Forum (ESF) in Florence, for example, was 
clearly dominated by Italian movements, and Italian national politics featured 
strongly. In my view, the ESF still has to go a long way to be truly inclusive and 
needs to expand its networks beyond its traditional strongholds, which seem to be 
centred in countries such as Italy and France. What about Eastern Europe, for 
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example? In Florence only a handful of people were present from the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. What about immigrants? I saw few different 
colours in Florence. This is also what Khalfa (2002) notes: "Even though the 
subjects of exclusion and immigration were discussed in the conference and the 
seminars, there were still.. . too 
few immigrants present". Hardt (2002) makes a 
similar point in his response to the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre in 
January 2002. In his view `the movement' is not yet global enough. For example, 
there were very few faces from Asia and Africa in Porto Alegre. Furthermore, 
Hardt maintains that the voices who dominated large aspects of the WSF's agenda 
(e. g. The French leadership of ATTAC, for example) were actually arguing for the 
strengthening of national institutions which would be, in their view, a viable 
response to globalisation and the erosion of national socio-economic politics. In 
Hardt's view, this is a dangerous position to hold, as national interests would 
always interfere with the need to continuously broaden the network of global 
resistance against `Empire', in terms of geography and diversity. Negri (2003), 
too, makes quite clear that the response to `Empire' should not be a call for the 
return to national politics, that is, the politics of national states and their 
bureaucracies. As I discussed in relation to liberalist thought, such a move can be 
regarded as a limitation of the diversity and multiplicity of `the political'. 
Having said that, one point of critique, which has been advanced at Hardt and 
Negri is that they do not sufficiently acknowledge the powerful resistance that can 
be produced by `traditional' representational politics, at the level of the party and 
the nation. Mertens (2002), for example, maintains that resistance is not only 
practiced on the level of `grassroots' networks. In his view, `old-style' party and 
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national politics can still be important in the struggle against `neo-liberal' 
formations of power. He points out, for example, that the 2002 WSF could have 
never taken place without the regional municipal government in Porto Alegre (led 
by the PT party, which has recently won the national elections in Brazil). Equally, 
one could add that the Florence ESF would not have been possible without the 
generous financial and organisational support of the mayor of Florence and the 
regional government. Thus, the fact that the ESF was as well organised as it was, 
must be mainly attributed to the efforts of local party politics, 41 which Hardt and 
Negri often seem to dismiss when they talk about the `multitude'. 
In this light, one could see the exclusion of political parties from social fora as 
also being a limitation of the political potential of `the movement'. As Teivainen 
(2003) points out, this policy of exclusion seems rather hypocritical given that 
political parties and regional governments clearly seem to be involved in the 
organisation and finance of social fora. Yet, this policy also raises some important 
theoretical questions. As Laclau and Mouffe make clear, one should not see the 
state as 
a homogeneous medium, separated from civil society by a ditch, but an uneven set of 
branches and functions, only relatively integrated by the hegemonic practices which take 
place within it. Above all, it should not be forgotten that the state can be the seat of 
numerous democratic antagonisms, to the extent that a set of functions within it... can enter 
into relations of antagonism with centres of power, within the state itself, which seek to 
restrict and deform them. (1985: 180) 
What they paint, then, is a picture of the state which is, just as civil society, ridden 
with antagonisms. That is, the state is not a homogeneity but something that is 
The city of Florence provided, for example, the forum's conference locations for free, helped 
with translations as well as provided free temporary accommodation. 
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comprised of multiple politics. The simple exclusion of political parties, which are 
seen to be too close to established hegemonic agendas of the state, could therefore 
be a limitation of the political possibilities of social fora and `the movement' in 
general. This is particularly true if one takes into account that it is often traditional 
labour parties that are being excluded. The lack of presence of labour movements 
and the non-representation of their agendas was clearly felt at the Florence ESF. 
This inability of social fora to become truly inclusive, and go beyond their history 
of being gathering spaces for `grassroots' movements, could again be seen as a 
serious limitation of their politics. Although Crossley (2003: 300) argues that the 
`anti-capitalist movement' could be seen as going beyond the traditional split 
between so-called `old' and `new' social movements - that is, it finds itself 
between socialist/labour movements and new `grassroots' movements - one also 
needs to acknowledge that `the movement' has so far failed to truly connect to 
more traditional labour resistances (Watson, 2003). 
This lack of inclusivity, which was clearly apparent at the 2002 ESF in Florence, 
can partly be explained by the fact that the seminars and conferences held at the 
ESF were dominated by relatively few organisations. First, there was ATTAC 
(although one should note that ATTAC is not a homogeneous organisation but, 
rather, a network of relatively independent regional groups which often have 
much more radical views and agendas than the French leadership, which seems to 
have much more traditional political ambitions). Second, there was the `hidden' 
Italian organisational committee, which seemed to dominate the agenda of the 
forum without any sense of transparency in their decisions. This leads Treanor 
(2002) to name the organisation of the Florence ESF as an exclusive, semi- 
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democratic, hidden process that was dominated by local and national political 
power-plays, rather than a truly enlarging pan-European movement. He claims 
that "the `organising meetings' for the ESF in other countries were unreal, they 
had nothing to say about its structure. The organising committees in Italy made all 
the major decisions about the ESF - about who to exclude, about censorship, and 
about co-operation with the sponsors, acceptance of their conditions, about the 
structure of the ESF, and its agenda" (2002). This leads Treanor to call for the 
abolition of the ESF, as it has, and he shows this too, financial links to business 
and governments and is, according to him, generally an undemocratic movement. 
Currently there are efforts under way to organise the second ESF, which will take 
place in Paris/Saint-Denis in November 2003. To prepare this event several 
meetings have taken place in Paris, Brussels, Berlin and Genoa. These meetings 
have been advertised on various email lists and could be attended by anyone. 
There is clearly an attempt to be open about the organisation of these preparatory 
meetings and the ESF in general. What has been discussed at these meetings is, 
for example, the `Proposal to Create a European Organisational Structure'. As a 
result, one could say that there are efforts on the way to broaden the reach of `the 
movement' and to build its organisational structure on a more democratic and 
inclusive fundament. Yet, so far - and here I would agree with the points made by 
Treanor discussed above - little has actually been achieved in that direction. The 
ESF organisation currently lacks an open, democratic and transparent process that 
is fully inclusive and encourages participation from all spheres of society. I am 
currently involved in organising a workshop for the 2003 ESF in Paris. It has been 
an uphill struggle to find out exactly how one can get involved. The whole 
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question of how the ESF is organised and who is in charge of anything remains 
largely mysterious. This is especially embarrassing if one considers that the ESF 
is meant to reopen the question of `the political' and make the democratic process 
more transparent and relevant to the pressing issues of our times. There is an 
urgent need to make the organisation of the ESF more inclusive and invite a 
diverse range of groups, movements and organisations to take part in it. At the 
moment it seems that the ESF is organised by a somewhat hidden network of 
individuals and groups; one can only speculate about who the powerful voices that 
seem to decide on the main organisational issues and the strategic and political 
directions are. Having said that, one does not have to be as pessimistic as Treanor 
and call for the abolition of the ESF; this would be a purely negative move that 
would not engage with the process productively. In contrast, and this is what I am 
attempting to practice with this chapter, the task is to positively influence this 
process of mobilisation and organisation of the ESF and `the movement' in 
general. 
However, the call for an ever increasing multiplicity and inclusivity of the ESF 
and `the movement' should not be an end in itself. According to Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), the `logic of difference', that is, the realisation that `the social' is 
an inherent multiplicity or impossibility, can only be one aspect of the political 
event (see also Laclau, 1990: 90-91). As I discussed in the previous sections, 
Laclau and Mouffe also highlight that a politics that aims to challenge a 
hegemonic positioning or emplacement of society needs to simplify the field of 
difference and establish a `logic of equivalence' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 130), 
a logic of `us' against `them'. Whereas the `logic of difference' points to the 
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fundamentally antagonistic reality of society, the `logic of equivalence' gives 
presence to some of these antagonisms in order to politically act upon them. The 
`logic of equivalence' points to an event in which groups that "we thought in 
objective contradiction to one another... [are] suddenly able to work together" 
(Hardt, 2002: 117). In Hardt and Negri's view, it is in such an event that the 
`multitude' becomes a political subject that can potentially constitute and 
institutionalise a new society. For Laclau and Mouffe, it is of utmost importance 
that politics is not only about `micro-political' strategies of resistance on the level 
of difference. Instead, "the strengthening of specific democratic struggles 
requires ... the expansion of 
`chains of equivalence' which extend to other 
struggles. The equivalential articulation between anti-racism, anti-sexism and 
anti-capitalism, for example, requires a hegemonic construction which, in certain 
circumstances, may be the condition for the consolidation of each one of these 
struggles" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 182). This logic of a `hegemonic 
construction' between different struggles implies a process of institutionalisation 
that can forge some of the multiple demands of social movements into a political 
agenda. 
Translated to the problematic of `the movement', one could therefore say that its 
task cannot only be seen in becoming more multiple and including ever more 
social actors but also in turning itself into an actionable political subject that can 
emplace and defend some specific `principled positions' (Squires, 1993). In my 
view, `the movement' has only just started this institutionalisation process. One of 
the first moments that offered a glimpse of the political power of `the movement' 
was when the 2002 ESF called for a day of global protest against the then looming 
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war in Iraq on the 15th of February 2003. This call for a particular protest day led 
to coordinated actions across the world - it is said that up to 15 million people 
took part in these protests on that day alone. According to Watson, with this 
particular day of protest the ESF had become more than simply a `talking shop', 
as he calls it (2003: 145). It had become a constitutive space able to engage in 
concrete political actions: "The ESF was the driving force behind the largest ever 
mobilisation against war in history. The 15`h of February 2003 will be recorded as 
the first co-ordinated day of global political protest; the results of which are 
immeasurable" (2003: 141). One could say that it was this specific event which 
provided a glimpse of the organisational and political possibilities of `the 
movement'. On that day it reached out, not only to `grassroots' movements, but 
indeed to the `anti-war movement', labour movements, political parties and 
`ordinary people' to protest against a specific issue, the war against Iraq. 
After that day of protests some groups attempted to maintain and institutionalise 
this newly found unity. According to Watson (2003: 143), there was a call for 
establishing `peoples assemblies' on local and national levels in the UK, in order 
to build permanent links between the groups, organisations and movements 
present at the anti-war demonstration. Yet, this event of opportunity to broaden 
`the movement' and somewhat institutionalise itself into a political subject was 
missed. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), it is exactly this building of 
`chains of equivalence' between different political demands, which would have 
worked towards a hegemonic event of politics, enabling the constitution of a 
different social organisation. In Laclau's view, this could have made a production 
of new societal values possible; as he writes: 
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For the very emergence of highly particularistic identities means that the particular groups 
will have to coexist with other groups in larger communities, and this coexistence will be 
impossible without the assertion of values that transcend the identities of all of them. The 
defence, for instance, of the right of national minorities to self-determination involves the 
assertion of a universal principle grounded in universal values. These are not the values of a 
`universal' group, as was the case with the universalism of the past but, rather, of a 
universality that is the very result of particularism. (1994: 5) 
The event in which a new universal value becomes possible cannot, according to 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 185), be seen as a strictly `political' event. Instead, it is 
an event in which the production of life and society themselves are under 
consideration and a new hegemony of social organisation becomes possible. This 
event, then, "is the terrain of the.. . anti-capitalist struggle" 
(ibid. ). As my analysis 
has attempted to show, `the movement' has started to engender this terrain, but it 
seems that it has still to fully embrace the possibilities of constituting a different, 
repositioned social organisation. To be clear, such a constitution of a new social 
hegemony can never finalise society; `the social' will always be an organisational 
and political impossibility, as Laclau and Mouffe highlight. Yet, what I have tried 
to argue throughout this thesis is that it is indeed precisely this notion of 
impossibility that makes different organisational and political positions possible. 
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6. In-Conclusions: Hopeful Failures 
I began this thesis by painting an image of a passage, a passage that was inspired 
by Benjamin's Passagen- Werk, or Arcades Project. To bring this thesis to a close, 
let us return to this image of a passage. As I discussed in the Preface, the Arcades 
Project was Benjamin's life project; it assumes a special place in his life as well 
as in his intellectual work. It was not only a close engagement with the Parisian 
arcade, or in German Passage, but also symbolises Benjamin's own life journey. 
For over fifteen years Benjamin worked on this project. Originally conceived as a 
fifty-page essay, it turned into a `monstrous' collection of thousands of quotations 
that aimed for nothing less than presenting a history of modernity. However, 
Benjamin failed to finish the Arcades Project. It was cut short by his death. He 
committed suicide while fleeing from the Nazis in 1940. On his passage to 
America he is said to have carried with him a manuscript of the Arcades Project, 
presumably to save it from the Nazis and have it published by the Frankfurt 
School, based in New York at the time of war. Yet, the Passagen-Werk never 
made it to New York. Its passage was interrupted by the events in Portbou on the 
night of the 25th of September 1940; it accompanied Benjamin on his passage 
from life to death. While the Arcades Project might symbolise Benjamin's death, 
it has outlived its author and inspired many readers and writers, like myself, since 
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it became available in German in the mid-1980s and in English in 1999.1 first 
came across Benjamin while reading John Berger's Ways of Seeing in 1998. 
Benjamin's thought, particularly his Arcades Project, has accompanied the 
`passage' of this thesis ever since that first encounter. 
As I discussed in the Preface as well as in Chapters Two and Three, the Arcades 
Project is significant not only because of its interest in the architecture, or space, 
of the arcade. Rather, Benjamin was fascinated by the arcade because its specific 
spatiality signified a particular time, a new time. For him, the emergence of the 
arcade marked the passage into modernity, a passage that was particularly 
characterised by the rise of the commodity. Benjamin saw the arcade as `a world 
in miniature' (AP, 31) and the commodity, which was on display in the arcade, 
was becoming an increasingly important feature of that world. For Benjamin, one 
could say, the Parisian arcade was a historical event that changed the way time 
and space are ordered. In Heidegger's language, the arcade was a particular 
technical apparatus that changed the way the world is emplaced or positioned; it 
was a `worlding' event in the sense that it marked a passage into a new 
emplacement of society. Part of that emplacement was the production of particular 
subjectivities, like those of the fläneur and the prostitute. As I discussed in 
Chapter Three, these subjectivities can only be thought of in relation to the 
particular `goings-on' of the commodity, which `intoxicates' the subject. The 
commodity-world of the arcade puts the subject to sleep, as Benjamin would have 
it (AP, 389). For Benjamin, capitalist modernity is a `dream-time', a 
`phantasmagoria'. 
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Now, Benjamin hoped that his Arcades Project would help to awaken the 
`sleeping collectivity' of modernity. To achieve this he did not write a narrative, 
or even a manifesto, which would instruct the reader. Instead, he collected 
thousands of quotations and arranged them in such a way that meaning could 
spring out between the lines of text. He referred to this `method' as `montage'. As 
I discussed in the Preface and Chapter Two, a montage has to be understood as 
`destruction'. A destructive montage is not a `method' in the traditional sense; the 
point is not to `positively' reproduce an outcome in a predictable manner. Instead, 
it is a movement that aims to be constructive by way of destructing established 
traditions, histories and meanings. The montage of the Arcades Project aims to 
discontinue established historical narratives by way of destructing text: passages 
of text are taken out of their original context. Instead of providing a textual 
narrative, Benjamin says that he `merely shows' quotations and `makes use of 
them': 
Method of this project: literary montage. I needn't say anything. Merely show. I shall 
purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the refuse - these 
I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: by making 
use of them. (BGS V. 1,574; AP, 460, emphasis in original) 
To quote means to separate the `con' from the `text'. This is the death of the text 
as context, as a homogeneous and organised whole. To quote means to anatomise 
the body of text - it depositions or cuts a passage of text from its original context. 
As Benjamin says: "Quotations in my work are like wayside robbers who leap 
out, armed, and relieve the idle stroller of his [sic] conviction" (OWS, 481). Yet, 
according to Benjamin, this killing of text is the only way to redeem it, to save it 
from the linearity of history and make it available, as a dead fragment, to a project 
of re-reading and repositioning time. 
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A montage, then, is a response to the history that is always already positively 
constructed and positioned by `those in power' (TPH, 254). Benjamin refers to 
this history as an `eternal image', because it is an image that `eternally returns' to 
the same point, again and again. This history works like a merry-go-round, which 
gives its passengers the illusion of going on a journey, a passage, but it simply 
spins around its own axis. As I discussed in Chapter Three, the Arcades Project 
portrays the commodity as the motor of this merry-go-round: it continuously 
announces change and searches for `newness', but in the end it always returns to 
itself. This is essentially what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) have in mind when 
they refer to capital as a deterritorialisation `machine' that always already 
reterritorialises everything along the well-established lines of commodity 
production. The point of Chapter Three was to explore the particular `goings-on' 
of this continuous process of de- and reterritorialisation, a process which 
reproduces the hegemonic positioning of capital. The Arcades Project aims to 
interrupt this `eternal image' of history; it hopes to bring the merry-go-round to a 
standstill and discontinue its phantasmagorical `machinery'. Its destructive 
montage presents fragments of history that do not amount to a coherent, 
homogenous narrative. Montage is an anti-narrative movement that challenges 
those images of history that are continuously emplaced by dominant forces of 
positioning. It dissects the homogenous body of history and therefore depositions 
it. Yet, what I have emphasised throughout the thesis is that such a destructive 
movement is not simply negative. Instead, it aims to be affirmative by seeing 
those historical images that have been forgotten or marginalised (BGS 1.3,1236). 
Benjamin hopes that the fragments of historical images presented in the Arcades 
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Project will illuminate the reader and enable certain re-cognitions and new 
experiences of reality. He refers to these illuminations as `flashes of knowledge' 
(AP, 462). As I discussed in Chapter Two, such a flash must be understood as a 
`dialectical image', an event, an Augenblick, which discontinues and destructs the 
continuity of the `eternal image' of history and enables new histories to emerge. 
Benjamin's Arcades Project or Passagen-Werk, then, aims to unsettle taken-for- 
granted emplacements of history. He questions the seemingly secure positioning 
of the Parisian arcades by constructing a montage of text that points to a passage 
beyond the architectural reality of the 19`h century. One could say, Benjamin 
depositions the emplacement of modern society to reveal its precariousness, 
temporariness and its contested nature. In this thesis I have been inspired by the 
Arcades Project and tried to put today's positioning of organised reality into 
question. This questioning has aimed to show the limits of the contemporary 
emplacement of social organisation and offer ways to imagine passages to a 
`beyond', a different and, perhaps, repositioned social order. This repositioning is 
not a reproduction of the well-established positions of society. Instead, it is an 
exploration of how `the social' can be organised and positioned differently. This 
exploration, however, will always fail to provide final answers - it can never be 
`concluded'. Just like Benjamin could never have finished his life project - in a 
way, he could have continued forever to collect quotations for the Arcades Project 
- one can never stop questioning and exploring possibilities of passages to a 
`beyond'. It is like being a jläneur in Benjamin's text: one passes through the 
quotations and Benjamin's short commentaries and every visit to his textual 
arcade holds the promise of new glimpses. These glimpses are temporary 
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illuminations that provide new experiences, passages to an elsewhere. This thesis, 
then, is, perhaps, nothing more than a temporary illumination that stems from my 
reading of texts such as the Arcades Project. 
This experience of a temporary illumination reminds me of Baudelaire's sonnet 
`A une passante', cited and discussed by Benjamin in `Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire' (BGS, 1.2: 622; CB, 124), one of the few essays that emerged out of 
his work on the Arcades Project: 
Amid the deafening traffic of the town, 
Tall, slender, in deep mourning, with majesty, 
A woman passed, raising, with dignity 
In her poised hand, the flounces of her gown; 
Graceful, noble, with a statue's form. 
And I drank, trembling as a madman thrills, 
From her eyes, ashen sky where brooded storm, 
The softness that fascinates, the pleasure that kills. 
A flash.. . then night! -0 lovely fugitive, I am suddenly reborn from your swift glance; 
Shall I never see you till eternity? 
Somewhere, far off! too late! never, perchance! 
Neither knows where the other goes or lives; 
We might have loved, and you knew this might be! 
Charles Baudelaire was a French poet who lived in 19'x' century Paris. His poem 
collections, The Flowers of Evil and Spleen Paris, were an inspirational source for 
Benjamin's study of the emergence of Parisian modernity and its city-life. For 
Benjamin, Baudelaire is a poet-fldneur who has to come to terms with the 
destruction of traditional poetry and the rise of modernity, which is characterised 
by non-poetic `shocks' of mass city-life: anonymity, commodities, advertising 
images and prostitution. As I discussed in Chapter Three, the fdneur is a modern 
subject that is fully exposed to these `shocks' of modem mass-society. In the 
above poem Baudelaire provides a snapshot of the fldneur's city-life. While 
walking through the streets of Paris, Baudelaire passes by thousands of other 
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people every day. He only `meets' these people for a second: a short glimpse, a 
sudden flash. In this flash of a second everything can happen; this is the hope. 
When passing by a fellow female fldneur, for example, Baudelaire thinks `We 
might have loved'. For one second only, love between two `passer-bys', two 
passengers of modern mass-society, is a real possibility. Yet, the kairotic 
opportunity provided by this short moment, this event, is missed and Baudelaire is 
subsumed again by `the deafening traffic of the town'. 
For Benjamin, Parisian modernity is characterised by these kairotic moments that 
are, however, continuously missed. The commodity, for example, can be seen as a 
`machine' that continuously produces encounters: products on display in the 
arcade seek customers' attention; advertisements flashing in colourful light; and 
prostitutes offering their bodies for `love'. The fläneur, embodied by Baudelaire, 
is in the midst of these `shock' encounters. For Benjamin, the fläneur is part of a 
class that was thoroughly destructed by the modern `shocks' produced by the 
commodity: 
The very fact that their share could at best be enjoyment, but never power, made the period 
which history gave them a space for passing time. Anyone who sets out to while away time 
seeks enjoyment. It was self-evident, however, that the more this class wanted to have its 
enjoyment in this society, the more limited this enjoyment would be. The enjoyment 
promised to be less limited if this class found enjoyment of this society possible. If it 
wanted to achieve virtuosity in this kind of enjoyment, it could not spurn empathizing with 
commodities. It had to enjoy this identification with all the pleasure and the uneasiness 
which derived from a presentiment of its own destiny as a class. Finally, it had to approach 
this destiny with a sensitivity that perceives charm even in damaged and decaying goods. 
(BGS 1.2,561; CR, 59) 
What Benjamin describes in this passage is that the enjoyment experienced by the 
class of the fldneur cannot be disconnected from the commodity. For Benjamin, 
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the passage into modernity is characterised by the commodity becoming a 
`pleasure machine': if one wants to enjoy life, one has to identify with the specific 
`pleasure principle' of the commodity. In Chapters Two and Three I discussed the 
Lacanian notion that this identification with the commodity can be seen as a 
fantasy that has filled the lack of social reality, or the Other. This is to say, the 
commodity assumes the role of the Other; it becomes social reality itself. This is 
essentially what Marx aims to show with his notion of `commodity fetishism'. 
The modem subject fetishises the commodity precisely because the commodity is 
the Other that provides pleasure and enjoyment. In Benjamin's eyes, Baudelaire's 
poetry is an attempt to enjoy the pleasures of modernity: Baudelaire tries to 
perceive charm `even in damaged and decaying goods', as Benjamin writes in the 
above passage. For Benjamin, Baudelaire succeeded `beautifully' in enjoying this 
`damaged and decaying' society, but only "as someone who had already half 
withdrawn from it" (BGS 1.2,561; CB, 59). Benjamin maintains that Baudelaire 
always "remained conscious of the horrible social reality" that surrounded him, 
"but only in a way in which intoxicated people are `still' aware of reality" (ibid. ). 
Baudelaire, then, is a poet who has been `intoxicated' by the `pleasure machine' 
of the commodity and modern mass-society. Marx's point is that this 
`intoxication' is structural; that is, `commodity fetishism' is not a `subjective' 
fantasy. Rather, it is precisely through the `goings-on' of `commodity fetishism' 
that capital continuously emplaces society within the realms of the commodity. In 
Chapter Three I aimed to show that it is this structural fantasy that produces and 
reproduces the hegemony of capital. Pace Laclau and Mouffe (1985), `hegemony' 
points to a certain unity in a specific social discourse. That is, the concept of 
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hegemony highlights the fact that there is something like `society' because it is 
possible to position, emplace and organise `the social' in particular ways. In 
relation to the positioning project of organisation, I argued that management 
describes the particular way organisation and organisation theory has been 
positioned or emplaced in relation to the hegemonic discourses of capital. Capital 
and management are hegemonic because they continuously set organisation into a 
particular place; they `corner' organisation, so to say. What I tried to show in 
Chapter Three is that this `cornering' restricts organisation theory to discourses 
like knowledge management, which are always already positively positioned in 
relation to the particular `pleasure principles' of capital. What I suggested in 
Chapter Three is that the knowledge manager can be seen, perhaps, as today's 
reincarnation of the fläneur. One could argue that, as the subjectivity of the 
fläneur was `cornered' by the specific `goings-on' of 19`h century capital, today's 
knowledge manager is set into the specific emplacement of global knowledge 
capitalism. 
What I aimed to suggest in Chapter Three is that the fläneur and the knowledge 
manager are somewhat intoxicated by the commodity, which perhaps conceals the 
`true' power relations that produce the contemporary hegemony of capital. As 
Benjamin (BGS 1.2,561; CB, 59) suggests, the Parisian class of the fläneur was 
only able to share its enjoyment, but never power. That is, by intoxicating the 
senses of the fldneur with its `pleasure principle' the commodity reproduces the 
hegemonic power of capital. What this hegemonic power of the commodity and 
the intoxication of the modem subject make `impossible' are ways to see the 
inequalities and contradictions that are produced through this hegemonic rule. 
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Equally, what it suppresses are alternative organisational regimes of society that 
might be able emplace `the social' differently. What this thesis has hoped to 
contribute is the discussion of ways of exploring possibilities of a political critique 
of the hegemony of capital and suggesting alternative organisational 
emplacements of society. 
This exploration has been based on Laclau and Mouffe's understanding that a 
hegemonic position can never be final or all-encompassing. While, for them, the 
concept of hegemony refers to a certain unity in particular discursive formations, 
it also points to a contingency of that very unity (1985: 65). This is to say, the 
apparent unity of dominant discourses, such as capital and management, is always 
already subverted by a multiplicity of alternative voices of organisation. Capital 
and management cannot be the final answer to the question of social organisation 
precisely because society will always fail to fully constitute itself. This failure of a 
full constitution of society is described by Laclau in the following passage: 
On the one hand, any political order is a concrete form of organization of the community; 
on the other, it incarnates, against radical disorganization, the principle of order and 
organization as such. Now, if the split between these two dimensions is constitutive, does 
this not mean that no ultimate order of the community is achievable, and that we will only 
have a succession offailed attempts at reaching that impossible aim? Again, this is true in 
one sense, but its consequences are not necessarily negative: because in the case that the 
split could be superseded, this would only mean that society would have reached its true 
order, and that all dissent would thereupon have come to and end. Obviously no social 
division or democratic competition between groups is possible in such conditions, since the 
very condition of democracy is that there is an insurmountable gap between what the social 
groups attempt to achieve and their abilities to succeed in such attempts. It is only if there is 
a plurality of political forces substituting for each other in power - as the attempt to 
hegemonize the very principle of `order' and `organization' - that democracy is possible. 
(Laclau, 1994: 5, emphasis added) 
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For Laclau, then, social organisation is a `succession of failed attempts' at 
reaching its `true order'. He refers to a Lacanian gap, or lack, that is constitutive 
of society, which is to say that social groups will always question the way society 
is organised - they will always deposition established positions of society. This 
notion of a lack points to the idea that a hegemonic emplacement will always be 
contested by different social actors. In this sense, the commodity and management 
are only temporary hegemonic contents that have filled the lack of society with 
their phantasmagoric `pleasure machinery'. What I would like to suggest here is 
that this structural failure of society to ever fully position itself can, perhaps, be 
related to Benjamin's failure in finishing the Arcades Project. Both, the 
positioning project and the Arcades Project, seem to be characterised by a certain 
lack. While the positioning project lacks the ability to fully represent society, 
Benjamin cannot finish the Arcades Project because it is impossible to ever 
achieve a full representation of modem society. The `method' of a montage of 
quotations seems to point to this impossibility. As I mentioned earlier, not only 
was it impossible for Benjamin to finish his collection of quotations, it is also 
impossible to finish reading it. The Arcades Project, then, is always transforming; 
one will always fail to fix its meaning in a definite place. What is important to 
realise is the political significance of this lack, this failure to finish the Arcades 
Project and society itself. This failure points to the inherent openness of `the 
social' and enables multiple ways of reading `the social' differently. 
The depositioning project of organisation, discussed in Chapter Four, engenders 
these possibilities of reading organisation differently. Laclau and Mouffe call this 
the `field of discursivity' or the `logic of difference', which is a `surplus of 
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meaning' that is characteristic of every social formation (1985: 111). This `field of 
discursivity' exists at the margins of society and must be seen as a multiplicity of 
resistances that seek to subvert dominant social discourses from within. It is this 
`logic of difference' which renders a full constitution of society impossible; that 
is, there is a certain failure at the heart of `the social'. This implies that society is 
fundamentally antagonistic; it is continuously contested. For Laclau and Mouffe, 
society can never be fully represented, that is, made transparent. In this sense, 
society and history can never end, although the possibility of such a `happy 
ending' has been suggested recently (Fukuyama, 1992). As much as proponents of 
capitalism and the liberal-democratic consensus want everybody to believe that 
history has come to an end and that all ideological struggles are relics of the past, 
we need to insist on the impossibility of such a `happy end'. Such an `end' is an 
illusion; all attempts to finalise `the social' will fail from the outset. According to 
Laclau and Mouffe, however, precisely this failure to finalise society is society's 
very hope. Their concept of impossibility renders any hegemonic social formation 
contingent; that is, an emplacement of `the social' can never be final and all- 
encompassing. This, then, opens up a gap that creates possibilities for political 
intervention and resistance. 
This is perhaps what Benjamin's quotations in the Arcades Project try to achieve. 
By cutting up texts, Benjamin subverts the established order of existing narratives 
and discourses of reality. What becomes important, however, is how the 
quotations are positioned in relation to each other; as Benjamin writes, "What is 
decisive is knowing the art of setting them" (AP, 473). This positioning of 
quotations, then, becomes a `minor' art form, to use a DeleuzoGuattarian (1986) 
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expression. Benjamin creates a different language by cutting up `major' languages 
and enabling the reader to read between the lines. This can be illustrated by 
showing how `Passage', a short essay on the Parisian arcades, ends with the 
contemplation of a "triumphal gate that, gray and glorious, was built in the honor 
of Louis the Great. Carved in relief on the pyramids that decorate its columns are 
lions at rest, weapons hanging, and dusky trophies" (AP, 871). What Benjamin 
does here is position images of the arcades next to the triumphal war architecture 
of the seventeenth century, which stands as a ruin in the middle of Paris. With this 
cunning historical positioning he destructs the contemporary `beauty' of the 
arcades and portrays them as today's triumphal architectures that will one day be 
ruins too. This cunning move, this `alarm clock', so he hopes, will awaken the 
`sleeping collectivity' that takes the arcades and their positioning within Parisian 
modernity for granted: 
We construct here an alarm clock that rouses the kitsch of the previous century to 
`assembly'. This genuine liberation from an epoch has the structure of awakening in the 
following respect as well: it is entirely ruled by cunning. For awakening operates with 
cunning. Only with cunning, not without it, can we work free of the realm of dream. (AP, 
883) 
What is therefore needed, according to Benjamin, is a cunning assembly or 
positioning that is able to destruct or deposition the narrative reality of today's 
world. `Cunning' is a word that can be translated into German as List, which also 
means knowledge, not in the sense of a representation or thing-in-itself, but in the 
sense of a particular skill, an artistic technique of hunting and war. Cunning 
knowledge is not the knowledge that counts in the realms of `the major' and the 
powerful: the king, the academy, the property owner. `Cunning' is practiced by 
`minorities', by those who live on the fringes and who have to make a living away 
from the well trodden paths of society. It is a knowledge that is practiced 
by 
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nomads, gypsies, hunters, partisans, clowns and other `outsiders' who do not fit 
into the normal `goings-on' of ordered society. Cunning is a knowledge that 
disrupts and depositions `normal' knowledge. 
"Knowledge comes only in lightening flashes" (AP, 462). This is how Benjamin 
describes the experience of reading the Arcades Project, which, one could say, 
can never provide a narrative of knowledge or a `major' language. All it can offer 
is the possibility of some `lightening flashes'. These flashes simultaneously 
illuminate and blind us. In the twilight zone of the flash, between seeing and not 
seeing, knowing and not knowing, it is undecidable whether one has been 
illuminated or not. As I discussed, particularly in Chapter Four, this notion of 
undecidability points to the depositioning of objects of reality that are usually 
taken for granted. What I termed the depositioning project in organisation theory 
questions the basic presence of any positions of organisation; it puts into doubt 
and resists the reality of organisation that is continuously produced by `major 
languages' or hegemonic discourses of society. To point to the undecidability of 
organised reality is thus a political resistance against those objects of reality that 
seem firmly positioned and emplaced. The depositioning project highlights the 
precariousness of any form of organisation and points to the fact that any 
positively positioned object of organisation is dependent on a negative process of 
disorganisation. In relation to the Arcades Project one could say that Benjamin 
reveals the precariousness of the `triumphal' presence of 19`h century Parisian 
arcades. When he pictures the arcade as a future ruin he depositions its positivity 
and envisages its destruction. 
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As I discussed in Chapter Two, however, this destruction should not be seen as 
the eradication of an object; Benjamin does not simply want to do away with or 
destroy the arcades. Instead, it is a dialectical negation of the presence of the 
arcades. Dialectical destruction is interested in questioning the presence of an 
object and exposing its limits; a process that tries to explore passages beyond that 
very object and thereby transform it. Destructing the presence of organised reality 
requires the analysis of the concrete modes of power and knowledge which 
produce that reality. This is to say, the dialectical process is interested in analysing 
specific modes of production and domination, "in order to maintain a grasp on 
the... organization, which is to be transformed effectively" (Derrida, 1987: 71). 
There is thus a question of the effectiveness of depositioning established realities 
of organisation. That is, not all depositionings are equally effective in achieving 
the aim of transforming existing modes of production. This is, perhaps, what 
Benjamin points to when he writes in the Arcades Project that it is decisive for a 
dialectician to know the art of setting or positioning concepts (AP, 473). The 
concern I expressed in Chapter Four was that many depositioning discourses, 
within the realms of organisation theory, fail to maintain a grasp on the concrete 
modes of production of organisation which they seek to transform. For example, 
the failure of many depositioning discourses to engage with the `goings-on' of 
capital prevents them from analysing, critiquing and resisting those hegemonic 
discourses that always already shape today's organisational realities. Capital and 
the commodity, it seems, have been relegated to the back seat of many 
depositioning discourses in organisation theory. My concern in Chapter Four was 
that this failure to engage with the `goings-on' of capital, and other hegemonic 
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discourses, has restricted the effectiveness of the depositioning project and has 
thus had certain depoliticising effects. 
A project of repositioning organisation aims to go beyond the restrictions of the 
depositioning discourses. While the depositioning project is primarily about 
showing the undecidability of all organised phenomena, the repositioning project 
is based on the understanding that the notion of undecidability also enables 
decisions to be made about how to organise society. Pace Derrida, Laclau argues 
that society is characterised by a certain `structural undecidability' (1995: 93). 
Yet, it is precisely this undecidability, he argues, that enables social decisions 
about how society should be constituted and positioned. One could say that, in his 
view, society is not only about the limitless play of undecidable differences but 
also about the limitation of that play. What I tried to show in Chapter Two is that 
it is this decision about how to limit society which describes the political event. 
Laclau's understanding of the concept of undecidability, then, can be seen as a 
call for political decisions about how to constitute and order society. The point of 
Chapter Four was to suggest that many depositioning discourses in organisation 
theory seem ill-prepared to conceptualise the political event as something that is 
able to position society itself. Rather than connecting the concept of 
undecidability to questions of societal organisation, depositioning discourses often 
highlight local, community-based processes of reality construction and `micro- 
political' resistances. I argued that, while these resistances have been important 
for showing the precariousness of processes of organising, they have failed to 
engage effectively with those positions and emplacements of society that traverse 
local boundaries of space and time. 
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In Chapter Five I therefore discussed discourses that are explicitly concerned with 
exploring possibilities of positioning society differently. The `anti-capitalist 
movement', I argued, is not only interested in showing the local contingencies of 
social reality, but presses for political decisions that can renew and reposition 
society itself, by way of organising multiple forms of protest actions and social 
fora. This necessitates a critical engagement with the `goings-on' of today's 
global capitalism and the `neo-liberal' consensus that seems to characterise many 
political fronts. The `anti-capitalist movement', then, does not only organise 
`micro-political' resistances in local communities, but explicitly resists today's 
hegemonic forces, which seem to `corner' and emplace social organisation on a 
global basis. As I argued in Chapter Five, this resistance seeks to establish a new 
social synthesis, a repositioned social reality that goes beyond today's hegemonic 
emplacement of society. However, as has hopefully become clear by now, such a 
synthesis can itself never be final, which is to say that the repositioning project - 
as indeed the positioning project - must be understood as an impossibility. 
Such an understanding is based on the notion that the dialectical process does not 
automatically produce `progress' or a `higher stage of development', as is 
sometimes assumed. According to Benjamin, dialectics should be seen to produce 
a `non-synthesis'; or, as Adorno would have it, dialectics is `negative' as it 
continuously fails to complete itself. Such notions see the dialectical process as 
always resulting in failure; the failure to produce a final synthesis. As 2i2ek puts 
it. 
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It is a standard argument against Adorno's `negative dialectics' to reproach it for its 
inherent inconsistency; Adorno's answer is appropriate: stated as a definitive doctrine, as a 
result, `negative dialectics' effectively IS `inconsistent' - the way to grasp it correctly is to 
conceive of it as the description of a process of thought.... `Negative dialectics' designates 
a position which includes its own failure, i. e. which produces the truth-effect through its 
very failure. To put it succinctly: one tries to grasp/conceive the object of thought; one fails, 
missing it, and through these very failures the place of the targeted object is encircled, its 
contours become discernible. (2001 c: 87-88) 
In Lilek's view, the dialectical process will always result in failure. Yet, for him, 
it is the continuous failure of the synthesis to deliver a final answer which 
functions as the answer itself (1989: 177). That is, Lilek sees a kind of hope in the 
failure of the dialectical process to complete itself. This is the hope in the 
incompleteness of society, the hope that society can never be made transparent 
and history be ended. 
This, then, brings us to the `end' of this thesis, which set out to explore political 
possibilities of repositioning organisation theory. If there is a conclusion we can 
draw from this exploration, it is that there cannot be a conclusion. This is to say, 
there cannot be a final answer to the question of how to position and organise `the 
social'. As I have highlighted throughout the thesis, society must be understood as 
an impossibility. It is, however, precisely this notion of impossibility that opens 
up possibilities of political intervention and resistance that might be able to 
reposition and reorganise society. This thesis has, perhaps, failed to give any 
definite answers. What I have tried to suggest, however, is that it is precisely this 
failure which can be seen as a hope in a different organisation of society. This 
hope must be enacted. It does not materialise automatically. This is what 
Benjamin's book of quotations, his Arcades Project, makes so vividly clear: one 
must read and one must also try "to read what was never written" (BGS 1.3,1238). 
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The montage of the Arcades Project invites us to read and reread, again and again. 
While this might be an infinite process, what, according to Benjamin, is important 
are the temporary illuminations, the events and passages, that are produced by 
these acts of reading. I hope that this thesis has been able to illuminate its readers 
to some extent - however temporary, marginal and `minor' such illuminations 
might have been. 
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